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As Canada’s capital, the City of Ottawa has benefited from several comprehensive land use 
planning exercises since the early 1900s.  Early plans carried out by the federal 
government were led by Prime Ministers who, in wanting to beautify the region, initiated 
long range plans that spanned both sides of the Ottawa River, providing land use goals and 
guidance for what are today the cities of Ottawa and Gatineau.  The planning context 
changed through the 1970s, however.  The federal government played a lesser role in land 
use planning as regional and area municipal governments grew and an expanding 
technically trained staff developed local plans.  It was in the absence of a strong regional 
plan aimed at controlling outward expansion that there was rapid growth of low density 
suburban communities outside of the National Capital Commission greenbelt.   
 
Today, planning policy in Ottawa recognizes the environmental, social, and economic 
benefits of compact development and encourages by, in part, directing growth to the 
existing built-up area.  Unfortunately, residential intensification efforts in the City have 
been disappointing.  While the City has developed a variety of policies and programs to 
encourage and support residential intensification, it appears site level constraints have 
prohibited it to occur in a significant way.   
 
This research is concerned with identifying weaknesses in the City of Ottawa’s current 
growth management strategy.  The purpose of this research is to provide recommendations 
that can be used to strengthen Ottawa’s growth management policies and programs to more 
effectively achieve the compact urban form desired by the municipality.  
 
The findings demonstrate that there is some level of disconnect between what recent 
literature and key informant interviews identify as the barriers to residential intensification 
at the site level and the motherhood principles for compact development at the municipal 
level.  More specifically, barriers can be summarized as community and political 
resistance, regulatory challenges, and policy vs. market realities.  It is recommended that 
the City of Ottawa adopt a strengthened strategy that establishes achievable growth and 
intensification targets; encourages community support for compact development; considers 
growth over the longer term and with a regional perspective; and is advocated by strong 
leaders.  Only in this way can the City create an improved strategy that will, like earlier 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
As Canada’s capital, the City of Ottawa has been subject to a series of comprehensive 
planning processes since the early 1900s.  Early plans were encouraged by Prime Ministers 
and carried out by federal planning bodies.  These long range regional plans included growth 
projections and guided urban and rural land uses in both Ottawa and Hull.  While not all of 
the elements of each plan came to fruition, their legacies are apparent in Ottawa today, 
particularly in its many parks, boulevards, employment campuses, transportation routes, and, 
most notably, the National Capital Commission (NCC) greenbelt. 
 
The last regional land use plan for the capital was prepared by Jacques Gréber in 1950.  Over 
the following twenty years, the NCC, a federal body responsible for the planning of federal 
lands, used expropriation powers, land ownership, and infrastructure budget to implement the 
Plan.  During the 1970s, however, federal proposals were met with increasing criticism from 
progressively more sophisticated local and regional planning authorities and a growing 
number of community advocacy groups.  At the same time, the population in the national 
capital area grew at a much faster rate than projected due to the post-war baby boom and rapid 
government expansion.  Local and regional planning authorities could not plan for growth fast 
enough.  The result was rapid development of low-density suburban municipalities outside of 
the NCC greenbelt.  
 
Today, these suburban centres form part of the new City of Ottawa.  The City was created in 
2000 with the amalgamation of eleven former Region of Ottawa-Carleton local 
municipalities.  The City of Ottawa is growing and is set to experience significant population, 
employment and household growth over the next two decades.  The City’s 2003 Official Plan 
presents a contemporary approach to accommodating this future growth.  Through policy, it 
encourages higher density, mixed use development in an effort to make efficient use of 
infrastructure, to support alternative modes of transportation and transit initiatives, and to 
maintain the city’s environmental integrity.  The City has adopted what they see as a 
comprehensive growth management strategy that is based on Smart Growth principles for the 
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purpose of improving the quality of life of residents by enhancing liveability, improving 
economic health, and ensuring environmental sustainability.   
 
The policies and programs that form Ottawa’s growth management strategy encourage 
compact development by, among other things, promoting and supporting the implementation 
of residential intensification projects in the built-up urban area.  Recent development trend 
data, however, suggest that infill and redevelopment projects are not occurring in a significant 
way and the degree to which intensification of the built-up area can accommodate future 
household growth is debatable.  It is apparent that while motherhood growth management 
objectives promoting a compact urban form are accepted at the municipal level, the 
implementation of intensification projects in already developed areas is constrained at the site 
level.  The apparent disconnect between the strategy to encourage compact development and 
limitations to the implementation of intensification projects has implications for the City’s 
ability to achieve municipal-wide goals for a compact urban form.   
 
The key question motivating this research is:  How can the City of Ottawa’s growth 
management strategy be strengthened to better support residential intensification in order to 
achieve the compact urban form promoted in the Official Plan?  This research is timely 
considering the municipality will be embarking on its mandatory 5-year Official Plan review 
in 2008.  The City has already begun assessing recent development trends and met with 
stakeholders to outline the review process.  Using the findings from recent literature and key 
informant interviews, this thesis identifies weaknesses in Ottawa’s current growth 
management policies and programs.  It concludes with recommendations for a strengthened 
strategy that more effectively supports compact development through the promotion of 
residential intensification. 
 
A qualitative method was used to carry out this case study.  The research involved a review of 
academic literature; a review of City of Ottawa planning documents, including Official Plan 
policies and staff reports; and, key informant interviews with City and National Capital 
Commission planning staff, representatives from the development industry, private 
consultants, and local citizen groups.  During this research the policies and programs that 
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make up Ottawa’s growth management strategy were defined and strengths and weaknesses 
of each initiative were identified.  This provided a base on which to develop recommendations 
that should be implemented to better support residential intensification efforts in the City in 
order to achieve the Official Plan vision for a more compact urban form. 
 
This thesis is organized into seven Chapters.  Chapter 2 provides a chronology of Ottawa’s 
urban plans and identifies the challenges currently facing the municipality as it embarks on its 
5-year Official Plan review.  Chapter 3 presents a review the academic literature to 
demonstrate the benefits of compact development, to discuss planning movements that 
addressed the issues of shaping growth patterns, and to identify policies and programs that can 
together encourage and support intensification.  Chapter 4 provides details on the research 
methodology, including the research purpose and objectives, justification for a case study 
approach and the qualitative method, and the weaknesses and strengths of both.  Chapter 5 
relates the literature to the City of Ottawa context.  It provides a review of City of Ottawa 
growth management policies and programs and presents the findings of key informant 
interviews.  A discussion of the findings and important recommendations are presented in 
Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 restates the research objectives and findings from previous chapters and 
identifies opportunities for further research. 
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Over the last 150 years, Ottawa has evolved from a small, remote, and dirty industrial town to 
one of Canada’s most beautiful cities.  Ottawa was an unlikely choice for the seat of Canada’s 
government in 1857.  At that time it housed the largest woods-based industry in the world and 
had a population of just over 10,000 people (Taylor, 1989).  Most politicians and civil 
servants were unhappy with Queen Victoria’s choice of locations for the capital city, as 
existing buildings near parliament hill lacked architectural design and the city had no utilities, 
no paved streets, no sewers, no gaslights, and no piped water supply – services that were 
common in other major cities at the time (Taylor, 1989).  The natural beauty of Ottawa was 
diminished by the dominant lumber and pulp industries which damned Chaudière Falls for 
power and used the banks of the Ottawa River as piling grounds.  Still, Queen Victoria 
believed that Ottawa was the best choice because of its relative location – in Upper Canada 
but directly adjacent to Lower Canada – and because other potential cities were in constant 
competition with one another (Taylor, 1989).   
 
Efforts to improve the capital city did not begin until the end of the century, over three 
decades after the parliament buildings were constructed.  Early planning efforts were led by 
Prime Ministers who created commissions mandated to improve the image of the capital city.  
The first plans for Ottawa focused on greening the urban area through the creation of parks 
and parkways.  Over time, plans became more sophisticated and were concerned with the 
location and relationship of land uses, the movement of goods and people, and the 
consideration of longer-term growth. 
 
Today, planning in the City of Ottawa is carried out by the National Capital Commission, 
which is responsible for the planning of federal lands, and the municipality (under the 
direction of the Province), which is responsible for privately and municipally held lands.  The 
City’s Official Plan presents a vision for development to 2021, a vision that emphasizes a 
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2.2.1 Ottawa Improvement Commission’s Preliminary Report 
 
Politicians spent little time in Ottawa in its early years as a capital.  Legislators typically 
stayed in hotels and left as soon as parliamentary sessions ended because they did not enjoy 
residing in, “one of the roughest, booziest least law-abiding towns in North America” 
(Gordon, 2001, p. 9).  Ottawa’s local economy at the time was focused exclusively on one 
industry – lumber – not government.   
 
An effort to improve the nation’s capital did not begin until the end of the 19th century.  In 
1893 Wilfred Laurier was the new leader of the Opposition and, recognizing the importance 
of creating a beautiful capital, made it his personal quest to improve the city.  He declared that 
he would transform Ottawa into “Washington of the North” if he were elected Prime Minister.   
 
I consequently keep a green spot in my heart for the city of Ottawa, and when the day 
comes, as it will come by and by, it shall be my pleasure and that of my colleagues I 
am sure to make the city of Ottawa as attractive as possibly could be; to make it the 
centre of the intellectual development of this country and above all the Washington of 
the North. 
 
 Source: Gordon, 2001, p. 10 
 
When Laurier was elected Prime Minister three years later he stood by his promise to improve 
the city and in 1898 established the Ottawa Improvement Commission (OIC) (Gordon, 
2001).  While it had no legislative mandate or authority over local government, the 
commission’s agenda was to improve and beautify Ottawa and the area around it by acquiring 
land, maintaining and improving parks, squares and boulevards, and constructing buildings 
(Gordon, 2001). 
 
Laurier took personal interest in the work of the OIC, which was credited with clearing the 
west bank of the Rideau Canal, building a parkway, building two bridges across the Rideau 
and generally beautifying Ottawa through the creation and maintenance of parks  (Gordon, 
2001).  Soon the OIC decided they would benefit from a general plan that would identify all 
of the improvements envisioned for the capital.  In 1903 the OIC sought the advice of 
landscape architect Fredrick G. Todd, Canada’s first resident landscape architect (Gordon, 
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2001).  Within six weeks of being retained by the OIC, Todd completed a report that 
identified a preliminary plan for a regional parks system linked by parkways and boulevards.  
Todd’s plan looked as far as one hundred years into the future and considered the region as a 
whole, proposing improvements in both Ottawa and Hull.  As demonstrated in Figure 2.2, 
Todd’s Preliminary Report recommended both large and small-scale improvements, from 
playgrounds, to suburban parks, to large natural parks.  One of his important 
recommendations to the OIC was that they acquire thousands of acres of woods and retain 




Source: Gordon, 2002a 
Figure 2.2: Parks and Pathways Proposed in Todd’s Preliminary Report, 1903 
 
At first, the Preliminary Report was well received by the OIC and it appeared that Todd 
would be retained to design Ottawa’s parks system.  Disputes, however, occurred over his 
high fees and the printing costs of the report.  It was the OIC’s opinion that they had sufficient 
design knowledge and construction supervision on staff and did not require his assistance to 
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carry out park development.  The OIC declined to retain Todd as a regular consultant and 
instead designed and constructed their own projects (Gordon, 2002a).  
 
Despite the OIC’s poor treatment of Todd and his work, his parks proposals were 
incorporated into subsequent plans for the region and many of his recommendations were 
eventually implemented.  Jacques Gréber’s 1950 Plan for the National Capital in fact 
criticized the actions of the OIC and recognized the importance of Todd’s long-range 
planning approach (Gordon, 2002a). 
 
2.2.2 Report of the Federal Plan Commission on a General Plan for the Cities 
of Ottawa and Hull (The Holt Commission Plan) 
 
In the years following Todd’s 1903 Preliminary Report the OIC made incremental additions 
to Ottawa’s parks and driveways (Gordon, 2001).  It was recognized, however, that a 
comprehensive plan was still required to guide the city’s development.  The OIC advocated 
that the new plan for Ottawa should be prepared by a commission of technical experts – 
Commission for Ottawa Beautification – and should be modeled on the successful 1902 
McMillan Commission plan for Washington (which had previously been rejected by Todd) 
(Gordon, 2002a).  Then Prime Minister Robert Borden, however, was concerned about 
establishing a commission of independent expert professionals who were not under his direct 
political control (Gordon, 1998).    Ultimately, Borden decided to create a new planning 
commission in 1913.  The Federal Plan Commission (FPC) was composed of a group of 
conservative businessmen and chaired by Herbert Holt, the president of the Royal Bank.  The 
mayors of Ottawa and Hull were also appointed (Gordon, 2001).  The FPC was to, 
 
… draw up and perfect a comprehensive scheme or plan looking to the future 
growth and development of the City of Ottawa and the City of Hull, and their 
environs, and particularly providing for the locations, laying out and 
beautification of parks and connecting boulevards, the location and architectural 
character of public buildings and adequate and convenient arrangements for 
traffic and transportation within the area in question. 
 
Source: Federal Plan Commission 1915 from Gordon, 1998, p. 277 
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The Commission chose Chicago architect Edward Bennett to be the chief consulting architect 
and planner.  Bennett was one of the foremost American planners at the time and a leading 
proponent of the City Beautiful movement (Gordon, 1998).  Work began immediately and 
between 1913 and 1914 Bennett and his team of engineers and draftsmen prepared surveys 
and completed detailed technical analyses of Ottawa.  The Report of the Federal Plan 
Commission on a General Plan for the Cities of Ottawa and Hull was completed in 1915.  
Like Todd, Bennett took a regional approach to planning, including both Ottawa and Hull in 
the plans, and planned for growth over the long-term.  For example, the 1915 plan projected 
that Ottawa’s population would be 250,000 by 1950.  Recognizing the importance of 
reserving park land for an even larger population, Bennett’s 1915 plan provided parks for a 
city of 350,000 people (Gordon, 2002a).  Some of the parks Bennett proposed were similar to 
those presented by Todd in 1903, including a large forest reserve in the Gatineau Hills, though 
the authors failed to credit Todd with the idea (Gordon, 2002a). 
 
Bennett’s plan was arguably Canada’s first comprehensive plan (Gordon, 1998). It included 
technical analyses of land uses, population projections, population densities, and railway and 
streetcar traffic and included urban design requirements, zoning, parks, and a government 
building analysis (Gordon, 1998 and 2002a).  As demonstrated in Figure 2.3, the plan 
proposed that urban development in Ottawa and Hull take a circular form with businesses in 
the centre, warehouses and high density residential uses adjacent to the CBD and along the 
transport lines radiating from the centre, and lower density residential spreading beyond that.  
It also recognized that to efficiently accommodate the expected population growth over the 
coming forty to fifty years, it would be necessary to redevelop existing uses as well as expand 
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Source: Gordon, 1998 
Figure 2.3: Proposed Zoning for Ottawa-Hull 
 
Another important component of the plan was the recommendations, particularly the 
recommendation to establish a Federal District like that established for the District of 
Columbia in the United States. 
 
“We are of the firm opinion that the future improvements in the area about the 
Capital at Ottawa and Hull should not be attempted without first establishing a 
Federal district and securing for the Federal authority some control of local 
government.” 
 
Source: General Plan for the Cities of Ottawa and Hull, 1915 
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Despite the significant work carried out in preparing the Report of the Federal Plan 
Commission on a General Plan for the Cities of Ottawa and Hull, Bennett’s plan was 
effectively shelved for a number of reasons relating to timing, politics, leadership, and 
criticism to the planning movement.  The report was tabled in 1916, a month after the Centre 
Block of the Parliament Building burned down and at a time when the First World War being 
fought in Europe was going poorly for Canada.  This meant there was little press exposure 
about the plan and little capital available to implement it over the short term (Gordon, 1998).  
One of the reasons the Plan was not implemented over the longer term was because the 
proposition of a Federal district was vigorously opposed in the City of Hull, where the City 
was uninterested in giving up territory or sovereignty to a federal government body.  
Divisions between English and French participants was worsened by the fact that the FPC 
conducted meetings in English without an interpreter for the benefit of Hull’s French speaking 
mayor and the report was never translated into French (Gordon, 1998).  Another 
implementation constraint related to the fact that the entire Commission was composed of 
Conservatives.  The Commission was disbanded after the Plan was printed and when the 
Conservative government fell in 1921 to the Liberals, there was nobody to advocate for the 
Plan (Gordon, 2001).  Also, there was serious opposition to the City Beautiful movement at 
the time of the Plan’s tabling (Gordon, 2002a).  Opponents suggested that Bennett’s plan was 
impractical and argued in support, instead, for a City Scientific approach (Gordon, 2002a). 
 
2.2.3 The Plan for the National Capital (The Gréber Plan) 
 
The election of William Lyon Mackenzie King as Prime Minister in 1921 marked a new era 
in the national capital’s planning efforts (Gordon, 2001).  The new Prime Minister took 
control of the OIC and in 1927 reconstituted it as the Federal District Commission (FDC).  
It had expanded powers, a mandate to plan in both Ontario and Quebec, and an increased 
budget.  Between 1927 and 1935, the Commission was primarily concerned with planning a 
major public plaza southeast of Parliament Hill, Confederation Square.  At the time, Canadian 
designers could not unravel the mix of congested streets, bridges, streetcars and canal located 
adjacent to the downtown railway station, Ottawa City Hall, the main Post Office, and a large 
Hotel.  In 1936, Mackenzie King found the planner that he needed to design Confederation 
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Square when he was visiting Paris – the chief architect of the upcoming World’s Fair, Jacques 
Gréber.  Upon Mackenzie King’s invitation, Gréber visited Ottawa and quickly grasped the 
complexity of the infrastructure problems at Confederation Square and produced a series of 
designs that resolved them.  Gréber was then retained to prepare a plan for an expanded 
National Capital Region but plans were put on hold after the outbreak of the Second World 
War (Gordon, 2002b).   
 
In 1945, three days after Japan surrendered, Mackenzie King summoned Gréber from France 
and retained him to prepare a plan for the national capital with the intent, “that construction of 
a national capital for Canadians would be the principal memorial for those who fell during the 
Second World War,” (Gordon, 2002b, p. 111).  Mackenzie King then established the 
National Capital Planning Committee (NCPC), a committee headed by the Prime Minister 
that was independent of the FDC that had the mandate to prepare a regional land use plan for 
Ontario and Quebec, urban plans for Ottawa and Hull, a regional infrastructure plan, and an 
urban design plan for downtown Ottawa.  Gréber became the head of the National Capital 
Planning Service (NCPS), which had a team of architects, landscape architects, engineers, 
technicians and information officers and was considered to be the only full time professional 
planning organization in Canada at the time (Gordon, 2005).  Over the next five years, Gréber 
and his team prepared background studies and carried out public relations campaigns across 
the country to improve the perception of the nation’s capital and promote the new plan.   
 
Gréber tabled the Plan for the National Capital in 1950 which consisted of two Volumes: the 
General Report and the Atlas.  The plan included the following components: 
 
• Projected a doubling of the population from 1950 to 2000; 
• Relocation of rail roads and industries from the core to the suburbs; 
• Construction of cross-town boulevards and bridges; 
• Decentralization of some government offices to the inner suburbs; 
• Slum clearance and urban renewal of LeBreton Flats; 
• Establishment of a greenbelt around Ottawa and Hull’s urban areas; and, 
• Development of a wilderness park in the Gatineau hills and a parks system 
along canals and rivers. 
Source: Gordon, 2005 
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Source: National Capital Planning Service, 1950 
Figure 2.4: The Gréber Plan for the National Capital Region 
 
The Plan for the National Capital is arguably the most important Canadian plan of the mid-
twentieth century (Gordon, 2001).  Gréber used anticipated development densities to project 
that the capital’s population growth could be accommodated within the plan’s urban area, 
illustrated in Figure 2.4.  The plan defined four residential areas with decreasing densities 
from the core to the suburbs.  It also defined existing and future federal government 
campuses and commercial and industrial areas.  The plan’s Green Belt marked the limits of 
the urban area and was to be used to protect, “against all undesirable or linear subdivisions or 
developments” (National Capital Planning Service, 1950, p. 191).  The land within the belt 
was to be used solely for agricultural purposes.  Beyond its boundary, the plan permitted 
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“new cities” in the rural area to act as satellites to the capital, accommodating about 20,000 to 
25,000 people each.  
 
Gréber’s 1950 plan was implemented slowly at first, impeded by weak provincial legislation 
and a lack of consensus amongst local governments (Gordon, 2001).  Following a Senate-
Parliamentary enquiry in 1956, it was determined that the federal government would have to 
implement the plan alone.  The National Capital Commission (NCC) was created from the 
FDC in 1959 and absorbed the NCPC and NCPS.  The NCC used its expropriation powers, 
land ownership, and infrastructure budget to implement the Gréber Plan.    
 
By the 1970s, many of the Gréber Plan elements were implemented, including the 
decentralization of government offices to inner suburb campuses, the establishment of the 
greenbelt in Ontario, expansion of Gatineau Park in Quebec, the construction of new suburban 
railway lines and yards, and the development of the cross-town expressway, the Queensway 
(Gordon, 2005; NCC, 2006).  However, over 50 years after their initial proposal, some of the 
elements of the Gréber Plan are only now being realized, including the redevelopment of 
LeBreton Flats and the NCC’s Confederation Boulevard initiative to improve streetscapes on 
major streets and boulevards (Gordon, 2005).  Some elements did not come to fruition due to 
local opposition, such as a greenbelt in Quebec and a Federal district. 
 
2.2.4 National Capital Commissions’ Plans 
 
One of the most significant shortcomings of the 1950 Plan for the National Capital was 
erroneous population projections.  The growth anticipated over the 50 year planning period 
was reached in half that time due to the post-war baby boom and rapid government expansion 
(Gordon, 2001).  While the land within the greenbelt was sufficient to accommodate the 
Plan’s projected population of 500,000, growth after the 1970s increasingly located outside 
the greenbelt.  The urban planning context had changed dramatically by this point, with local 
and regional planning authorities in both Ontario and Quebec developing their own urban 
plans with ever increasing technical staff.  The NCC’s proposals were faced with increasing 
criticism from both local planning bodies and an increasing number of community groups 
   
  
   15
who were increasingly involved due to the emerging citizen participation planning process 
(Gordon, 2001).   
 
Over the following years the NCC produced a number of documents to guide planning in the 
National Capital Region, including the Federal Land Use Plan in 1988 and the Plan for 
Canada’s Capital in 1999.  These plans differed from those of previous federal planning 
bodies in that they were concerned exclusively with the existing and future use of federally-
owned land in the National Capital Region.  Today, the latter of the two documents sets out 
the goals and policies for federally owned land and is supported by a hierarchy of other plans, 
specifically Master Plans, Sector Plans, and Area Plans.  The National Capital Region 2050 
Concept is provided in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Source: National Capital Commission, 1999 
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2.2.5 Summary of Federal Government Plans 
 
Ottawa has been subject to numerous comprehensive planning efforts over the past 150 years 
which incorporated elements of nearly every planning movement (Taylor, 1989).  While not 
all of the plans have come to fruition, each subsequent plan has included elements of previous 
work.  Important similarities exist amongst Ottawa’s federal government-led plans: 
 
• Early plans were driven by Prime Ministers who had a personal interest in 
beautifying the city for the benefit of the country; 
• Plans applied to both the Ontario and Quebec sides of the Ottawa river; and, 
• Plans considered growth over the longer term, 50 to 100 years out. 
 
Also similar amongst the early plans were challenges to implementation.  The Federal 
District recommendation was never seriously considered because of territory and sovereignty 
concerns, particularly on the Quebec side of the Ottawa River.  The evolution of planning 
movements, particularly reaction to the City Beautiful movement, also impacted the success 
of Ottawa’s early plans.  
 
Despite these challenges, there are obvious signs of the successes of federal-government led 
plans in Ottawa today, particularly in its many parks, boulevards, employment campuses, 
and, most notably, the NCC greenbelt.  The greenbelt was implemented as a land use control 
in the tradition of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City model and the NCC successfully 
expropriated land to create a distinct green area around the City that is generally accepted by 
everyone today as a protected area.  
 
2.3 Today’s Plans 
 
The Gréber Plan was the last of the federal government plans for the National Capital Region 
that defined long-range growth projections, identified land uses, and established development 
controls.  In the absence of a strong regional plan aimed at controlling outward expansion, 
there was rapid growth of low density suburban communities outside of the NCC greenbelt 
after the 1970s.   
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This section discusses provincial and municipal planning policies that are currently in place to 
guide growth in the City of Ottawa and contrasts policy directions with actual development 
trends. 
 
2.3.1 Provincial Planning Policy Context 
 
In Canada, municipalities are, “wholly a creature of the provincial legislature … it derives all 
powers from statute,” (Makuch, 1983, p. 81).  As such, municipalities may only assume 
powers that are conferred on them by the province and are subject to provincial provisions on 
all planning matters.  The Ontario Planning Act, 1990, defines the roles of municipalities and 
the province and includes provisions that ensure that the province is the ultimate decision 
maker in planning matters.  For example, it is responsible for approving all new Official Plans 
and administering the Ontario Municipal Board.   
 
Some of the province’s planning requirements are presented in the 2005 Provincial Policy 
Statement (PPS), a document that provides policy direction on matters of Provincial interest 
related to land use planning and development (MAH, 2007).  The underlying principles of the 
PPS relate to the province’s long-term economic prosperity, environmental health, and social 
well-being.  These depend on efficient land use and development patterns which support 
healthy communities while protecting the environment and public health and safety and 
facilitating economic growth (MAH, 2005).   
 
A main goal of the PPS is to direct urban growth to built-up areas, where possible, to achieve 
a more compact urban form.  Policies encourage higher density, mixed use development to 
make efficient use of infrastructure, to support alternative modes of transportation and transit 
initiatives, and to maintain environmental integrity.  To accomplish this, infill and 
redevelopment are encouraged in existing built-up areas and greenfield development is 
confined to land designated for future development.  These policies are to be complemented 
by local land use planning which is carried out by regional and municipal planning bodies 
(MAH, 2005). 
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2.3.2 Local Planning Policy Context 
 
The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton was created in 1968 with the amalgamation of 
the former Carleton County and Cumberland Township (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-
Carleton, 1997).  Over the next thirty years its geographic extent grew and political 
boundaries shifted so that by 1999 it included eleven local municipalities.  In 2000, these 
municipalities were amalgamated to create the new City of Ottawa, shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a 
Figure 2.6: City of Ottawa’s Municipal Boundaries 
 
Prior to amalgamation, the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton had established 
policies to encourage a more compact urban form.  In the years that followed amalgamation, 
City planners, engineers, and economic development officers worked to prepare a 20-year 
plan for Ottawa that built upon and strengthened policies for compact development.   
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The current Official Plan was adopted by Council in 2003 and provides a broad approach to 
shaping and accommodating future growth in the municipality.  The policies are consistent 
with those established by the province in the PPS and reflect contemporary planning 
principals of Smart Growth.  It incorporates goals for managing growth, providing 
infrastructure, maintaining environmental integrity, and creating liveable communities.  
Growth has been expressed as targets for population, housing, and employment Inside the 
NCC Greenbelt, within three suburban communities, and rural areas.  The spatial extent of the 
suburban areas is demonstrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a 
Figure 2.7: City of Ottawa’s Urban Area  
 
Official Plan policies support compact development by managing growth in two ways: it 
encourages residential infill and redevelopment in the existing built-up area; and, greenfield 
development is confined to land within an urban boundary.  Intensification, promoting better 
use of existing urban infrastructure, and minimizing the rate of consumption of greenfields are 
important goals for Ottawa.   
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A review of development policies in the 1994 and 1997 Regional Official Plans indicates that 
the City of Ottawa’s 2003 Official Plan contains similar provisions to its predecessors with 
respect to encouraging infill and redevelopment.  Table 2.1 presents a comparison of policies 
pertaining to residential infill and redevelopment in the 1994, 1997, and 2003 Official Plans. 
 
Table 2.1: Official Plan Policies Regarding Infill and Redevelopment, 1994 to 2003 






City of Ottawa 
2003 
Infill  Encouraged 
Encouraged with an 
emphasis on conversion of 
non-residential buildings 
and intensification Inside the 
Greenbelt 
As 1994 but also encourages 
redevelopment of older 
commercial sites and does 
not permit the downzoning 






Permitted within Primary 
and Secondary Employment 
Areas 
Permitted within Primary 
and Secondary Employment 
Areas and Town Centres 
50% of Enterprise Areas 
may develop for residential 
Transitway 
In Orleans, high density 
residential permitted within 
400 metres 
High density residential 
permitted at all transitways 
Mixed land uses permitted 
within 600 metres of 
transitways 
Mixed Use Encouraged where local zoning permits 
Mix of residential and non-
residential development 
permitted on Mainstreets 
and Regional Roads with 
transit. 
Mixed use buildings 
permitted along both 
Mainstreets. 
Housing Forms 
One third of new housing 
must be medium or high 
density 
One third of new housing 
must be medium or high 
density and apartments are 
permitted in most residential 
areas 
Minimum density of 29 
units per hectare set for 
Developing Communities 
and 40% of homes to be 
medium or high density 
Urban Boundary Expansion 
Must meet Official Plan 
policies and demonstrate 
requirement for land 
Must meet Official Plan 
policies and demonstrate 
requirement for land 
Must meet Official Plan 
policies and demonstrate 
requirement for land, will 
only be assessed during the 
five-year Official Plan 
review process 
Source: Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, 1994 and 1997; City of Ottawa, 2003a 
 
Policies in the former Regional Official Plans and those in the current City Official Plan have 
been consistent in permitting residential development in well-serviced locations as well as 
permitting mixed use development along arterial roads.  Additional policies have been added 
in the most recent Official Plan, however, to help facilitate compact, mixed development.  
Specifically, the 2003 Official Plan includes policies that state the City will: 
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• Investigate financial incentives for residential development within mixed use 
projects; 
• Review use of municipal land to facilitate compact and mixed use development; 
• Consider how to reduce the amount of land used for parking; 
• Partner with others in building commercial and residential development over 
transit stations, municipal parking structures, and municipal offices and facilities; 
and, 
• Negotiate an increase in building density in exchange for developing municipal 
facilities, transit stations, and public cultural facilities. 
 
Source: City of Ottawa, 2003a 
 
Despite the fact that favourable policies encouraging intensification and the creation of a 
compact mixed use form of development were in place since at least the mid-1990s, 
significant amounts of such development has not occurred. 
 
2.4 Recent Growth and Development Trends 
 
Over the course of the past decade, Ottawa has experienced rapid urban growth.  This can be 
credited to the shift in the City’s economy from one based on primarily federal government 
employment to one that includes a significant number of private sector jobs.  After Ottawa’s 
unemployment rates peaked in 1995, a result of federal government cutbacks and layoffs, the 
local economy rebounded due to the influence of the advanced technology sector (City of 
Ottawa, 2003b).  Rapid growth in this industry resulted in unprecedented population, housing 









   
  
   22
Population Housing Starts 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007; CMHC, 2006 
Figure 2.8: Population Growth and Housing Development Trends, 1991 to 2006 
 
Historically, Ottawa’s homebuyers have preferred single detached or townhouse units, a built 
form that has made up the vast majority of housing starts in the City over the past ten years.  
These trends are shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Source: CMHC, 2006 
                   Figure 2.9: Housing Starts by Type, 1997 to 2006 
 
Despite policies encouraging a compact urban form and support for intensification, recent 
housing start data indicates that between 2001 and 2006 about three-quarters of the City’s 
housing starts were located outside of the urban boundary in its three suburban centres (see 
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Source: City of Ottawa, 2007a 
                       Figure 2.10: Location of Housing Starts in the City of Ottawa 
 
Development trends demonstrate that the bulk of Ottawa’s vacant urban land development in 
the past ten years has occurred outside the greenbelt, primarily in the West Urban Centre.  
Demand for residential land was influenced by the supply of serviced land, the number of 
builders and sites, the range of housing products, the desirability of community infrastructure, 
and proximity to work.  By comparison, federal government and high tech employment 
growth drove the demand for employment land Inside the Greenbelt and in the West Urban 
Centre.  Figure 2.11 demonstrates the proportion of vacant land consumed for residential and 
employment development in Ottawa’s four urban areas. 
 
          Residential Employment 
 
Source: City of Ottawa, 2002a; City of Ottawa, 2003c, City of Ottawa, 2006a; City of Ottawa 2006b 
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While Ottawa has supported a compact urban form for years, it has not seen a significant 
amount of intensification occur in locations where higher density development is encouraged.  
Since 1998, a City of Ottawa monitoring program has tracked the number of new residential 
building permits issued for land targeted for intensification, namely land in the Central Area, 
along Mainstreets, in Mixed Use Centres and suburban Town Centres, in the Vicinity of 
Rapid Transit Stations (600m); and in Enterprise Areas (see map presented in Figure 5.4).    
Since 1998 and 2006, between 10% and 20% of new residential units have been built on land 
targeted for intensification annually.  As shown in Figure 2.12, over the nine years of 
monitoring, an average of 15% of new residential construction has been in intensification 
target areas.  
 
 
Source: City of Ottawa, 2005a and 2007a 
Figure 2.12: Proportion of Residential Units Built in Intensification 
Target Areas, 1998 to 2006 
 
 
While the City of Ottawa does not have an intensification target, one planning document 
suggested that the City should aim for a 40% intensification rate in the built-up urban area 
(City of Ottawa, 2006a).  The report, however, did not define either the “built-up area” or 
“intensification”, making it impossible to compare infill and redevelopment trends in 














Intensification Units 9 Year Average
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It should be recognized that over-optimistic assumptions about the amount of housing demand 
that can be satisfied through infill and redevelopment projects could lead to unrealistic unit 
supply counts, which has implications on the amount of vacant residential land set aside in the 
urban area when residential supply and demand analyses are carried out.  Erroneous unit 
supply and demand estimates can lead to a constrained land supply, higher land values, and 
the out-migration of residents to neighbouring municipalities that have lower housing costs 
and weaker growth management strategies.  These trends are currently being realized in 
Ottawa today.  
 
The City of Ottawa is located in the Greater Ottawa-Gatineau Metropolitan Area, a region that 
includes municipalities that are either adjacent to Ottawa or Gatineau and/or have a high 
percentage of their employed labour force working in one of the two cities (City of Ottawa, 
2007a).  The geographic extent of this area is illustrated in Figure 2.13. 
 
 
Recent growth trends in the larger 
region provide an indication of 
how well Ottawa’s growth 
management strategies are 
working to contain growth and 
encourage a compact urban form 
and how well they correspond to 
those strategies in neighbouring 
municipalities.  Recent growth, 
migration, and commuting trends 
indicate that Ottawa’s policies do 




Figure 2.13: Greater Ottawa-Gatineau Area 
Source: City of Ottawa, 2007a 
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Since 2000, Ottawa has experienced a net loss of residents moving between the City and 
surrounding municipalities.  Between 2004 and 2005, just over half (52%) of the residents 
who moved from Ottawa to other Canadian cities moved to Gatineau or surrounding 
municipalities (City of Ottawa, 2007a).  The City has attributed this phenomenon to improved 
road access and the increased cost of housing in the City (City of Ottawa, 2005a).  Migration 
trends are demonstrated in Figure 2.14. 
 
 
 Source: City of Ottawa, 2005a and 2007 
Figure 2.14: Migration Trends in Ottawa and Surrounding Municipalities 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.15, the high proportion of in-bound commuters in 2001 from adjacent 
municipalities reflects the fact that residential growth in those communities is linked to job 
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Figure 2.15: Surrounding Municipalities’ Employed Labour Force  
Working in Ottawa, 2001 
 
While Ottawa’s population has been growing, adjacent municipalities have experienced 
significant growth as well.  In fact, 1996 to 2006 census data demonstrate that Quebec 
municipalities grew at a faster rate than the City of Ottawa over the 2001 to 2006 period.  This 
is demonstrated in Figure 2.16. 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 
Figure 2.16: Population Growth, 1996 to 2006 
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The leapfrogging of urban development to surrounding municipalities represents a lost 
opportunity for Ottawa to increase transit ridership and to reduce environmental impacts from 
automobile use.  In-bound workers place stress on the city’s infrastructure and services but do 
not contribute to development charge and property tax revenue. 
 
Recent development trends demonstrate that there is some disconnect in the City of Ottawa 
between municipal-wide objectives for compact development and the actual implementation 
of intensification projects on the ground.  While the City has developed a variety of policies 
and programs to encourage and support residential intensification, it appears site level 
constraints have prohibited it to occur in a significant way.  The implication of these trends is 
that the municipality will find it increasingly difficult to achieve its objectives for compact 




Early planning efforts in Ottawa were encouraged and endorsed by Prime Ministers who 
made it their quest to beautify the capital.  They retained renowned professionals to prepare 
plans that were some of the most comprehensive and sophisticated documents of their day.   
In contrast, urban planning in Canada’s capital region since the 1970s has been carried out 
primarily by local and regional municipalities that prepare forecasts and land uses exclusively 
for their own jurisdictions.  These urban plans have shorter time frames than historic plans 
and deal exclusively with growth projected within a particular local or regional municipality.  
The City of Ottawa has adopted an Official Plan that promotes compact development and 
encourages it primarily through the intensification of residential land uses.  Recent 
development trends, however, demonstrate that there are weaknesses in the City’s current 
strategy, which has implications for achieving its vision for a more compact urban form.  
There is an opportunity now, as Ottawa embarks on its 5-year Official Plan review, to create a 
growth management strategy that evokes the same pride as historic planning efforts and 
guides the City boldly into the 21st century. 
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The City of Ottawa’s vision for a more compact urban form reflects current trends in urban 
planning.  This Chapter provides a review of the traditional approach for accommodating 
growth and identifies environmental, social, and economic costs of sprawling development.   
Planning movements in North America are traced from the 1960s to demonstrate how 
planning approaches have evolved to encourage a more compact urban form.  The strengths 
and weaknesses of policies and programs that are intended to support residential 
intensification efforts are discussed.  The Chapter concludes with a review of the challenges 
to implementing intensification projects at the site level. 
 
3.2 Urban Dispersion 
 
There are two important reasons why urban growth is important for residents and municipal 
governments: economic benefits and social improvements.  Growth means expansion of the 
municipal tax base, which is important for local governments who derive the majority of their 
funding from property and sales taxes.  With the continued downloading of fiscal 
responsibilities from the provincial government, local municipalities are increasingly left to 
fund physical and social infrastructure projects.  In the interest of attracting new investment, 
municipalities compete for new jobs and businesses by promoting themselves as growth 
centres (Boyle, et al., 2004).  Local governments offer incentives in an effort to encourage 
new business development, ultimately lowering the costs for businesses in an effort to get a 
larger property and sales tax base.  Growing communities benefit by attracting a more 
specialized service sector, broadened cultural diversity, and established social programs.   
 
The physical manifestation of urban growth is important because urban planning and urban 
policies must together address transportation, land use, economic development, and public 
service provisions (Ding and Bingham, 2000).  Historically, the shape and distribution of 
urban areas was limited by transportation and communication technologies (Gordon and 
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Richardson, 1997).  Today, technological advances have contributed to, among other things, a 
more dispersed urban form whereby more people live and work in the suburbs than in the core 
area (Robinson, et al., 2005).  The location, form, and spatial extent of urban growth has 
direct implications on the efficient provision of public services, the assurance of social equity 
amongst different races and classes, the overall achievement of sustainable development, and 
the protection of sensitive areas.   
 
Urban sprawl is a derogatory term often used to describe expansive, sometimes poorly 
planned, development of a suburban area.  It was historically used to describe the 
predominantly commercial ribbon development that emerged adjacent to highways (Gordon 
and Richardson, 1997).  The term now implies a number of characteristics of a built area 
including low-density development, distinct specialization of land uses with little mixing, and 
locations near the fringe of an urban area with all land uses served primarily by private 
automobile (Filion, 2003; Miller and Hoel, 2002; Pucher, 1998; Sewell, 2003).   
 
While numerous factors have been cited for causing urban dispersion, the literature points 
heavily to the influence of transportation improvements: 
 
• 1880s – Electric-powered street railroads made it possible for those working in the 
city centre to live on the periphery of the city and commute easily to their jobs 
(Fishcel, 2004).   
• 1920s and 1930s – The private automobile gained popularity and residential 
neighbourhoods were built on the vacant land between streetcar corridors.  Suburban 
residents became increasingly dependent on private vehicles because of the low-
density nature of their communities and the dispersed and segregated land uses 
(Muller, 1995).  Trucking meant that industry was no longer dependent on locating 
near downtown railroad stations and docks and jobs moved out to suburban 
“industrial parks” where land was cheaper (Fishcel, 2004).  The dispersion of 
employment areas meant that workers did not need to go to the Central Business 
District for employment but required vehicles to get to suburban jobs.  Similarly, 
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commercial development began to slowly decentralize, with commercial strip 
development occurring adjacent to major roads (Muller, 1995).   
• 1940s and 1950s – In the United States, a series of federal initiatives promoted the 
development of interstate highways.  City plans at this time were dominated by car 
dependent scenarios and failed to integrate other modes of transportation, such as 
mass transit, with the highway system (Ellis, 2001).  The major land-use impacts of 
freeway construction were the massive expansion of urban growth into exurbia and 
the reduced reliance on the Central Business District.  Highway systems reduced the 
competitive locational advantage of the central area because all areas along the road 
network could be reached easily by car, thus leading to an acceleration of non-
residential decentralization (Muller, 1995).  The decentralization of employment 
meant workers could access places of employment via high-speed freeways, thereby 
expanding their residential location choices (Fishcel, 2004).   
 
In addition to transportation improvements, infrastructure investment as a whole, by both the 
private and public sector, has led to a decrease in urban densities over time.  In the 1800s, 
private companies built transportation and other infrastructure as a means to encourage home 
buyers to move to locations outside of the central area owned by the very same companies 
that provided the infrastructure (Muller, 1995; Pendall, 1999; Fishcel, 2004).  Later, 
government investment in urban water supply and sewage treatment facilities and the 
highway system encouraged lower density development by providing suburban residents with 
services that they did not pay for directly (Ellis, 2001; Pendall, 1999).  Because of these 
subsidies, the true value of rural land is not reflected in its sale price because infrastructure 
development costs are not covered in the average-cost pricing system employed in most 
municipalities, and the social and environmental costs (congestion, emissions) of private 
vehicle use is not paid by motorists (Byun and Esparza, 2005).   
 
Government policies and initiatives that influence the spatial pattern of land prices have an 
impact on the shape of cities because subsidies result in an increase in the demand for housing 
and land in the suburbs (Voith and Gyourko, 2002; Daniels, 2001).  There are three ways in 
which government investment can influence land absorption: it reduces the relative price of 
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land; it reduces local government or private household spending resulting in an increase in 
discretionary income and effectively increased demand for residential space and housing 
investment; and supports business activities outside the central area ultimately influencing the 
residential location choices for employees (Persky and Kurban, 2003).   
 
Market demand and consumer preference have also played an important role in influencing 
the spatial pattern of urban development.  Lifestyle choices favouring single-family homes, 
automobile ownership, and low-rise workplaces have contributed to sprawling development.  
With support from increasing incomes, the demand for suburban life is self-perpetuating 
(Carruthers, 2002).  The suburbs and countryside are perceived to be safer and cleaner places 
to live compared to urban centres and houses on the periphery of urban areas are expected to 
have considerable appreciation potential (Daniels, 2001).   
 
While the diffusion of residential development from the core to the edges arguably causes the 
decentralization of supporting land uses, such as commercial and employment areas, there is 
the theory that the development of commercial and employment areas themselves causes the 
outward movement of people from the core and encourages urban sprawl (Ding and Bingham, 
2000; Walker and Lewis, 2001).  The historic decentralization of factories and manufacturing 
districts to the metropolitan fringe has continually played an important role in creating multi-
nodal cities.  Property investment in fringe locations have the potential to generate large 
profits because of low property values and the relative ease of land assemblage and 
speculative development has the potential to pull urban infrastructure and investors to the 
suburbs and, in turn, attract residents from the core to the fringe (Walker and Lewis, 2001).  
 
Clearly, the spatial pattern of development has changed dramatically since the 1950s and the 
shape and role of our urban and suburban areas is continuously evolving.  Muller (1995) 
identifies five stages in our current suburban era.  The first was the bedroom community stage 
(1945-1955) in which residential development in the suburbs outpaced non-residential 
development.  The second phase was the independence stage (1955-1965) when industrial and 
office parks began to emerge in the suburbs followed by regional shopping centres.  The 
catalytic growth stage (1965-1980) followed with the clustering of office, hotel and restaurant 
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developments around large suburban shopping centres.  During the 1980s there was the high-
rise/high-technology stage in which suburban downtowns grew with the introduction of high-
rise office buildings catering to companies in the high-tech industry.  Muller dubbed the 
1990s as the mature urban centres stage because suburban centres were increasingly 
diversifying to include social, cultural, civic, and recreational functions in addition to their 
existing residential and economic roles.   
 
3.3 The Cost of Sprawl 
 
Over the past 20 years, there have been increasing concerns over the environmental, social, 
and economic costs of the conventional approach to urban development.  The following 
sections provide a summary of those costs. 
 
3.3.1 Environmental Costs 
 
Sprawling development involves the expansion of urban land uses from the periphery of 
metropolitan areas to surrounding rural land.  The negative effects of urban dispersion can be 
seen when considering the subsequent increases in land consumption and energy consumption 
– both of which have implications on the quality of the environment. 
 
Urban expansion comes at the expense of green space and ultimately reduces the supply of 
agricultural land on the urban fringe and negatively impacts environmentally significant areas.  
Concern about the implications sprawling development has on the consumption of land is 
demonstrated in numerous studies that have tracked the take-up of forest and agricultural land 
by urban development in cities across North America.  Academic literature demonstrates that 
new development has the potential to destroy farmland, forests, and wetlands and replace it 
with impermeable surfaces, such as buildings, roads, and parking lots.  The replacement of 
natural areas with impermeable surfaces, if not mitigated appropriately, could mean a rise in 
water temperatures and an increase in erosion, which ultimately reduce water quality 
(Paehlke, 1991; Hasse and Lathrop, 2001; Robinson et al., 2005; MacDonald and Rudel, 
2005).   
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The environmental costs of lower density development on the fringe of urban areas are also 
reflected in the increased energy demand for transportation, heating and cooling larger homes, 
and powering appliances (Gonzalez, 2005; Alexander and Tomalty, 2002).  Similarly, there is 
a tendency to use excess water in low density singles due to the interest in watering lawns, 
gardens, and washing cars (Alexander and Tomalty, 2002).  Increased greenhouse gases and 
airborne emissions emitted by private vehicles can contribute to climate change (Tomalty, 
1997).  Reliance on private automobiles to access segregated land uses increases fuel usage, 
air pollution, and energy consumption (Paehlke 1991; Jackson, 2005).  Meanwhile, sprawling 
low density development impacts the viability of alternative modes of transportation such as 
walking, biking and transit.  More dense urban areas, with smaller living quarters, lessen the 
demand for land, automobiles, electricity, gasoline, appliances and furniture (Gonzalez, 
2005). 
 
3.3.2 Social Costs 
 
The option to move to low-density living in the suburbs has a lot to do with the mobility of 
particular social and economic classes (Ding and Bingham, 2000).  Homeownership in the 
suburbs by white, middle class residents ultimately led to the wide adoption of fiscal and 
exclusionary zoning (Byun and Esparza, 2005).  Urbanists argue that Euclidian zoning, 
“generally a single-use layer zoning, separating individual land uses into individual, defined 
areas,”  (Jackson, 2005, p. 300), is a physical expression of an exclusionary white society who 
moved from the urban core to the suburbs due to class and racial segregation (Tomalty, 1997).   
This protectionist perspective is manifested in not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) opposition to 
less advantaged groups (CMHC, 1993). 
 
The segregation of classes is enhanced in the suburbs by a need for private vehicles to access 
different activities, such as residential, commercial, and employment land uses, because of the 
distinct separation of those uses.  Ewing (1997) refers to access deprivation as the difficulty 
associated with moving around a sprawling community without private transportation.  Ellis 
(2001) and Jackson (2005) support Ewing’s argument that low income people, seniors, or 
others who do not have access to private vehicles experience stress; lack of access to jobs, 
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housing and open space; and suffer from a generally feeling of isolation.  Alternative modes 
of transportation, such as biking and walking are sometimes not an option because of the 
sheer distance between land uses and vehicle congested fast moving arterials.  The lack of 
viable transportation options creates a problem for equitable access to municipal services by 
disadvantaged groups (Canadian Urban Institute, 1991).  Those residents with access to 
private vehicles express frustrations with increasingly longer commuting distances, traffic 
congestion, and parking options (Canadian Urban Institute, 1991).   
 
The homogenous, monotonous, and unaesthetic characteristics of traditional suburban 
development impact the liveability of those communities (CMHC, 1993).  Ewing (1997) uses 
the term environmental deprivation to refer to the lack of action or stimuli in a sprawling 
community.  Low-density, segregated land uses pose challenges for place-making due to the 
lack of vitality, intimacy, neighbourliness, and social ties in neighbourhoods (Ewing, 1997; 
Freeman, 2001; Canadian Urban Institute, 1991).  
 
In contrast, more compact, mixed use development has the opportunity to improve the quality 
of life of residents as it provides proximate services and amenities, allows for pedestrian 
friendly neighbourhoods thereby improving the vibrancy of a community, and provides 
greater security through constant surveillance (Alexander and Tomalty, 2002).  The reduced 
reliance on the automobile and the increased use of alternative forms of transportation, such 
as walking and bicycling, improves the quality of life of residents because there is reduced 
emissions; reduced auto congestion; reduced impact of the automobile on social effects, such 
as having to commute to work from the suburbs; reduced spatial effects, such as the sheer 
amount of land used for roads; and, reduced class division, with lower income residents able 
to move about the city using public transit (Miller and Hoel, 2002).   
 
3.3.3 Economic Costs  
 
The segregated land uses and lower development densities typical in sprawling suburbs make 
them more expensive to service than compact areas.  Monetary costs can be measured through 
the construction and maintenance of infrastructure and the provision of public services.   
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Sprawling suburban development does not make efficient use of existing infrastructure 
capacity and requires expensive financial investment in the development of services on the 
urban fringe.   Speir and Stephenson (2002) found that the cost to provide water and sewers 
increased with the increased dispersion of development; the increased distance from existing 
service centres; and large lots, the latter being the most cost-sensitive spatial attribute.  
Similarly, Carruthers and Ulfarsson’s (2003) analysis of per capita spending on twelve 
measures of public expenditure, including garbage collection, police and fire protection, 
education, and libraries, indicated that the per capita costs of these services increased with 
decreased density.   
 
The financial investment required to service growing suburbs has the potential to lead to the 
economic decline of the core area and can result in an underutilization of existing servicing 
capacity (Tomalty, 1997).  The failure (or inability) to invest in public services, particularly in 
the urban core, can result in a self-perpetuating situation of tax increases and property value 
and tax base decreases, resulting in the increased movement of residents to the suburbs 
(Jackson, 2005).  This cyclical situation is reflected in the White Flight era of the 1950s and 
1960s in the United States, a time when low-income and ethnic minorities moved to central 
cities after World War II, placing an increasing tax burden on middle class and non-Hispanic 
whites.  In response, middle class city dwellers and businesses moved to the suburbs, causing 
a further reduction in tax revenues which resulted in a decline in physical and social 
infrastructure in core areas (Byun and Esparza, 2005; Pendall, 1999).   
 
3.4 A Move to Compact Development 
 
Academic literature traces efforts to control unplanned urban dispersion back in history as far 
as cities themselves.  However, it has only been within the last century, and more specifically 
since the mid-1900s, that sustained efforts have been made to stop sprawling development 
(Bruegmann, 2005).  Planning movements over the past half century can be distinguished in 
part by their response to environmental, social, and economic concerns of the day and in part 
by implementation strategies, which have shifted from relying exclusively on regulatory 
controls to the use of financial incentives to achieve land use objectives (Godschalk, 2000).  
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This section provides a brief history of the evolution of planning movements from the mid-
1900s that have influenced the current Smart Growth movement. 
 
3.4.1 Influence of the Garden City Concept 
 
Bruegmann (2005) has recognized an interesting paradox in urban planning: today’s solutions 
for controlling sprawling development and lessening its environmental, social, and economic 
costs are similar to the remedies developed to combat high density blight over a hundred years 
ago.  Specifically, he refers to Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City concept and its goals for a 
clear urban boundary; a balance of people, households, and jobs; and a balance of built land to 
green space.   
 
The Garden City concept emerged out of a reaction to the plight of Industrial Cities and was 
first proposed in Howard’s 1898 book Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform.  The 
concept was prepared as a response to what Howard believed were the corrupt, immoral, and 
inhumane political and economic structures of Industrial Cities.  ‘Planned dispersal’ was a 
conscious and organized effort to move people and businesses out of Industrial Cities to the 
countryside (Ward, 1993), a move in which a citizen could, “vote with ones feet against the 
concentration of power and wealth that the cities represented,” (Fishman, 2003, pp. 38).  
Howard recognized that decentralization had to happen in a balanced manner, providing for 
residential, employment and leisure opportunities so that communities could be self-
contained.  He also acknowledged the importance of accommodating a mix of social classes 
and providing full access to urban and rural amenities (Simmonds, 2001).  
 
To reach this end, Howard proposed that Garden Cities take the form of a perfect circle, 
ensuring that each land use would be placed to ensure maximum utility and convenience.  The 
Garden City concept provided for low-density land uses while recognizing that some 
concentration was necessary to capitalize on efficiencies in the built form (Fishman, 2003).  
Also, what could be argued as the most defining feature of the Garden City, Howard proposed 
that the entire urban centre be surrounded by a band of agricultural and natural land: a 
greenbelt.  Howard’s model was realized in the development of two Garden Cities: 
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Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden City (1920).  Unfortunately, the focus on economic 
and political reform that was the driver for his Garden City concept was disregarded as 
concerns for the towns’ development shifted to architectural detail and physical design.   
 
While Howard’s Garden City concept was never fully realized, it did mark the beginning of 
the New Town planning era that was important in shaping Britain’s urban areas in the years 
following the Second World War.  In 1944, Sir Patrick Abercombie’s Great London Plan was 
released.  It recognized the problems associated with a crowded central city and sprawling 
development on the edges.  The plan recommended the decentralization of the central core’s 
population, a strengthened greenbelt around the existing built-up area, and the creation of 
New Towns (Bruegmann, 2005; Ward, 1993).  Abercombie’s plan was radical in that it 
required a high level of government intervention in the planning of land uses and was very 
much an example of top-down planning (Bruegmann, 2005).   
 
Legislation was passed in the late 1940s to implement Abercombie’s plan but, when the 
government changed in 1951, so too did support for planning control at the national level.  
While the London plan was successful in lower densities, it arguably did so at the expense of 
high land values within the greenbelt and new towns and increases in commuting times and 
traffic congestions in the core due to a more decentralized population beyond the greenbelt 
(Bruegmann, 2005). 
 
3.4.2 The Quiet Revolution – 1960s and 1970s 
 
While not all of the planning efforts in Britain were beneficial, planning reformers in North 
America in the 1960s saw advantages to Britain’s move to push land use planning up in the 
government hierarchy (Bruegmann, 2005).  First, the fragmentation of local governments 
meant that municipalities adopted their own land use regulations; which could have the 
implication of inducing competition as municipalities focused primarily on their own well-
being at the expense of larger anti-sprawl efforts (Pendall, 1999; Byun and Esparza, 2005).  
Also, a more regional approach meant that more funds could potentially be available to pay 
for more highly skilled professional planners (Bruegmann, 2005).   
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The planning movement that emerged in the 1960s in the United States was primarily a move 
to create statewide plans.  It was dubbed the Quiet Revolution, “because it was done state by 
state and apparently by many individuals and groups acting without any centralized command 
structure,” (Bruegmann, 2005).  While the academic literature is not conclusive about the 
beginning and end dates of this planning period, there is general agreement that it began in 
1961 with the enactment of Hawaii’s statewide land use planning law (Weitz, 1999).  While 
an estimated 34 states had statewide planning legislation by 1960, only Hawaii had developed 
a plan that addressed land use (Weitz, 1999).  The legislation basically implemented statewide 
zoning, as it divided the state into four zones: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation, and 
directed growth to locate in the urban zone (Daniels, 2001). 
 
While the Quiet Revolution was originally prompted by planning reformers who desired a 
more regional approach to curbing sprawl, the real revolution in land control did not begin 
until the environmental movement grew in the late 1960s (Weitz, 1999).  Environmental laws 
were strengthened to protect environmentally significant areas and the requirement for 
mandatory environmental impact statements was introduced (Bruegmann, 2005).   
 
At the same time, “No Growth” and “Slow Growth” initiatives that effectively limited the 
pace and geographic extent of development were implemented.  In theory, low-density-only 
residential zoning places an upper threshold on population while building-permit caps or 
growth limits on residential development can stabilize property tax increases (Pendall, 1999; 
Jackson, 2005).  Municipalities adopt such policies in an effort to build higher quality homes 
that sell for higher prices and have the potential to attract empty nesters that typically place a 
lower demand on the school system (Pendall, 1999).   
 
Growth limiting actions, however, can have dramatic impacts on new urbanization because 
the adoption of such policies often results in competitive responses in adjacent municipalities, 
ultimately leading to an expansive area that has low-density residential uses (Pendall, 1999; 
Jackson, 2005).  Reduced construction rates of all homes under building-permit caps or of 
attached or rental housing under low-density-only zoning policies means higher rents leading 
to increased racial and class divisions (Pendall, 1999). 
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Such results are best exemplified in Boulder, Colorado, a municipality that intentional slowed 
growth rates through growth control initiatives in an effort to preserve its existing character; 
limit crime, pollution and urban decay; and prevent urban sprawl (Jackson, 2005).  It did so 
through the creation a greenbelt, the implementation of increased taxes and development fees, 
and by restricting growth rates by limiting the number of residential building permits issued 
(Bruegmann, 2005; Jackson, 2005).  The implication is that while growth slowed within the 
greenbelt, the constrained land supply drove up the price of land inside and pushed growth 
even further out (Bruegmann, 2005). 
 
Another example of the anti-growth attitudes of the 1960s and 1970s was reflected in the 
State of Oregon’s enactment in 1973 of the Land Conservation and Development Act.  
Oregon governor Tom McCall supported efforts to slow growth, stating, “Come visit us again 
and again.  This is a state of excitement.  But for heaven’s sake, don’t come here to live,” 
(Bruegmann, 2005, p. 203).  The Act was introduced to curb sprawl and protect forest and 
farmlands by, among other things, requiring that cities and counties work together to create 
“urban growth boundaries” large enough to accommodate growth over a 20 year period 
(Daniels, 2001; Katz, 2002).   The comprehensive plan included statewide goals and the act 
set up the Land Conservation and Development Commission whose role it was to ensure plan 
compliance.   
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the Oregon system, particularly its implementation in 
Portland, is the subject of significant academic debate.  Supports recognize the livability of 
the central area and the preservation of greenspace within and around its urban area.  
Opponents argue that growth controls have caused land prices to increase inside the growth 
boundary and low density development to locate in the suburbs at the expense of agricultural 
land.  Academic literature does not provide conclusive evidence on either the success or 
failure of Oregon’s planning efforts. 
 
In general, the Quiet Revolution was characterized by planning efforts that used statewide 
regulatory means to control land use, including traditional zoning and subdivision ordinances 
and growth boundaries (Godschalk, 2000).  The end of the planning movement came in the 
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late 1970s as economic growth slowed in the United States.  Some regions that had adopted 
No Growth or Slow Growth planning policies abandoned their planning efforts in an attempt 
to encourage new economic growth (Bruegmann, 2005).  Others modified their plans to 
reflect the goals of the new movement, growth management. 
 
3.4.3  Growth Management – 1980s to early 1990s  
 
While government interest in regional and statewide planning and environmental protection 
programs began to wane in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the overhaul of Florida’s growth 
management legislation in 1985 is credited as being the first in a second wave of statewide 
planning efforts (Weitz, 1999).  Florida’s State Comprehensive Plan and Growth 
Management Act of 1985 together sought to establish an integrated system of local, regional, 
and state plans (Nicholas and Steiner, 2000).  Similar growth management laws were passed a 
few years later in Delaware, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Weitz, 1999).   
 
This second wave in combating urban sprawl still used planning regulations to direct growth 
but also recognized the need to have interjurisdictional coordination to ensure consistency 
(Godschalk, 2000).  Carruthers (2002) recognizes that growth management programs must be 
vertically consistent (local plans are consistent with upper-tier policy objectives), horizontally 
consistent (local plans are consistent with each other), and internally consistent (local plans 
are consistent with development regulations such as zoning) to be effective.   Growth 
management policies that merely require local municipalities to plan without considering 
horizontal and internal consistency can actually promote sprawl because of inconsistencies 
between competing municipalities’ growth strategies and a fragmented approach to growth 
management which could encourage leapfrog development (Carruthers, 2002).   
 
Around the time of the overhaul of Florida’s growth management legislation, there was also a 
move by the United Nations Generally Assembly to recognize the link between the economic 
and social costs of environmental degradation caused by development.  In 1983 the United 
Nations convened the Brundtland Commission and in 1987 they published Our Common 
Future, a report that established policies for ‘sustainable development’.   The report defined 
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sustainable development as, “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,” (Montgomery, 2006, 
p.58).  The definition recognized the objectives for economic development while identifying 
the need to protect the environment.  In general, the sustainable development concept 
recognizes the realities and necessity for growth but encourages it to occur in a more efficient 
form. 
 
Around the same time as the Brundtland Commission was preparing their report, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) was beginning work on its Healthy City initiative.  The initiative, 
beginning in 1986, “recognized that health can be improved by modifying living conditions, 
namely, the physical environment and the social and economic conditions of everyday life,” 
(Werna et al., 1999, p. 28).  The projects were based on the premise that the health of citizens 
could be improved if health promotion and protection were included in development 
activities, such as housing, industry, and infrastructure (Werna et al., 1999).  The WHO were 
responsible for establishing Healthy City projects, projects that supported health authorities 
and local governments to gather information, analyze results, implement policies, and 
advocate for healthy development (Werna et al., 1999).  Like sustainable development, this 
approach to building and managing cities recognized the interconnection between the 
environment, the economy, and the social well-being of residents. 
 
Growth management has evolved from the 1980s to become a regional approach to shape and 
accommodate growth in a compact form while balancing environmental, social, and economic 
objectives (Tomalty, 1997).  The planning approach recognizes the realities and necessities of 
urban growth and, rather than trying to stop or slow it like the previous movements, it 
manages it while balancing other costs (Leo et al., 1998).  Planning at a regional level makes 
use of economies of scale, thereby maximizing the benefits of development and minimizing 
the costs of sprawl by more efficiently managing such things as transportation, water and 
sewage treatment and distribution, and parks and open space (Jackson, 2005; Boyle, et al., 
2004).   
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Comprehensive growth management strategies consist of a package of responses that together 
address the rate, amount, type and location of growth while also considering development 
costs (Nelson and Peterman, 2000).  Strategies can include population growth targets, targeted 
growth areas, urban growth boundaries, policy innovations, partnerships, and protection 
programs.  The success of such policies can be measured in density, spatial extent of the 
urbanized area, property values, public investment in infrastructure, and population change 
(Carruthers, 2002).   
 
3.4.4 Smart Growth – 1992 to present 
 
The planning movement influencing today’s urban plans, Smart Growth, evolved out of the 
growth management movement.  In fact, recent academic literature frequently uses the terms 
“Smart Growth” and “Growth Management” interchangeably.  The main difference between 
Smart Growth and previous generations of growth management is that advocates state Smart 
Growth actually promotes economic development and population growth by giving 
confidence that an urban area can support it (Danielsen et al., 1999; Daniels, 2001).  
Tregoning et al. (2002) suggest that Smart Growth more directly links environmental, 
economic, and social concerns of sprawl by broadening the audience, “by shifting the focus 
from self-sacrifice to self-interest,” (p. 342).  In this way, environmentalist, farmers, 
developers, planners, politicians can come to the table together to discuss growth issues 
(Tregoning et al., 2002).  Smart Growth does not interfere with market forces but instead 
controls where government chooses to invest, thereby curbing government subsidies that 
support urban sprawl (Daniels, 2001).   
 
The current planning movement began with the enactment of Maryland’s Neighbourhoods 
Conservation and Smart Growth Act (Godschalk, 2000; Weitz, 1999).  It differed from 
previous growth management efforts in that it added state-funding incentives to encourage 
compact development.  Specifically, the legislation had five main components: Priority 
Funding Areas, The Brownsfield Redevelopment Programme, The Job Creation Tax Credit 
Act, The Live Near Your Work Programme, and the Rural Legacy Programme (Daniels, 
2001).  The legislation had elements of earlier growth management land use regulations but 
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specifically used funding to encourage local governments to prepare plans and to support 
growth in target areas (Daniels, 2001; Tregoning, et al. 2002).  By providing state funds to 
finance infrastructure in target growth areas, the legislation, “drew a clear connection between 
a healthy economy and a healthy environment, a link that had often been missed in the past,” 
(Tregoning, et al., 2002, p. 343). 
 
The Smart Growth planning concept today responds to sprawling urban development through 
a set of principles aimed at guiding development and good planning practice (Daniels, 2001; 
Jackson, 2005; Johnson, 2004; Curran and Tomalty, 2003).  It can be defined by the outcomes 
of six main goals: 
 
• Neighbourhood liveability by being safe, convenient, attractive, and 
affordable; 
• Better access and less traffic by building mixed use developments and offering 
alternative forms of transportation; 
• Thriving cities, suburbs, and towns by investing in already developed areas; 
• Shared benefits for all income and social classes; 
• Lower costs and lower taxes by encouraging compact growth; and, 
• Keeping open space open by focusing new growth in developed areas. 
 
 Source: Smart Growth America, 2006  
 
Smart Growth promotes and manages growth so that it occurs in an environmentally sensitive 
way, is financially feasible, and it creates an acceptable quality of life (Filion, 2003).  It 
emphasizes an urban form that is more compact for the purpose of: encouraging transit use 
and walking as major forms of transportation; protecting natural and agricultural land from 
development; and, providing for efficiencies in the provision of physical and social 
infrastructure.  Finally, it addresses equity issues such as affordable housing, who pays for 
growth, and gives consideration to the environment and the economy (Curran and Tomalty, 
2003; Robinson, et al., 2005).  As demonstrated through the Maryland initiative, Smart 
Growth is implemented through a set of multi-layered and flexible programs that together 
address such things as land use patterns, transportation, open space, and infrastructure. 
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In Ontario, the provincial government has taken a lead role in stressing the importance of 
Smart Growth programs.  Ontario’s Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal’s (2006a) 
Places to Grow: Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe is a comprehensive plan for 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe that indicates where growth will occur, identifies the 
infrastructure requirements necessary to support that growth, and protects the region’s natural 
resources and agricultural areas.  The Place to Grow Concept is presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Source: MPIR, 2006a 
Figure 3.1: Places to Grow Concept (Schedule 2) 
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Places to Grow presents broad strategies for achieving the objective of a more compact form 
of development and links intensification to infrastructure investment.  The plan identifies 
urban growth centres and intensification corridors and introduces policies that would 
strengthen transportation linkages, encourage more compact development, and protect natural 
spaces and agricultural lands.  To help achieve these goals, the provincial government is 
expected to invest in infrastructure, create legislative and regulatory planning framework, and 
provide fiscal tools to help area municipalities attract and locate growth strategically. 
 
While incorporated into urban planning strategies across North America, the Smart Growth 
movement is not without its critics.  It is argued that the term is so broad it can be used to 
support virtually any sort of urban development and has been used to argue against sprawl 
while at the same time acting as a defense for developing the urban fringe (Curran and 
Tomalty, 2003).  Other weaknesses with the concept include: its focus on fast growing urban 
areas with little attention to slow or declining growth communities; its failure to consider 
situations in which growth should be limited, for example in areas with sensitive 
environmental features; and the promotion of initiatives that may not be possible given market 
realities, like mixed use buildings in suburban areas (Curran and Tomalty, 2003).   
 
As Filion (2003, p.54) acknowledges, implementing Smart Growth regulations could provoke, 
“a heavy political toll, probably beyond what most governments are willing to incur”.  This 
can be attributed to NIMBY opposition to such things as high density residential projects and 
new transit right-of-way provisions in already established neighbourhoods.  Similarly, 
pressure from residential and commercial developers on political leaders has the potential to 
sway politician’s decisions about the implementation of Smart Growth principals in policy 
and in individual development projects. 
 
Other criticisms of Smart Growth also exist.  In her review of the new City of Toronto 
Official Plan, Bunce (2004) argues that the municipality has used Smart Growth as a 
technique to support its own economic development agenda.  She suggests the City has 
garnered public support for urban intensification by heralding the environmental aims of 
Smart Growth, which is, protecting the natural environment from sprawling development.  
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Bunce suggests that Toronto’s new Official Plan uses the environmental impacts of urban 
sprawl as a guise to attain economic and land use development goals.  By focusing on the 
ecological concerns of urban development, the City has not had to, “challenge the structural 
dilemmas of capitalist development” (Bunce, 2004, p. 180). 
 
Despite the arguments that surround the merits of Smart Growth principles and their 
application, a more intense, compact urban form does provide community wide benefits.  This 
strategy for development has environmental, financial, and social benefits over the alternative 
of urban sprawl.  Intensification efforts protect the country side, reduce dependence on the 
automobile, encourage a mix of other forms of transportation, and provides for more efficient 
infrastructure and public service development.   
 
3.5 The Link Between Smart Growth and Residential Intensification  
 
Smart Growth promotes economic development and urban growth in a compact urban form.  
This can be accomplished by reducing regulatory constraints that inhibit the development of 
housing and other economically productive land uses inside designated growth boundaries 
(Danielsen et al., 1999).  The ability of Smart Growth policies and programs to encourage 
more compact residential land uses is important because housing comprises a major share of 
the built environment; residential uses influence the size and composition of a population; 
and, housing influences the locational decisions for other land uses (Danielsen et al., 1999; 
Tomalty, 1997).  As Danielsen et al. (1999) recognize, “the most basic smart growth housing 
strategy is the creation of higher density housing,” (p. 1).  The development trend toward 
higher densities than previously achieved and the policy objective of such development is 
termed intensification (Tomalty, 1997).  Objectives for intensification are consistent with 
Smart Growth principles: 
 
Social objectives: provide affordable housing and improve equitable access to 
community amenities such as health and social services and schools.   
 
Economic objectives: reduce the per unit cost of hard and soft infrastructure and 
make more efficient use of existing service capacity.  Intensification units are unlikely 
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to cost more than new suburban development, even when considering grants awarded 
to encourage compact development. 
 
Environmental objectives: reduce reliance on the use of private vehicles by 
increasing the feasibility of alternative modes of transportation and reduce land 
consumption.  Smaller units also reduce the demand for construction materials and 
have the potential to reduce energy consumption. 
 
 Canadian Urban Institute, 1991; City of Richmond, 1993 
 
The ability to meet these objectives means an opportunity to remedy the social, economic, and 
environmental costs of conventional development.   
 
It is possible to distinguish between intensification in the built-up area and on greenfields.  
There are four ways in which residential intensification occurs at the site level within built-up 
areas: 
 
Conversion/Addition: the creation of additional residential units in an existing 
structure through renovations or additions.  This can occur through such things as the 
addition of a secondary suite, the conversion of a single family house to a duplex or 
fourplex, or the addition of residential units above a commercial use.  The benefit of 
this form of intensification is that it has minimal impact on surrounding uses, it 
provides additional accommodations in an already serviced area, and it can provide 
income for home owners. 
 
Infill:  the construction of new housing on a vacant or underutilized site in the 
existing built-up area, in a form that is compatible with the existing community.  Unit 
yield is dependent on the size of the lot, its orientation, and access.  This type of 
intensification project can increase a municipality’s tax base with a limited increase in 
capital and operating costs and is advantageous because it can fit in with the existing 
scale of development. 
 
Redevelopment: the development of new housing or mixed use development on 
underutilized residential or non-residential sites.  It typically occurs on a larger scale 
than infill and requires significant infrastructure upgrades.  Appropriate sites for 
redevelopment are usually located where existing structures and infrastructure are 
aging and can include along arterial roads or in obsolete commercial, industrial, and 
institutional areas. 
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Adaptive Reuse: the construction of new housing units within non-residential 
buildings.  This can include the renovation of warehouses, factories, schools or offices 
for residential purposes. 
 
 Tomalty, 1997; Canadian Urban Institute, 1991; Ottawa-Carleton, 1990; CMHC, 2004 
 
Greenfield intensification, or suburban densification, refers to the more efficient use of land 
by both increasing the variety of new housing types through the development of more 
medium and high density housing and by encouraging smaller lot sizes (Tomalty, 1997; 
Canadian Urban Institute, 1991; CMHC, 1993; Ottawa-Carleton, 1990).   
While many of the objectives of Smart Growth are generally supported by the public, such as 
increasing transportation options and preserving open space, it is the goal to increase densities 
that is the most controversial aspect of the movement (Alexander and Tomalty, 2002).  While 
‘motherhood’ principles of compact development are generally accepted by communities at 
the municipal level, there are significant challenges to implementing intensification projects at 
the site level, particularly in well-established neighbourhoods.  These constraints can slow or 
inhibit intensification projects, thereby limiting the opportunities to achieve a compact urban 
form. 
 
NIMBY opposition to intensification projects is perhaps the greatest inhibitor and stems 
primarily from concerns over property values, crowding, and the loss of community values.  
Community opposition is typically more intense in well-established residential 
neighbourhoods surrounding intensification projects and can serve to limit residential yield 
and lengthen the planning approvals process (CMHC, 2004).   
 
Concerns regarding intensification can be linked to the image of the low-quality, sub-standard 
public housing projects developed through the 1940s and 1970s.  These high-rise buildings 
did not often fit with the low-rise character of surrounding neighbourhoods or the 
architectural fabric that had previously been established.  The lack of compatibility between 
intensification projects and neighbouring developments had implications for the community 
atmosphere.  Privacy and safety have always been a central concern of suburban dwellers who 
may feel uncomfortable with higher densities and perceive development to be an assault on 
their neighbourhoods (Paehlke, 1991).  The public holds deeply entrenched notions that 
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higher density development is associated with lower incomes, undesirable neighbours, 
increased crime, strained community services, and lower quality neighbourhoods.   
 
Also of concern is the perceived loss of community values.  Low-density suburbs were largely 
shaped by traditional family units.  Today, cities are formed of diverse communities that are 
shaped by different values of community based on ethnicity, lifestyles, and sexual and 
political orientations (Canadian Urban Institute, 1991).  Opposition to intensification can 
actually be related to a reaction to rapid social change and the feeling that residents have little 
control over the changes taking place in their community (Canadian Urban Institute, 1991; 
Paehlke, 1991).   
 
Market demand and consumer preference also play an important role in influencing the spatial 
pattern of our cities.  Higher-density projects may appeal to empty nesters, single-person 
households and other non-traditional households; however, they do not always appeal to 
families.  Marketing to young families could be challenging as it is complicated by the fact 
that institutional uses, such as schools, may not be able to accommodate an increased 
residential population in already developed areas and land prices in central areas may be too 
high to support affordable, market-rate housing.  Land assembly, unique construction costs, 
and infrastructure improvements could raise infill and redevelopment costs, requiring a 
population that has the purchasing power to support it (Peirce, 2002).  Gordon and Richardson 
(1997) suggest that while there is a “boutique appeal” for higher density living, there is still a 
strong consumer preference for low-density, single family homes.  While compact 
development does offer consumer choice, the authors believe there are not a sufficient number 
of projects to make an observable difference on land use patterns.  For this reason, 
intensification of developed areas typically proceeds too slowly to offset the need for 
greenfield development.   
 
3.6 Implementing Intensification  
 
Strategies that aim to intensify urban development typically require a shift in funding 
priorities and a change in planning policy through incentives and penalties.   Policies must 
   
  
   51
steer clear of barriers to implementation by avoiding agitating politically powerful opponents 
and being financially feasible (Filion, 2003).  This can only be realized through a 
comprehensive strategy that takes into consideration environmental, social, and economic 
considerations and requires the involvement and commitment of politicians, the public, and 
the development industry. 
 
The following section examines policies and programs that can be implemented as part of a 
comprehensive Smart Growth growth management strategy.  It begins with a discussion of the 
need for Collaboration amongst different levels of government, citizens, and the development 
industry during policy and program formulation and implementation.  Two main categories of 
programs are then discussed: Land Use Controls, which are implemented through Official 
Plan policy and facilitate the regulatory process, and Financial Incentives and Disincentives, 
which are permitted through Official Plan policy but implemented through specific municipal 
initiatives.  Both categories include a number of policies and programs that can be tailored to 




Because community planning is a political activity that impacts different segments of the 
population in different ways, the public has a right to be involved in the process of creating 
future plans.  Open communication between politicians, planners, and the public is important 
for two reasons: citizens can develop a clear understanding of the problems and the impacts of 
proposed solutions; and, politicians and planners have an understanding of the resources 
available to implement solutions and of the procedures that must be followed to implement 
change (Hodge, 2003). 
 
Coordinated land uses require cooperation between regional governments, local governments, 
and residents.  Collaboration is a communicative and participatory process that can be defined 
as a group of stakeholders, often with competing agendas, who examine their different 
approaches to a common problem to reach an agreed upon solution (Margerum, 2005).  An 
effective collaborative process in growth management includes: participation of a full range 
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of stakeholders; a common understanding of the problem and sufficient information to solve 
it; and, an appropriate problem solving process that is organized, establishes ground rules, and 
encourages consensus (Margerum, 2005).  
 
Interest in collaboration efforts between regional and local municipalities and citizens have 
increased in recent years, as is illustrated through the increasing number of visioning 
exercises conducted by different levels of government (Margerum, 2005).  In Canada, 
regional authorities have been particularly important in responding to regional issues such as 
transportation, solid waste, public sewers and water, and future growth (Curran and Tomalty, 
2003; Daniels, 2001).  That said, strong citizen advisory groups are necessary to keep 
governments on track with respect to promoting compact urban growth (Curran and Tomalty, 
2003).  Currie (2006) recognized the importance of engaging community members at the 
outset of the planning process, by allowing multiple community engagement opportunities 
throughout the planning process, and encouraging two way communication to allow mutual 
learning.  It provided mutual benefits for planners and the public. 
 
Challenges to carrying out a collaborative planning process have been identified in the 
literature.  Creating policies can be complicated by the large number of decision-makers and 
potential lack of communication and direct interaction between participants (Margerum, 
2005).    Also, the concept of collaboration assumes that a common goals exists and can be 
achieved, which is not necessarily the case in diverse communities that are shaped by 
different values of community based on ethnicity, lifestyles, and sexual and political 
orientations (Shipley, 2002; Canadian Urban Institute, 1991).  Successful implementation of 
policies requires on-going communication and interaction between participants, which can be 
challenging with a large group of stakeholders who have other commitments and who are 
constantly changing (Margerum, 2005).  For example, Currie (2006) recognized the 
challenges of engaging a representative sample of community members to participate in a 
long-range, non-controversial planning issue, especially when the issue was city-wide and not 
constrained to a particular site. 
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Fortunately, solutions to these challenges have been suggested, including: ensuring policies 
and tools for implementation are included in the collaborative growth management plan; 
using local forums to address local or sub-regional issues; and ensure that the public 
representative or stakeholder be the appropriate person, be accountable for their decisions, act 
responsibly, and be accessible to those they represent (Margerum, 2005). 
 
3.5.2 Land Use Controls 
 
Regulatory issues can impede intensification efforts, particularly in suburban locations where 
there is little variation in housing intensity and mix.  Zoning amendments required to change 
municipal standards such as dwelling type, minimum lot size, setbacks and parking 
requirements costs both time and money (Ottawa-Carleton, 1990).  Similarly, urban design 
requirements instituted to ensure compatible development often require creative solutions, 
lengthy negotiations, and compromises on behalf of both the municipality and the developer 
(CMHC, 2004). 
 
Academic and planning literature point to the opportunities offered by planning policies that 
control the use of land for the purpose of encouraging denser development.  These land use 
controls are typically included in Official Plan policies and address the rate, amount, type, and 
location of urban growth in a municipality.  Such policies enforce municipal objectives for 
encouraging compact development thereby aiding in the regulatory process.  The following 
section considers land use controls that can be implemented to encourage intensification.  
 
Urban Growth Boundaries 
 
Municipal Official Plans distinguish between urban and rural areas for the purpose of 
encouraging compact, contiguous growth in an effort to protect environmentally significant or 
important agricultural areas from development and to encourage improved social and 
economic conditions in an urban area (Jackson, 2005; Ding, et al., 1999; Burby, et al., 1999).  
A growth boundary defines the geographic extent to which a planning jurisdiction will permit 
urban growth and beyond which development is discouraged or prohibited.   
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The interpretation of a boundary’s role tends to differ between interest groups.  
Environmental and farmland protectionists tend to view growth boundaries as permanent, 
inflexible lines between urban and rural land uses while new urbanists argue that it is a tool to 
increase urban densities and promote transit use (Knaap and Hopkins, 2001).  Most strategies 
that implement growth boundaries include provisions that allow for expansions over a certain 
interval of time based on a set of criteria (Jackson, 2005).   
 
Perhaps the greatest argument against the use of urban growth boundaries is the impact it has 
on affordable housing.  There are two ways in which containment boundaries can cause 
housing price inflation: supply effects and demand effects (Dawkins and Nelson, 2002).  
Urban boundaries limit vacant land supply and have the potential to cause an oligopoly of 
landowners which can lead to a minimum price floor for new housing.   Due to the increased 
cost of developable land in a constrained market, affordable housing units tend not to be built 
because projects become economically infeasible.  As new higher priced homes are built, the 
average housing price increases.  If the demand for new housing is relatively inelastic, the 
impact of an urban containment policy will be reflected in housing prices.  Demand can be 
influenced by the positive externalities associated with urban containment, such as additional 
localized and regionalized amenities.  As demand increases, so to does the cost of housing.  
The problem is exasperated with a constrained land supply (Dawkins and Nelson, 2002).  
 
It should not be surprising that urban containment policies lead to increased housing prices 
(Dawkins and Nelson, 2002).  One of the main reasons for containing an urban area is to 
increase the potential for infill and redevelopment projects and such land should be expected 
to command a premium.  Developers tend to compensate for higher land prices by building at 
higher densities (Burby, et al., 1999).  To be effective, planning strategies that include an 
urban boundary must also permit sufficient opportunities for higher density, infill or 
redevelopment projects, as exclusionary zoning only perpetuates low density development 
and increased housing prices.  Policies that include provisions for affordable housing and a 
continuous monitoring program are also necessary to reduce the impact of housing price 
inflation (Dawkins and Nelson, 2002).   
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Another consequence of urban growth boundaries is the increased exposure to natural 
hazards.  Inflated land prices resulting from containment policies can create a pressure to 
develop less-expensive hazard lands (floodplains, coastal areas, and slopes) which are 
vulnerable to natural disasters and can lead to the loss of life or increased property damage 
(Burby, et al., 2001).  
 
Conclusions concerning the success of growth boundaries are varied.  Avin and Bayer (2003) 
suggest that while there is a fair amount of research that considers the effects of adopting 
growth management strategies as a whole, there are few studies that isolate the impacts of 
growth boundaries exclusively.  In contrast, Fulton (1999) cites positive feedback directly 
attributed to the growth boundary encompassing Seattle.  Planners for the area remarked that 
close-in suburbs, particularly older ones, are experiencing renewed growth and there is a 
significant amount of new investment in Seattle’s downtown since the enactment of the 
boundary in 1991.  Pendall (1999), however, cites research that suggests that empirical studies 
do not prove one way or another that implementing land use controls forces growth to infill 
development sites, to fringe areas, or neither.  He also cites a national survey that concludes 
that urban boundaries do not impact the spatial extent of urban development. A reason why 
this may be so is the concern for market factors – providing sufficient vacant land for 
competition and choice – when preparing urban boundaries.  If it is assumed that the 
boundary is permanent, consideration for market factors is imperative.  In fact, one could not 
assume a percentage of vacant land too high.  If it is recognized, however, that the boundaries 
are flexible, there is no need to consider market factors because an assessment will occur 





New urbanism came about in the early 1980s as an approach to designing compact 
communities.  The key design features of the approach are: higher densities through the 
creation of smaller lots and apartments; mixed uses allowing for a range of residents from 
varied income groups; and, pedestrian orientation to reduce the prevalence of private vehicles 
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and encourage the use of transit (Brown and Cropper, 2001).  Neo-traditional neighbourhoods 
and transit-oriented development fall under the label of new urbanism. 
 
Historically, local planning jurisdictions unintentionally encouraged sprawling development 
by adopting Euclidian zoning.  The distinct separation of land uses fostered a need for private 
vehicles to access different activities, such as residential, commercial, and employment land 
uses.  Over time, some suburban centres emerged as market forces forced a clustering of 
activities in accessible locations, specifically, at the intersection of major arterial roads and 
highways (Filion, 2001).  Recognizing the appeal of “spontaneous” centres, mixed 
designations are being increasingly incorporated into Official Plan and Secondary Plan 
policies for the purpose of intensifying development, reducing urban land requirements, and 
promoting alternative modes of transportation including bike riding, walking, and transit.   
 
Mixed designations can be described as locations where pedestrian-friendly, mixed use 
projects are encouraged within walking distance of a public transit facility (Boarnet and 
Compin, 1999).  The result is higher density, compact development which reduces reliance on 
the automobile and, in turn, improves the quality of life of residents by increasing the vitality 
and liveability of a community (Tumlin, et al., 2003).  The mixed use nature provides 
opportunities for affordable housing, a residential form occupied by lower income individuals 
who tend to use transit more frequently (Tumlin, et al., 2003).   
 
Carrying-out new urbanist goals is an incremental process that can be slowed by 
implementation barriers related to local opposition, fragmented land ownership, market 
demand, and fiscal pressures.  While there may be a market for higher-density, mixed use 
projects in inner suburban areas, the regulatory planning framework favouring low-density 
residential and segregated land uses are difficult to modify where existing residents are 
resistant to high-density development (Levine and Inma, 2004).  Mixed designation policies 
encourage a true mix of land uses, including the integration of different uses in a single 
structure.  Often, however, uses may only be integrated at a block level because of the 
challenges associated with financing mixed use buildings.  Financial institutions are often 
specialists in a particular real estate development niche.  As such, they have established 
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standards on which to evaluate proposals and tend to be conservative in their lending when a 
project does not fit a particular lending category.  The lack of investor understanding and 
confidence is reaffirmed by the few comparable projects that exist.  As such, developers and 
bankers are more confident developing and financing products that are familiar, predictable, 
and have a low level of risk on conventional, well-proven segregated land use designations.  
To obtain funding, developers often have to demonstrate a sufficient amount of demand for 
each project component. 
 
Official Plan policies can include land use designations that permit mixed use development to 
help capitalize on transportation efficiencies.  There is an important relationship between 
intensification and transportation due to the fact that the coordination of these two elements 
has the potential to increase development densities, increase transit use, and address social 
issues.  Opportunities to support alternative modes of transportation include implementing 
non-auto transportation improvements in existing neighbourhoods and directing residential 
intensification to corridors and boulevards (Miller and Hoel, 2002).  A complication, 
however, is the fact that rail transit alignments intended to support mixed centres often follow 
pre-existing freight right-of-ways that are surrounded by legacy uses, typically industrial or, 
to a lesser extent commercial, which impact the feasibility of future land uses.  The fiscal 
pressures experienced by local municipalities can result in land use policies that favour the 
development of easier commercial projects over more difficult residential, an option that 
generates both property and sales tax for the municipality (Boarnet and Compin, 1999; Levine 
and Inma, 2004; Boarnet and Crane, 1998). 
 
The concept of manipulating land uses to alter travel behaviour is a relatively new concept in 
North America and evaluating its success is complicated by such as things as neighbourhood 
demographics and neighbourhood self-selection (Boarnet and Compin, 1999; Levine and 
Inma, 2004).  In general, land use policies that are intended to encourage transit use can only 
be successful if supported by a system to manage transit demand, such as parking 
management, discounted transit passes for residents or employees, investment in other 
alternate forms of transportation, and walkable street designs (Tumlin, et al., 2003).  Local 
governments can also encourage mixed uses by aligning new rail lines and transit stations in 
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high-growth areas that have both developed and undeveloped land.  In this way, mixed use 
plans can be consistent with other planning development strategies.  Because land acquisition 
costs can be high in high-growth areas where there are no pre-existing rail right-of-ways, 
transit ridership goals should be balanced with anticipated development costs.  Balancing 
competing interests requires a high degree of collaboration between the local governments 
that plan land uses and the regional transit authorities that plan transit lines (Boarnet and 
Crane, 1998).   
 
3.5.3 Financial Incentives and Disincentives 
 
Demographics, including age, social needs, family lifecycle, lifestyle, and housing 
experiences all influence the demand for, and satisfaction with, housing.  Singles and seniors 
are most apt to reside in higher density developments because of the opportunities for social 
interaction, reduced maintenance responsibilities, and the lower costs associated with 
apartment living.  Families, however, typically opt for suburban living because of amenity 
and open space opportunities, larger housing units, perceived safety and privacy, and the 
greater ability to monitor children in common areas (City of Richmond, 1993).  While 
intensification sites may be available, marketing to young families could be challenging, as it 
is complicated by the fact that institutional uses may not be able to accommodate an increased 
residential population and land prices in central areas may be too high to support affordable, 
market-rate housing (Paehlke, 1991).  Land assembly, unique construction costs, and 
infrastructure improvements could raise construction costs, requiring a population that has the 
purchasing power to support it.  Market demand and interest in high density projects can 
inhibit residential intensification efforts.  Public sector regulations that are politically 
desirable could be in conflict with what the market dictates will be commercially viable.   
 
NIMBY, market, and regulatory issues pose huge risks to the development industry in the 
form of time delays and cost overruns.  The need to integrate architectural features to respond 
to neighbourhood concerns about compatibility and the time associated with the approvals 
process, including public input, makes intensification development more risky than greenfield 
development.  Higher development costs are also associated with higher construction costs of 
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upgrading and restoring heritage buildings, cleaning up contaminated sites, and the general 
costs of working on an urban site, including paying for road closures, parking, and security 
(CMHC, 2004) 
 
Financial techniques can be used by municipalities as a control over development in an effort 
to achieve land use objectives.  Financial incentives can be used to encourage development in 
targeted areas and levies can be imposed to discourage growth in others (Needham, 2000; 
Sewell, 2003).  The land market is the most important factor in spatial development patterns, 
as it influences the locational decisions of households and developers and controls the density 
of development (Carruthers, 2002; Pendall, 1999).  The spatial distribution of development 
can be influenced by land use policies, which can constraint the land supply, and consumer 
preference, which influences demand (Carruthers, 2002).  In general, more sprawl occurs 
where land values are lower.   
 
Growth-inducing incentives can be linked directly to growth management techniques for 
encouraging compact development in existing urban areas.  For example, financial incentives 
that support intensification projects both increase property values and the tax base in the core, 
and create residential, commercial, or employment opportunities in a developed area.  
Property taxes, development charges, building permits, fuel taxes, and parking fees influence 
citizens’ and developers’ choices about where to locate and, for that reason, can be brought in 
line with planning objectives (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).   
 
While financial incentive and disincentive programs are typically established in Official Plan 
policies, they are usually implemented through specific municipal programs.  The following 
section considers Financial Incentives and Disincentives that can form part of a 




Development charges are collected by local municipalities to help pay for the capital costs of 
new development.  In Ontario, the Development Charges Act, 1997, allows municipalities to, 
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“…impose development charges against land to pay for increased capital costs required 
because of increased needs for services arising from development of the area…” 
(Development Charges Act, 1997).  The basic principle of Development Charges is that new 
development should pay its own way, rather than as was the case in the past, making existing 
landowners pay for new growth through general taxation (Needham, 2000).  The 
Development Charge Act sets out the charges developers are expected to pay, which includes 
hard infrastructure, such as roads and sewers, and soft infrastructure, such as municipal 
offices and police (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).   
 
The Development Charges Act permits municipalities to establish sub-areas over which an 
average charge could be applied.  This system mimics a marginal cost approach by basing 
development charges for a sub-area on the efficiency of the delivery infrastructure to that 
specific area (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).  This makes it possible to command higher 
development charges for projects located away from existing major infrastructure and charge 
lower rates on development in designated growth areas, such as infill or redevelopment 
locations.  The approach has been favoured by developers in Markham and Richmond Hill, 
Ontario because money generated is spent exclusively in the newly developing area and there 
is less political control in the phasing of projects (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).   
 
It is possible under the Development Charges Act, 1997, to differentiate development charges 
based on density or targeted service standards, a provision that could be used to link planning 
goals with development charges and, in turn, influence development patterns.  Also, the Act 
permits the exemption of charges on affordable housing projects and accessory units at the 
discretion of the municipality (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).   
 
Some argue, however, that, in reality, development charges’ sole goal is to ensure fiscal 
stability of municipalities.  As such, development fees are not linked to planning objectives, 
they fail to account for the full social costs of development, and they ignore a project’s mix of 
uses, density, location and affordability.  Instead, a marginal cost approach to determining 
development charges has the ability to encourage investment in targeted areas and to shift 
development interests away from less efficient locations (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).  
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Although the area-specific development charge design could be used to encourage mixed use 
developments, higher densities, or development in preferred locations, there are few 
municipalities who actually adopt such a design (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).  Most 
municipalities argue that such a system requires greater administrative work and that it 
unfairly increases the costs of development in areas with higher growth related costs.   
 
The continued downloading of financial responsibilities from the provincial government to 
the local government enforces the revenue-generating goal of development charges and 
further reduces the importance of linking charges with the opportunity to influence 
development patterns (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003).  As a solution, the Province could 
provide subsidies to local governments to offset the costs of reducing development charges on 
development patterns that conform to planning goals (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003) 
 
Tax Increment Financing 
 
Since the 1970s, tax increment financing (TIF) has become an increasingly popular economic 
development tool used for encouraging development and redevelopment of “blighted” 
districts of cities in the United States.  The purpose of TIF programs is to encourage 
development in areas that would not otherwise attract private investment (Man, 1998).  This 
financing tool, managed by municipalities, uses the future increased property taxes that a new 
or improved real estate development will generate to finance the initial cost of land 
improvements (Michael, 2003).    The result is the attraction of private development and 
businesses to a targeted area by using the increased taxes a developer would typically pay on 
an improved property to cover development costs and the provision of infrastructure related to 
the development (Man, 1998; Michael, 2003).  TIF programs are beneficial because they give 
confidence to developers because their property taxes are directed to the TIF District in which 
they are investing and are not being allocated to general municipal services (Man, 1998).  
 
TIF programs are relatively new in Ontario.  In 2004, the Ontario Provincial government 
introduced the Brownfields Financial Tax Incentive Program.  This financing tool encourages 
investment and development on vacant, underused, or abandoned land in an effort to curb 
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sprawling growth, to promote more compact development in existing urban areas, and to 
make the best use of existing infrastructure (Ministry of Finance, 2004).  Eligible properties 
are entitled to receive municipal tax assistance and those municipal contributions may be 
matched by the Ministry of Finance.  The municipality is responsible for administering the 
program and establishing eligibility criteria while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
reviewing applications for provincial contributions on a case-by-case basis.  The total amount 
of assistance available is equal to the cost of rehabilitating the site and tax assistance is 
applied to the costs of remediation.   
 
In order to be eligible for TIFs in Ontario, the property must be in a designated Community 
Improvement Project Area which is identified in a provincially approved Community 
Improvement Plan which includes provisions for tax assistance.  As well, a draft by-law must 
be prepared by the municipality for the property authorizing tax assistance.  An application 
must then be sent to the Ministry of Finance for approval by the once-annual submission date.  
If approved by the Ministry, the municipality may enact the by-law and provide tax 
assistance.  Some examples of tax assistance include a cancellation of some percentage of the 
property taxes or to freeze some percentage of property tax increases (Ministry of Finance, 
2004).  
 
Opponents to TIF programs, however, warn that incentive and equity concerns could be raised 
if there are increments on the property tax base that are not a result of the TIF (such as new 
development or inflationary increases) or if the TIF relocates development that would have 
otherwise located elsewhere in the jurisdiction.  They also view TIF programs as a method of 
taking from other governments revenues associated with increased property values that would 




Section 37 of the Provincial Planning Act allows municipalities to enter into an agreement 
with developers, typically through a zoning by-law amendment, to share the increased value 
that may result from increased density or height of a development project.  Density Bonusing, 
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“is an incentive for developers to provide community benefits” for higher density projects but 
it is not a tool for increasing density (City of Ottawa, 2005b).  Instead, it is a method in which 
municipalities can negotiate increased height or density to secure particular public amenities.   
 
Funds generated through Section 37 agreements may be used to support initiatives above and 
beyond development charges and other items agreed to through the development approvals 
process such as affordable housing, additional parkland, and other provisions.  OMB 
decisions on the matter of density bonusing indicate that the community benefits secured 
through the Section 37 agreements must be provided in the same area or close to the 
development site so that the development itself benefits.  This requirement may change as the 
provision is tested further at future hearings. 
 
While the objectives of Section 37 are understandable, there have been serious concerns from 
the public and the development industry that has inhibited its application.  The greatest 
argument from the development industry is the perception that they are being penalized by the 
municipality for high density development.  They contend that a project should be evaluated 
on its design and planning merits, not on the amount of public amenities provided to the 
municipality.  Concerns expressed by the public stem from the fact that height and density 
approvals can be obtained from Committee of Adjustments, thereby circumventing the 
bonusing process, and that density bonusing negotiations do nothing to ensure that good 




In addition to providing financial incentives and disincentives to encourage urban growth and 
economic development in targeted areas, protection programs can be established to protect 
heritage areas, rural areas or environmentally significant land.   
 
The Ontario Heritage Tax Relief program was developed by the Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Finance and is presented in Section 365.2 of the Municipal Act, 2001.  The 
program recognizes the role of heritage buildings in improving the quality of life of residents, 
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their aesthetic value, and their ability to attract residents, businesses, and visitors to a 
community.  The Ontario Heritage Tax Relief financial tool allows municipalities to establish 
a program to provide property tax relief of 10 to 40% on eligible properties for the purpose of 
conservation.  It recognizes the maintenance and restoration costs associated with heritage 
buildings, costs that are usually borne by private property owners.  The program is funded in 
part by the province which funds the educational portion of the property tax and by the 
municipality which funds the municipal tax portion (Ministry of Culture, 2005). 
 
Local municipalities are responsible for administering the tax relief program but must accept 
the mandatory eligibility criteria set by the province: the property must contain a “designated” 
building or structure; and the property is subject to a heritage conservation agreement which 
ensures heritage features are protected and there is appropriate property maintenance.  In 
addition, municipalities may set their own eligibility criteria which can include the 
rehabilitation of certain types of properties, such as residential and the regeneration of a 
targeted area, such as a downtown.   Municipalities are responsible for determining the 
amount of tax relief and the form in which it is provided, such as a reduction in taxes or a 
refund (Ministry of Culture, 2005). 
 
The provincial government has also introduced a number of conservation programs to 
encourage the continued stewardship of environmentally significant land, forests, and farm 
land.  The Conservation Land Tax Incentive Program, administered by the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, was established in 1998 and targets provincially significant wetlands, 
areas of natural and scientific interest (ANSI), land inhabited by endangered species, 
escarpment land in the Niagara Escarpment Plan, and conservation land in communities.  The 
program recognizes the importance of Ontario’s natural heritage and encourages the private 
stewardship of land by providing a 100% property tax exemption on the eligible portion of the 
property.  It does not, however, provide tax relief on buildings or structures that occupy the 
land (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006) 
 
In recognition of the social and ecological benefits of forests, the provincial government also 
introduced the Ontario Managed Forest Tax Incentive Program in 1998.  This program, 
   
  
   65
administered through the Ministry of Natural Resources, reduces the property taxes by 75% 
for landowners who willingly conserve and manage their forests.  The program applies to 
privately owned forest land over 4 hectares in size that have an approved Managed Forest 
Plan.  Previously, such land was assessed at the same rate as farm land but changes in 
assessment criteria in 2003 now requires lands’ tax rate to be based on the current use of the 
property (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006). 
 
Farmland is another important land use in Ontario.  In 1998 the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Rural Affairs Farmland Taxation Program replaced the Farm Tax Rebate Program.  
Now, lands that are identified as Farmlands Property Class are taxed at 25% of their 




Academic and planning literature demonstrates that compact development has social, 
economic, and environmental benefits over low density, sprawling development.  Smart 
Growth principles respond to the concerns of the conventional approach to development 
through a set of principles aimed at guiding development and good planning practice.  Growth 
management strategies are implemented at the municipal level to encourage compact 
development through a variety of policies and programs.  A comprehensive, multi-layered 
strategy should be sufficient to respond to community and political opposition to residential 
intensification by using a collaborative approach; to regulatory challenges by modifying land 
use controls; and, to market constraints through the use of financial incentives and 
disincentives.  
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This Chapter provides details on the research problem, purpose, objectives and approach.  
This research is illustrative of an intrinsic case study method.  Strengths and weaknesses of 
the qualitative approach and case study method are discussed. 
 
4.2 Problem Statement 
 
The City of Ottawa claims to have adopted a collaborative approach to growth management 
and implemented numerous policies and programs to achieve a compact urban form that 
reflects the contemporary planning principles of Smart Growth.  Growth trends, however, 
demonstrate that much of Ottawa’s growth over the last 15 years has and will continue to be 
in the City’s three suburban centres.  At the same time, actual rates of intensification as 
witnessed on the ground have been disappointing.  A constrained land supply in the hands of 
only several large land owners has resulted in an increase in land values and, in turn, an 
increase in housing costs.  This, as well as provincial funding for new roads, the market’s 
desire for low density housing, and weaker growth management policies in surrounding 
municipalities has resulted in negative net migration in Ottawa and high growth rates in 
neighbouring municipalities. 
 
The review of the literature suggests that the low rates of residential intensification in Ottawa 
could be a result of some level of disconnect between the acceptance of the broad, 
motherhood principles of compact urban form as a policy objective at the municipal level, and 
prohibitive constraints on development observed at the site level.  Increases in residential 
intensification will require a strengthened growth management strategy that can respond to 
site level constraints.   
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The key research question motivating this thesis is:  How can the City of Ottawa’s growth 
management strategy be strengthened to better support residential intensification in order to 
achieve the compact urban form promoted in the Official Plan?   
 
This research is timely because the City of Ottawa will embark on its mandatory 5-year 
Official Plan review in 2008.  There will be an opportunity during that process to establish 
municipal-wide intensification targets and to strengthen the growth management strategy 
policies and programs that support residential intensification projects. 
 
4.3  Purpose Statement 
 
This research is concerned with identifying weaknesses in the City of Ottawa’s growth 
management strategy.  The purpose of this research is to provide recommendations that can be 
used to strengthen Ottawa’s growth management policies and programs to more effectively 
achieve the compact urban form desired by the municipality.  
  
4.4 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research are: 
 
• To identify the City of Ottawa’s individual policies and programs that together form 
the growth management strategy; 
• To evaluate the degree to which individual growth management policies and 
programs support residential intensification;  
• To identify general themes concerning weaknesses in the City’s growth management 
strategy; 
• To provide recommendations on how the growth management strategy can be 
strengthened to better support intensification projects at the site level thereby 
achieving municipal-wide goals for a compact urban form. 
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4.5 Intrinsic Case Study 
 
Case study research can be defined as a holistic inquiry that aims to investigate, explore, and 
depict a setting or phenomenon for the purpose of advancing understanding of it (Harling, 
2002, Cousin, 2005).  It is typically used to answer “how” and “why” questions in an effort to 
provide an understanding of a particular phenomenon (Tellis, 1997).  The “phenomenon” can 
be almost anything, including a program, an event, a problem or an individual(s) (Harling, 
2002).  In case studies, the researcher works within the natural setting of the phenomenon, 
defined as the contextual conditions.  Context is important in case studies because, “many 
factors in the setting impinge on the phenomenon or because the separation between the 
phenomenon and the context is not clear or evident,” (Harling, 2002).  While researchers 
attempt to develop a holistic understanding of the research setting, the work is bound by 
temporal and spatial boundaries (Cousin, 2005; Harling, 2002) 
 
Case studies can involve one or multiple cases.  Three types of case studies have been 
identified in academic literature: intrinsic case studies, which are concerned with a particular 
case; instrumental case studies, which use a single case to provide a general understanding of 
a phenomenon; and collective case studies, which use a number of cases to provide a general 
understanding of a phenomenon (Harling, 2002, Cousin, 2005).   
 
This research was carried out as an intrinsic case study, an appropriate approach given that the 
purpose of the research is focused on the unique circumstances facing the City of Ottawa and 
given that the resulting recommendations will apply strictly to the case study city.  While 
other planning jurisdictions may experience similar development patterns and pressures to 
that of the case study area, the findings and conclusions of this research will not be 
generalized to apply to similar circumstances in other municipalities.  The City of Ottawa is 
unique from other Canadian cities in that, as a capital city, it has been subject to a relatively 
long history of planning efforts.  Ottawa is subject to federal as well as provincial and local 
planning efforts and it borders on the Province of Quebec, a province with a distinct culture 
and its own territorial and sovereignty concerns.  Although one may make generalizations of 
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the findings, “the research aims to generalize within rather than from the case.” (Cousin, 
2005, p. 422). 
 
4.6 The Qualitative Method 
 
Case studies typically rely on qualitative research, a method that permits unique responses.  
The benefit of this approach is that it, “seek(s) to understand social action at greater richness 
and depth …,” than a quantitative method (Orum et al., 1991).  The latter assumes that a 
behaviour or relationship can be measured numerically through scores, counts of incidents, 
ratings or the like (Jupp, 2006).  An inherent weakness of the quantitative method is that 
social meanings are eliminated in the process of converting non-numerical values to numbers 
(Jupp, 2006).  Instead, a qualitative approach places, “an emphasis on the qualities of entities 
and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity or frequency,” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, p. 13).  The approach 
recognizes the complexity and plurality of relationships and permits flexibility in judgments 
(Orum et al, 1991).   
 
The research conducted for this thesis relies heavily on qualitative data because it aims to 
provide an understanding of a complex problem that defies simple explanation.  A qualitative 
method is best employed in this situation because many variables need to be considered 
(Harling, 2002).   
 
The most common sources of qualitative information are interviews, documentary analysis 
and participant observation (Somekh and Lewin, 2005; Tellis, 1997).  Interviews are one of 
the most important sources and can be characterized as: open-ended, in which informants are 
asked to talk about key events and where they may propose solutions or provide insights; 
focused, a short interview in which a set of questions is typically asked in an effort to confirm 
data collected from another source; and structured, in which informants are asked a detailed 
set of questions developed in advance (Tellis, 1997).   
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This research relied heavily on key informant interviews with City of Ottawa and National 
Capital Commission planning staff, development industry representatives, and leaders of 
community associations.  Most of the interviews were open-end, however, several focused 
interviews were carried out with key informants who had authored particular reports and thus 
had intimate knowledge of one or several aspects of Ottawa’s growth management policies 
and programs.  A significant amount of time was spent in advance of the meetings reviewing 
planning policy documents, staff reports, and Council minutes. 
 
4.7 Methodological Steps 
 
This research was accomplished in four main steps: identification of policies and programs; 
key informant interviews; data sorting and analysis; and, interpretation. 
 
4.7.1 Identification of Policies and Programs 
 
The first step in the research process was the collection of all applicable planning documents 
related to managing growth in the City of Ottawa, including policy documents, planning staff 
reports, and private consultant reports.  These documents were reviewed for the purpose of 
identifying the policies and programs that formed the City’s growth management strategy.  In 
accordance with the findings in the review of the relevant recent literature (Chapter 3: 
Encouraging Compact Development), policies and programs were categorized as being either 
an example of a Collaborative Approach, a Land Use Control, or a Financial Incentive or 
Disincentive.  Table 4.1 provides a summary of Ottawa’s growth management policies and 
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Community Design Plans 
Land Use Controls 
Urban Boundary 
Target Areas 
Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives 
Development Charges 
Brownfields Development Strategy 
Draft Density Incentive Guidelines 
 
 
The preliminary review of the documents provided an initial understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each of the policies and programs.  City of Ottawa planning staff reports 
were particularly useful in providing a chronology of various initiatives, highlighting their 
applicability to municipal goals for compact development, and outlining opportunities and 
constraints for implementation.  The document review was also useful in providing an initial 
contact list of possible key informants. 
 
4.7.2 Key Informant Interviews 
 
Key informant interviews were carried out with City of Ottawa, surrounding municipalities, 
and National Capital Commission planning staff; members of the development industry; 
private planning and real estate consultants; and community associations.  A list of potential 
key informants was initially prepared based on personal contacts, the document review, and a 
review of municipal and corporate web sites.  An effort was made to ensure that there was 
sufficient diversity in the preliminary list of key informants to make certain that a broad range 
of perspectives would be represented.  Potential interviewees were contacted by telephone, a 
call that informed them of the study, its purpose, and their possible role.  Those interested in 
participating were e-mailed an information letter explaining the research and the process.  
After several days, those who had expressed interest were contacted, their participation was 
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confirmed, and interview dates were established.  Key informants were then asked if they 
could recommend and provide contact information for additional potential participants.  
Those potential interviewees were contacted and recruited using the same process.  Similarly, 
at the end of each interview, each participant was asked if they could provide the name and 
contact number of possible participants.  By the end of the interview process many of the 
same contact names were provided. 
 
Key informant interviews were carried out in person over a two week period in mid-October 
2006.  As Table 4.2 demonstrates, a total of 23 interviews were conducted with participants 
from a diverse range of local businesses and organizations.  
 








City of Ottawa Planning Staff 6 CO 
Development Industry 
(including greenfield and infill residential, commercial, and 
industrial developers and the Ottawa-Carleton Home Builders 
Association) 
8 DI 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 3 P 
Surrounding Municipalities 3 SM 
Community Association Representatives 2 CA 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 1 NCC 
Total Key Informant Interviews 23 - 
   
 
During face-to-face interviews, key informants provided verbal opinions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of Ottawa’s individual growth management policies and programs for which they 
were familiar.  In some situations the individual was familiar with all of Ottawa’s growth 
management initiatives, while in others the key informant specialized in a particular aspect of 
the strategy.  Questions covered in interviews are presented in Appendix A. 
 
All of the interviews were digitally recorded.  After all of the interviews had been carried out, 
a summary of each interview was prepared in Microsoft Word format using the digital 
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recording.  Each respondent’s text summary was organized by growth management policy or 
program identified in Table 4.1.  Additional comments made during the interview that 
pertained to the issue of intensification were placed at the end of the text summary for further 
reference. 
 
4.7.3  Data Sorting and Analysis 
 
All of the text files summarizing the 23 interviews were gathered into one Microsoft Word 
file and respondents’ comments were categorized by policy or program.  This data was then 
sorted into favourable and unfavourable comments.  Quotes that best summarized 
respondents’ opinion’s were then retrieved from the digital audio files and transcribed.  
Quotes were coded by respondent by organization based on their Quote Sector Code 
identified in Table 4.2. 
 
The open-ended interview process allowed many respondents to comment on general 
observations about the City of Ottawa’s growth management strategy, barriers to 
intensification, or opportunities for improvement.  After 23 interviews, general themes clearly 
emerged.  Table 4.3 classifies these themes. 
 
Table 4.3: Emergent Themes 
 
Barriers to Intensification 
Community and Political Resistance 
Regulatory Challenges 
Influence of the Market 
Opportunities for Improvement 
Use Education and Demonstration Projects 
Establish Definitions 
Stronger Political Leadership 
 
 
In most cases, respondents did not either completely condone or condemn a particular policy 
or program.  A serious attempt was made to try and balance the complicated opinions 
expressed by respondents.  In an effort to summarize the responses, a synoptic table was 
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prepared for each policy or program to highlight respondents’ varied opinions.  The response 
of each key informant to each of the identified policies or programs was categorized into one 
of four response categories depending on how well they believed the initiative in question 
effectively supported residential intensification efforts in the City of Ottawa.  Response 
categories are presented in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Synoptic Table Response Categories 
Effective 
• While the respondent recognized there may be some 
opportunity for small improvements, they generally saw the 
policy or program as effectively supporting compact 
development 
Somewhat Effective 
• The respondent indicated that the current policy or program 
is appropriate for encouraging intensification but some 
elements required strengthening to be more effective 
Not Effective • Respondent did not believe the initiative effectively supported residential intensification efforts 
Not Addressed • Policy or program was not discussed or respondent refused to comment because they were not familiar with the initiative 
 
 
Individual responses were summarized by key informant sector, presented in Table 4.2.  The 
purpose of this summary was to illustrate how each sector generally responded to a policy or 
program, as it is recognized that some key informant sectors may be biased in their responses.  
For example, City of Ottawa respondents may be thought to always respond favourably to 
municipally-led intensification initiatives while the Development Industry, by nature of their 
relationship in the planning process, may consistently be unfavourable.  The synoptic table 




The interpretation process involved an evaluation of how effectively each of the City of 
Ottawa’s current growth management policies and programs responded to what the literature 
review and key informant interviews identified as barriers to intensification, namely: 
Community and Political Resistance, Regulatory Challenges, and Market Realities.  Based on 
key informant interviews, policies and programs were deemed to be either Effective, 
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Somewhat Effective, or Ineffective at responding to barriers to intensification.   Greater details 
defining effectiveness are presented in Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations. 
 
Recommendations that could be used to strengthen policies and programs were prepared 
based on the findings of the interview process and reference to recent relevant literature. 
 
4.8 Challenges of the Approach and Method 
 
Despite the general acceptance of the use of qualitative methods in the case study approach, 
the issue of reliability is a common criticism.  Reliability generally refers to, “the ability to 
replicate the original study using the same research instrument and to get the same results.” 
(Orum et al., 1991).  In qualitative research, personal interpretation plays a large role in 
analyzing and synthesizing data (Harling, 2002).  The results of the research reflect the 
subjective judgements of biased researchers, meaning that results could be unreliable because 
of multiple realities and cannot be used to construct solid, scientific evidence (Harling, 2002; 
Orum et al., 1991). 
 
To resolve these issues, an analytic strategy that organizes data into themes allows researchers 
to focus on common results and distance themselves from the trends that they want to see 
(Cousin, 2007).  Similarly, a variety of data sources, including multiple key informants, can 
be used to cross-check findings in a strategy called triangulation (Orum et al., 1991).  While 
researcher judgment is a necessary part of the case study approach, “the great strength of this 
form of research is that it does permit the observer to assemble complementary and 
overlapping measures of the same phenomena,” thereby supporting the validity of the 
observations (Orum et al., 1991, p. 19). 
 
This research used triangulation and an analytic strategy to help overcome the complications 
of perceived researcher bias.  Once data was collected, it was summarized, organized into 
themes, and then analyzed, thereby reducing the opportunities for subjective judgement.  It 
should be noted that because this research relied exclusively on qualitative data, every effort 
was made to ensure the accuracy of the emergent trends.  Many of the themes and trends 
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identified in this research had been observed by the researcher in previous work.  In instances 
where there was some question about the accuracy of the interpretation of responses, the 
researcher checked with objective others.  If this research was to be replicated, it is suggested 
that each key informant be formally asked whether a policy or program was, after defining the 
terms, Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Ineffective.  This would help eliminate much of the 
interpretation requirements and reduce the opportunity for the influence of researcher bias. 
Also, while this research attempted to reflect opinions of respondents from a broad group of 
businesses and organizations, including community associations, responses from members of 
the general public were somewhat limited.  Attempts were made to correspond with additional 
members of community associations but it was impossible to coordinate meetings with more 
than two representatives during the research period.  While meetings with two executive 
members of local community associations were carried out, respondents’ knowledge about 
specific policies or programs was somewhat limited.  Still, their opinions about certain growth 
management policies or programs were useful and they provided valuable insight into what 
they perceived to be barriers to intensification and opportunities for growth management 
strategy improvement. 
 
Seeing that politics plays such an important role in planning decisions, it would have been 
advantageous to have some representation from municipal politicians.  Because this research 
was carried out several weeks before municipal elections, no City Councillors were available 
for the key informant interviews.  Similar research in the future should consider the inclusion 
of perspectives from political representatives. 
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This Chapter provides a description of each of Ottawa’s growth management policies and 
programs designed to support compact development.  Each is followed by key informants’ 
opinions about the policy or program’s ability to implement the vision.  The Chapter includes 
a discussion of the broader challenges to intensification that were observed through the 
interview process but not addressed in each individual policy or program discussion.  
Similarly, it also provides a summary of what key informants thought were opportunities for 
strengthening the strategy. 
 
5.2 A Collaborative Approach to Managing Growth 
 
The literature review indicates that a collaborative approach is necessary to create, implement, 
and achieve intensification goals.  Because community planning is a political activity that 
impacts different segments of the population in different ways, this communicative and 
participatory process can, theoretically, help stakeholders, with often competing agendas, 
develop a common understanding of a problem and reach an agreed upon solution.  City of 
Ottawa planning staff provided examples throughout the key informant interviews of ways in 
which they have attempted to include stakeholders in the development of planning policy and 
program initiatives.  Two initiatives in particular stand out as being examples of a 
collaborative approach to community planning: the Official Plan and Community Design 
Plans. 
 
5.2.1 Official Plan 
 
The City of Ottawa has stated that they recognized the importance of taking a collaborative 
approach to developing their growth management strategy with the understanding that 
implementable solutions require key stakeholder input.  Growth management efforts for the 
new City began soon after amalgamation with a multi-day Smart Growth Summit.  The event 
   
  
   78
examined the concept of Smart Growth, how it could be applied to Ottawa, and launched the 
Ottawa 20/20 initiative - a framework for managing growth in the City over the next 20 years.  
The City then released A Window on Ottawa 20/20 – Ottawa’s Growth Management Strategy, 
a document that outlined the City’s growth management principles, growth management 
plans, implementation challenges and opportunities, and monitoring efforts.  After 
interdepartmental discussions and community feedback, seven growth management principles 
were established and used to guide the development of the City’s Official Plan, Economic 
Strategy, Humans Services Plan, Arts and Heritage Plan, and Environmental Strategy, 
documents which are collectively referred to as the City’s growth management plans.  
Together they contain municipal-wide policies intended to encourage a compact urban form, 
with a particular emphasis on the intensification of the built-up area.  There are several key 
policies in the Ottawa Official Plan that are particularly salient to the issue of intensification. 
 
Intensification means that the density of development, measured in households or 
employment per hectare, increases.  Intensification occurs along a continuum, from 
expansion of an existing use or infill on a vacant lot, right up to large-scale 
redevelopment of an area such as Rockcliffe Airbase.  Within the designated urban 
area, growth will be directed to locations with significant development potential, 
specifically those designated as Central Area, Mixed use Centres, Employment Areas, 
Enterprise Areas, Development Communities, and Mainstreets.  These areas include 
locations that are centred on the rapid-transit network, major roads, busy commercial 
streets, and large tracts of vacant land. 
 
Section 2.2.3, City of Ottawa Official Plan, May 2003 
 
 
The City supports intensification and infill development throughout the urban area, 
including areas designated General Urban Area.  The City will promote opportunities 
for intensification and infill in the following cases, provided that all other policies in 
the Plan are met: 
• Lands within 600 metres of future or existing rapid-transit stations; 
• Lands with legacy uses that are no longer viable for the purposes for which 
they were intended; 
• Lands that are currently used but are under-utilized; 
• Lands used for parking lots or extensive storage areas; and, 
• Brownfields 
 
Section 2.2.3.3, City of Ottawa Official Plan, May 2003 
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Introducing new development in existing areas that have developed over a long period 
of time requires a sensitive approach to differences between the new development and 
the established area … In general terms, compatible development means development 
that, although it is not necessarily the same as or similar to the existing buildings in 
the vicinity, nonetheless enhances an established community and coexists with existing 
development without causing undue adverse impact on surrounding properties. 
 
Section 2.5.1, City of Ottawa Official Plan, May 2003 
 
There was a clear division in respondents’ opinions about the success of the collaborative 
approach to the Official Plan visioning exercise, particularly between the City’s planning 
staff and the development industry.  Respondents disappointed in the visioning process 
suggested that it was completed under a very tight timeline, leaving little opportunity for a 
true consultation process and resulted in policies, many relating to residential intensification, 
being brought in with little or no debate.   
 
The whole OP process was one that was fast tracked from the private sector’s 
perspective, and you may find that the community groups feel the same way.  The 
Council and the administration set a timeline for completing the Official Plan 
exercise that basically led to a process that was rushed through.  There were some 
areas where policies were added into the plan at the 11th hour because they just never 
were dealt with in terms of consultation with the development community or the 
community associations.  The intensification policies were one, quite frankly, where I 
think the administration decided it was a good thing, and I don’t think anyone is 
going to say it was not a good thing, but then they developed policies to make it 
happen, and those policies weren’t developed with a whole lot of consultation with 
the private sector or the development community. (P – 2)  
 
I think there were certainly cases where very specific interests managed to insert 
things in the Official Plan that we may not have liked. (CA – 1)  
 
Some development industry respondents felt they were not fairly consulted because they had 
limited opportunities to express their opinions and felt that the concerns they did raise were 
not adequately addressed.   
 
From where I sit on a greenfield land development side, it was clear that the city was 
not looking to expand the boundary and not interested in planning for more than the 
next five years.  I was disappointed with the results.  (DI – 4)  
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The development industry was not fairly consulted during the Official Plan visioning 
process and there is consensus that we weren’t listened to either when we were 
consulted.  (DI – 7) 
 
The development industry was not very involved in the visioning process.  It was very 
much a grassroots, community driven process and the development industry was not 
well represented.  (P – 3) 
 
Some respondents expressed concerns that they had no representative on the Smart Growth 
Summit panel, a panel that instead included invited academics, planners and city officials 
from around the world, many of them from the United States, who had differing perspectives 
on growth controls.  Industry representatives were frustrated that they were left to attend 
sessions as general audience members.   
 
The speakers were very much into slowing growth, controlling growth.  Most of them 
came out of the United States where they have very different experiences with growth 
patterns and intensity of growth.  We’d be considered a fairly intensive city by any 
American standards.  You’d have people coming up from South Carolina talking 
about controlling growth in a state where they are facing tremendous sprawl … it is a 
different sort of discussion than we are having here.  I don’t think it was a full 
discussion of issues of growth that surround this City.  (P – 3) 
 
They held a weekend visioning exercise where they brought in a bunch of experts 
where they created these panels and, despite many expressions of interest to 
participate as a panel member, there was nobody from the industry invited to sit on 
any of the panels … And yet they brought in, quote-unquote, experts from the United 
States and western Canada and they telelinked to some guy in Oxford, England.  They 
debated 20/20 and Smart Growth and visioning exercises and had all these panels of 
experts debating the issues and yet nobody from the industry was invited.  (DI – 5) 
 
Similarly, respondents expressed frustration with the fact that their only forum for voicing 
concerns on draft Official Plan policies was during large public meetings, meetings in which 
they had to share time with special interest groups and the general public.  Because of the 
development industry’s role in shaping Ottawa’s urban form, they believed it was not 
unreasonable to expect exclusive meetings with City staff.  Similarly, respondents also 
complained that they did not have sufficient time to comment on draft documents.   
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It was clear that the City wasn’t as interested in what we had to say as we thought 
they should be.  Then we went into the consultation process and it didn’t go very well.  
We would be provided a document, we would provide comments and questions, but by 
the time we would get answers, the document would have changed 180 degrees. (DI – 
7) 
 
We’d be circulated on something and be asked for comments in the next week.  They’d 
be working on a document for a year, and suddenly they’d say, “Here it is and give us 
your comments by Monday.”  We would review the documents in detail and submit 
recommendations and none of them would ever appear anywhere.  There was never 
any discussion.  It was like things went in a black hole and disappeared.  (DI – 8) 
 
The visioning process left many in Ottawa’s development industry feeling as though the City 
was not interested in addressing their arguments and had taken a token approach to 
consultation.  Most agreed with the intensification principles expressed in general policies 
but believed the lack of developer input meant a lack of understanding about the market for 
high density products and about their economic feasibility.  There was also a concern 
expressed that there was no political will or community support to actually achieve policies 
related to intensification.  They felt this lack of development economic knowledge in turn led 
to over optimistic assumptions about the ability for infill and redevelopment opportunities to 
respond fully to the housing demands of the growing population.  For many, the implications 
of being left out of the process lead to a theoretically based Official Plan that did not 
recognize market realities or the challenges associated with political or community 
opposition to intensification projects. 
 
The development industry was concerned that the intensification policies were not 
realistic or achievable, not necessarily because the development sector thought the 
market potential or even the demand wasn’t there for the form of housing … it was 
the reality that it has been demonstrated time and time again that there wasn’t the 
political will or community support for it to happen. (P – 2) 
 
The opportunities (for intensification) exist, but I don’t think it is right that you do 
that by eliminating consumer choice in more traditional greenfields product.  There 
was an attempt in the Official Plan to do that.  I think it was a mistake not to 
recognize that market component.  The City didn’t do a good job of understanding 
that part of it.  (DI – 7) 
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The result of the failed visioning process, some respondents felt, was the adoption of a 
controversial Official Plan that the development industry generally opposed and lead to a 
significant number of appeals to the Ontario Municipal Board. 
 
It has resulted in a lot of policies that as an industry we oppose quite strongly and not 
something that is a historic trend.  Other OPs have gone through the process over the 
last few decades with far less controversy and far less opposition from the industry. 
(DI – 5) 
 
In contrast to the development industry’s views, City planners felt that the process was 
comprehensive and effective and cited City Council’s unanimous support for the Official 
Plan as evidence of a successful visioning process.  Planning staff argued that all special 
interest groups were well represented and indicated that the development industry was, in 
their opinion, fairly consulted as a stakeholder group and larger landowners were consulted 
on an individual basis.    
 
I am sure you have heard from the development industry that they were not included 
in the process and that anything they had to say we disregarded.  That, I don’t 
believe, was the case.  We certainly did involve them in a variety of ways in the 
development of the new Official Plan … Council agreed with staff’s recommendation 
that we impose a fixed urban boundary and not consider any revisions to it at a 
minimum during the five-year review period and likely over a longer period of time. 
(CO – 1) 
 
The Commissioner was a very eloquent supporter of the vision and had the complete 
backing of Council, which is refreshing.  The plan was carried unanimously, which is 
a very good accomplishment.  (CO – 2) 
 
Some City planning staff respondents suggested that the development industry’s criticisms to 
the Official Plan visioning exercise stemmed from the fact that most of Ottawa’s developers 
were in the business of building single and medium density homes in suburban locations.  
Intensification policies and a tight urban boundary make it more difficult to continue to build 
those dwelling types and, for that reason, the industry was reluctant to accept the new 
policies.   
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In general, key informant respondents who were critical of the collaborative approach to the 
visioning exercise felt the process was rushed and did not fairly take into account the 
opinions of all stakeholders.  It is important to note, however, that critics did acknowledge 
that the City is currently attempting to improve their consultation process by including key 
stakeholders early in the 2008 Official Plan review process. 
 
Once the city planning department realized it was right to do the right thing and that 
they weren’t going to lose their jobs just to listen to us, and that we had some good 
ideas, things started to go better.  In the last year we have made progress.  They have 
included us in a lot more.  We have discussed the run-up to the 2008 OP.  Everything 
has to be done – transportation plans, population projections – they have assured us 
that we will be involved in all of those activities all the way through.  At this point, we 
don’t have reason to doubt that, I think it will happen.  (DI – 8) 
 
Going into the next OP, the City has tried to fix previous problems by initiating 
consultation and going through more factual information.  They are doing a better 
job now of going through the vacant land inventory, doing proper market studies, 
demographic projections, all those sorts of things, or so far they have been.  They 
have included us in some meetings.  I think what we want to be able to achieve is to 
come to a consensus about what the existing needs are and what the forecasts are, 
even if we don’t know how to treat them … So far I feel more comfortable with the 
process.  (DI – 7) 
 
With respect to other stakeholders, community associations and National Capital 
Commission respondents generally supported the City’s approach to their visioning exercise.  
 
The City did a great job.  They had a 20/20 Growth Summit.  It was brilliant!  They 
had speakers and workshops and everybody was talking about Smart Growth. (NCC – 
1) 
 
I think we were quite involved … We had all of the subsequent drafts that came out.  
Though, it was like so many of those processes that start off slowly and, as we reach  
the end, they seem to come quicker and quicker so toward the end we were having 
difficulty in keeping track as we went into draft 3 to 4 and in a few weeks time in was 
in front of Council.  We certainly had a chance to comment and I certainly went down 
to comment as an individual and I certainly felt that we were listened too.  (CA – 1) 
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In general, the interview findings suggest that the vision prepared for the City did not 
appropriately respond to the issue of community and political resistance.  While the 
motherhood principles of a compact urban form had obvious social, economic, and 
environmental benefits, the “vision” did little to address the concerns of the public at the site 
level and Councillors often failed to uphold the policies for compact development in their 
own wards by supporting higher density proposals.  Similarly, respondents were concerned 
that the lack of involvement of Ottawa’s development industry but the inclusion of academics 
and urban thinkers from other cities meant that local market factors, such as the market 
demand for and the economic feasibility of higher density projects, were disregarded, leading 
to a very theoretical, academic based Official Plan. 
 
On the positive side, there is no doubt that raising the profile of the benefits of intensification 
will improve, if only somewhat, the perception of high density infill and redevelopment 
projects.  Similarly, the City’s attempt to package residential intensification as a legitimate 
way in which to accommodate a growing population is an appropriate approach.   
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the collaborative approach to create an Official Plan that effectively 
supports residential intensification.  The definitions and operational characterizations for the 
response categories in the following table and other tables in this Chapter are presented in 
Section 4.7.3 Data Sorting and Analysis. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of the Official Plan in 
Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 2 1 0 3 
Development Industry 0 1 6 1 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 0 2 1 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 2 1 
Community Association Representatives 1 1 0 0 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 1 0 0 0 
Total Responses 4 3 10 6 
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The interview process demonstrated that respondents were more content with the City’s more 
recent attempts to include a broad range of stakeholders in the visioning and Official Plan 
review process.  The fact that planning staff have consulted stakeholders a year in advance of 
the next review demonstrates their eagerness to encourage more productive dialogue and 
makes participants feel that their ideas and concerns are being legitimately addressed.  As 
Currie (2006) recognizes, a shift in the role of city planners from facilitators to facilitators and 
technical experts should improve the collaborative process in the 2008 Official Plan review.  
The City has made an attempt to seek out stakeholders and convey information at each stage 
of the process, efforts that will ensure the community is informed and allow for more 
meaningful dialogue between stakeholders and planners. 
 
5.2.2 Community Design Plans 
 
The Community Design Plan (CDP) initiative was introduced in Ottawa’s 2003 Official Plan 
in an effort to better address the challenges of land use compatibility in both the built-up area 
and on large greenfield sites.  The intent of the CDP process is to translate the principles and 
policies of the Official Plan to the community scale prior to introducing any significant 
changes in the community.  This planning process has two distinct features: it attempts to 
encourage community involvement early in the community planning process with the 
expectation of landowner, community, and political buy-in to the proposed plan; and, in 
recognizing the weaknesses in a land use documents’ ability to ensure compatible, tasteful 
design, it is used to implement urban and architectural design guidelines.  City planning staff 
provided some evidence of how these objectives were accomplished. 
 
The key words about CDPs are ‘public participation’ and ‘design’, and design has to 
do with vision.  That is why it is called a “Community Design” not a “Community 
Plan” and that is what differentiates it from a Secondary Plan, which is a land use 
plan based document.  A CDP has a greater design focus because we recognize that 
higher densities require a higher quality of design.  Land use planning documents 
cannot ensure high quality design.  (CO – 3) 
 
Planning is land use oriented and we are not held accountable for the final product.  
In a land use document, you may have all of the greatest thoughts on land use but the 
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product looks awful.  We have to take ownership of that, and that is the beauty of the 
CDP process, you can look at everything.  In the CDP process, land use is actually 
secondary. (CO – 4) 
 
CDPs can be carried out in either the existing built-up area or in Developing Communities, 
which are defined as large, undeveloped tracts of land within the urban boundary designated 
for new development.  As Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 demonstrate, eleven CDPs have been 
completed or are currently being carried out in the City of Ottawa. 
 
Table 5.2: Community Design Plans in Ottawa 
Developing Communities 
1 Fernbank Community Design Plan 
2 Barrhaven South Community Design Plan 
3 South Nepean Town Centre Community Design Plan 
4 Riverside South Community Design Plan 
5 Leitrim Community Design Plan 
6 East Urban Centre Community Design Plan 
7 Mer Bleue Community Design Plan 
8 Rockcliffe Airbase Community Design Plan 
Existing Built-up Area 
9 Old Ottawa East Community Design Plan 
10 O-Train Corridor Community Design Plan 
11 Wellington Street Community Design Plan 
12 Richmond Road Community Design Plan 
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Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a and recent CDP initiatives. 
Figure 5.1: Community Design Plans in Ottawa 
 
 
CDPs can be initiated by the City, a landowner, or community association.  In existing built-
up areas, CDPs are typically carried out in neighbourhoods that are experiencing growth 
pressures.  They are intended to provide an opportunity for the community to prepare a plan 
that locates sites that are best suited, in the opinion of stakeholders, for higher density 
development.   
 
By comparison, greenfields with the Developing Community land use designation are subject 
to the comprehensive planning process for the purpose of encouraging a mix of housing and a 
balance of jobs and households in an effort to create a complete community at the outset.  The 
plans may include no more than 60% single-detached and semi-detached residential units so 
that at least 40% of the units are multiple dwellings.  Ten percent of the units must be 
apartments.  Policies also require that residential uses develop at higher densities than in the 
past and that a broader mix of land uses is provided.  The overall average density of 29 units 
per net hectare for singles, semis and townhouses must be achieved for areas outside of the 
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Greenbelt.  The plan must also demonstrate how the proposed mix of land uses will achieve a 
balance of jobs and households, measured by the provision of 1.3 jobs for each new housing 
unit. 
 
Figure 5.2 demonstrate the mix of land uses proposed for Barrhaven South established 
through the CDP process.  The plan locates residential, commercial, and employment areas as 
well as major open space in the community, ensuring there is an appropriate balance of land 
uses as per Official Plan policies.  Residential unit mix and development densities comply 
with Official Plan requirements.  The CDP document provides further design guidelines for 
the built area, guidelines that development approvals planners are expected to consider when 
















Open Space 147.6 
Major Roads 118.1 
TOTAL 492.2 
 
Figure 5.2: Barrhaven South CDP and Development Statistics 
 
Stakeholders in the CDP process are reached through a variety of means including 
announcements in newspapers, mass mailings, and the invitation of community associations 
and special interest groups by the City.  Participants in the process can include multiple city 
departments, residents, landowners, businesses, and other interested parties.  Input by 
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stakeholders is typically obtained through workshops, questionnaires, and meetings held at 
key stages in the community planning process. 
 
In general, key informants agreed that, in theory, the CDP process is an appropriate approach 
to garner community support for locating higher density projects in the existing built-up area 
and increase development densities and broaden unit mix in suburban communities.  
Frustration, however, was expressed about the length of the process, the monetary expense, 
and confusion over the status, and thus the implementation potential, of the resulting plans. 
 
When the process was originally contemplated, it was expected that CDPs would be 
completed efficiently, generally within a year.  In actuality, only one of the City’s approved 
CDPs was completed in that timeframe and only because it was a small area, it was owned by 
the city, and it was in relative isolation from existing communities.  Ottawa’s other CDPs 
have taken much longer to complete, a common frustration amongst all respondents.   
 
I agree that it is an appropriate vehicle, but I think it takes way too long.  It just 
always takes twice as long as you think. (DI – 4) 
 
The consultants, subconsultants, the landowners and the core project team 
established here in the City would meet every two weeks for a half day for the whole 
duration of the process, say a year and a half.  It was very, very time consuming for 
everybody.  (CO – 5) 
 
Greenfield CDPs are easier in the fact that the expectations are clearer but they have 
been more challenging in terms of getting these things through the municipality and 
approved.  They take a long time … I don’t think they (the City) really knew how long 
they were going to take, to be perfectly honest.  (P – 3) 
 
The lengthy process was blamed by some respondents on the level of detail required for each 
CDP and the general lack of internal organization at the municipal level.  Many complained 
that CDPs in greenfields required much more detail than previously required secondary plans 
and were virtually equivalent to plans of subdivision.  Frustration was expressed about the 
time and monetary expense required to complete detailed design work that would likely have 
to be revised by the time development was ready to be built. 
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They are trying to get into the equivalent of plans of subdivision – detailed 
engineering drawings for every road and every intersection, all the sewers, built 
design stormwater management ponds, parks, and their size and their orientation 
right down to the block size – all for this community.  In the old secondary plan, they 
would just have a star.  Theoretically, if all this stuff didn’t change, then what you 
had in place would all work.  But by the time this stuff starts happening, however, it 
will be old stuff.  (DI – 3) 
 
They are actually doing subdivision planning.  They tell you that they aren’t but they 
really are.  You can look at a report and you can figure out how that 10,000th house is 
going to get serviced, from where and what drain it will drain to.  I think they need to 
tone it down … now we are micro managed to the point that we are doing detailed 
design at the first level.  (DI – 4) 
 
More detailed plans are more costly to prepare.  A consistent complaint about the CDP 
process was the dependence on City of Ottawa staff resources to lead projects, which are 
limited by budgetary constraints.  The City of Ottawa carries out CDPs based on an approved 
work program and budget for the year.  In an effort to overcome budgetary constraints and 
advance the CDP work program, front-ending agreements have been established between the 
City and some landowners to allow for the preparation of CDPs prior to their work program 
date.  The CDP process is thus managed by the City of Ottawa but the project consultants are 
paid directly by the developers, who regain some of their expenses in the future from the City 
in the form of an area charge that is part of the development charge.  This approach has made 
the development industry concerned about the optics of the resulting plan to the general 
public. 
 
There is a grey line because the bills are being paid by the developers for a City-run 
project.  So the consultants get pulled in both directions.  You have the City saying, 
“We want you to do this, this, and this,” and the developer’s saying, “While you are 
considering that, can you do this and this.”  If, for what ever reason, it goes the 
developer’s way, it comes back to, “Well, you were being paid on the behalf of the 
City by the developer.” (DI – 6) 
 
It puts the planning department into a huge conflict because now they are relying on 
consultants picked by developers.  (DI – 3)   
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Another concern raised by respondents was the issue of the plan’s status when it was 
complete, particularly the enforcement of design guidelines.  In theory, plans are expected to 
be supported by Official Plan or zoning by-law amendments.  Council is expected to approve 
these amendments at the same time as they approve the CDP.  There are, however, examples 
where zoning amendments have not been implemented but the CDP has been approved by 
Council and is in place.   
 
Requirements are put in the design guidelines.  How enforceable are they?  Who 
knows!  (DI – 3) 
 
The plan is to implement them through zoning, but that is a bit unclear as well.  The 
original Official Plan said they would be approved by Council as Council resolutions.  
The difficulty with that is there is no right of appeal, not like a secondary plan that 
you bring into the Official Plan and you get the right of appeal.  That is problematic 
from the developer’s point of view because if Council makes a silly decision, there is 
no right to challenge it.  From a community’s point of view, if they make a silly 
decision on behalf of the developer because he happens to have the ear of Council, 
there is no right of appeal.  It hasn’t really been tested yet.  (P – 3) 
 
A City planning staff respondent arguing in favour of CDPs made a similar point but saw the 
flexibility of the status as a positive feature of the CDP initiative. 
 
I think they are great documents because they aren’t tied to the Planning Act.  They 
are adopted by Council.  At the OMB they have the status of guidelines and decisions 
can be rendered based on them, though they may have a little less power than if they 
were a secondary plan.  The beauty of them is that you can put anything you want in 
them. (CO – 4)  
 
The respondent indicated that CDPs contained design and architectural detail guidelines that 
are expected to be implemented at the development application stage and suggested that there 
is sufficient information within each CDP for development approval planners to make 
informed decisions.   
 
Related to this issue is the development industries criticism about the lack of consistency 
amongst CDP requirements.  While the Official Plan very specifically outlines CDP 
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requirements, some of the resulting plans are very detailed while others provide only high 
level guidelines.   
 
They are still struggling to figure out what a Community Design Plan is.  There are 
different ones out there that have different flavours and different requirements for 
research.  The City did one in a community in the east that has virtually no backbone, 
no studies, but resulted in a plan.  There are others in the west or the south that 
require extensive study beyond anyone’s expectation. (P – 3)  
 
City planning staff defended the differing scopes by stating that each CDP should be different 
because they each represented different local contexts.  They argued that each neighbourhood 
is different and some stakeholders asked for more precision in their document than others.  A 
number of respondents also acknowledged that differing project managers have differing skill 
sets and interests in planning.  These values are reflected in the CDP process and in the end 
product.  
 
The CDP process depends on the experience of the planner.  So you have social 
planners vs. land use planners vs. design planners.  This is not necessarily a bad 
thing.  The most important aspect of the CDP process is management.  Management 
must assign a planner that has the particular knowledge set for the area in which the 
CDP is being conducted.  (CO – 3) 
 
It takes on the flavour sometimes of the project manager or consultant who has been 
hired to do it.  (NCC – 1) 
 
Despite the complaints raised about the process, City planning staff respondents were content 
about the success of CDPs.  They indicated that all of the greenfield community design plans 
completed to date had been successful in reaching the residential unit mix and density targets.   
 
CDP’s start to change their perception of what the Official Plan says and what they 
are actually going to see as a community, and I think that helps … The CDPs are 
definitely achieving the 60/30/10 split.  (CO – 5) 
 
Developers are buying in and are willing to have CDPs reflect higher densities.  (CO 
– 1) 
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To the City, it demonstrated that the development industry was confident that they could 
successfully market townhouses and stacked townhouses in the suburbs.  That said, they did 
acknowledge that the higher average density was achieved by increases in the proportion of 
medium density units, not by increases in the density of singles.  Development industry 
respondents agreed that density increases for singles had stalled.  Also, there was general 
agreement that high density units would be difficult to achieve in suburban communities. 
 
Blocks will be set aside for stacked townhouses or maybe even a block set aside for an 
apartment and the real question is going to be, when it actually gets developed, how 
will it get developed?  So that in terms of your applications and approvals process, 
you may meet the target and may meet the policy, but does that last block that 
actually achieves the density ever get built?  (P – 2) 
 
Whether the higher development densities on the greenfield CDPs are the result of stricter 
policies and a more collaborative planning process is debatable.  Several respondents stated 
that the CDP process is no different than any other secondary plan process in terms of public 
participation or stake holder buy-in.  In addition, City staff and development industry 
respondents recognized that while Official Plan policies and zoning facilitate development, it 
is the market that dictates the type of product that is built.  Ottawa is a fast-growing City that 
is experiencing significant housing demand. 
 
I think the market has driven the development community to higher densities 
generally because of the simple cost of housing has required that they put a variety of 
marketable products in their subdivisions.  So typically, without a forcing of the hand 
of the municipality, we are getting a very strong blend of towns, back-to-back 
townhouses, terraced houses, and small lot singles.  I think the market was going 
there regardless.  (P – 3) 
 
There has been a huge increase in intensification and it has partly been an accident 
of timing.  The condo market was, for whatever reason, barely non-existent in Ottawa 
for the last 10 years, from the late 80s to the late 90s.  There was that negative cycle 
going on.  But the market has been driving the change since 2000.  (CO – 2) 
 
Developers will tell you that the market will dictate what they build, not the city.  The 
City can have a policy and that policy can be fine now but if the market isn’t there, it 
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isn’t going to get built.  In the end, the market will tell you if you can do what you 
want to do.  (P – 1) 
 
Several respondents involved in the CDP process suggested ways in which the planning 
process could be improved. 
 
I don’t think they should be a 2 year process.  They should be a couple of community 
meetings, a vision statement, and a general sense of what a mainstreet should look 
like.  (DI – 4) 
 
A good CDP requires: a good terms of reference; a good reference point for 
receiving feedback, such as a steering committee; and a good steering committee 
should be composed of a mix of participants – developers, community business 
owners, key city staff, and rate payers – because it encourages good discussion.  (P – 
3) 
 
In general, respondents were optimistic about the potential for neighbourhood-specific 
Community Design Plans for encouraging higher densities.  Most of the frustrations about 
CDPs were process related, such as the lengthy timeline, unclear report component 
requirements, and the status of design and architectural guidelines.  The collaborative 
approach seemed to be successful in attracting key stakeholders and used a variety of formats 
to solicit input from the general public, developers, and politicians.  There is an expectation 
that these efforts will help thwart community and political resistance and overcome regulatory 
challenges when development applications come forward in the future.  There is also the 
expectation that the approvals process will be faster and easier because detailed background 
work has been completed.  Only time will tell if the collaborative approach to neighbourhood 
planning has been successful in implementing higher density projects in existing developed 
areas.  Expectations are high that they will.   
 
Table 5.3 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the collaborative approach to create Community Design Plans that 
effectively support residential intensification. 
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Table 5.3: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of Community Design Plans 
in Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 2 4 0 0 
Development Industry 1 4 3 0 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 3 0 0 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 1 0 2 
Community Association Representatives 2 0 0 0 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 1 0 0 
Total Responses 5 13 3 2 
 
5.3 Land Use Controls 
 
The literature review demonstrated that intensification policies and programs can be 
implemented through land use controls, which are typically implemented through Official 
Plan policies and help to facilitate the regulatory process.  The City of Ottawa Official Plan 
land use policies manage growth in two ways: direct new growth to land within the urban 
boundary; and encourage compact, mixed use development on greenfields and infill and 
redevelopment in existing built-up areas.   
 
5.3.1 Directing Growth within the Urban Area Boundary 
 
City of Ottawa Official Plan policies manage growth by directing new development to land 
within the urban boundary.  Policies state that there is to be a sufficient amount of land in the 
urban boundary to meet the city’s 20-year requirement for housing, employment and other 
purposes.  It is expected that about 90% of population growth will be directed to land within 
the boundary.  The remaining 10% is projected to be dispersed throughout the rural area, 
primarily in villages.  The spatial extent of Ottawa urban boundary is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a 
Figure 5.3: Ottawa’s Urban Boundary 
 
 
In an effort to encourage compact urban development and intensification, the ability to 
expand the urban boundary has been made increasingly difficult in recent years.  Policies in 
the former Region of Ottawa-Carleton permitted boundary expansion through a Regional 
Official Plan Amendment application process.  In contrast, one of the cornerstones of the new 
Official Plan is that the city will only consider expanding the boundary after it has completed 
a comprehensive review of the need for additional land, a process that will only be carried out 
as part of the five-year Official Plan review process.  If it is determined that additional land is 
required, alternative locations for expansion would be identified, compared, and evaluated 
based on a number of criteria and would include consultation with stakeholders.  Only large 
plots of land that are sufficient in size to complete a new or an existing community would be 
considered. 
 
To ensure that the land supply within the urban boundary meets the policies in the Official 
Plan and the Provincial Policy Statement, the City of Ottawa continuously monitors the 
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supply of vacant residential and employment land.  While municipal documents state there is 
a sufficient amount of land within the urban boundary to meet policy requirements, recent 
Ontario Municipal Board decisions supporting incremental expansions to the urban boundary 
and Council’s decisions to redesignate large parcels of urban land for alternate uses calls into 
question the accuracy of the City of Ottawa’s assumptions and conclusions about supply.  
OMB decisions have recognized that there is a shortage of residential land for low-density 
housing and that supply has fallen short of Provincial Policy Statement guidelines.   
 
The issue of “sufficient supply” is often debated in attempts to expand the urban boundary or 
to obtain large land use redesignation approvals.  Attempts to quantify the supply of 
residential and employment land is complicated by opposing assumptions about total demand, 
locational preferences, unit/employment mix, development densities, influence of infill or 
redevelopment opportunities, vacancy/demolition/in-production rates, and net-to-gross ratios.   
 
I think what was lacking when policies were devised was the proper inventory of 
existing supply and that market factor and whether it was supportable.  (DI -7) 
 
Urban boundaries limit vacant land supply and have the potential to cause an oligopoly of 
landowners which can lead to a minimum price floor for new housing.  Opponents of the 
spatial extent of the current urban boundary argue that there is not a sufficient amount of 
vacant residential land and it is having a negative impact on the provision of affordable 
housing.   
 
Urban boundary expansion is a very political topic and there was no way the mayor 
was going to allow it to expand.  As a result, land values have sky rocketed and now 
you see unzoned rural lands selling for what 5 years ago urban greenfield lands 
would sell for.  So people are really betting on land at high prices.  (DI – 4) 
 
The whole problem of freezing the boundary is it has driven up home prices, has 
created a situation where developers aren’t selling serviced lots to anybody else 
because all of a sudden their land supply is so finite that they wouldn’t dare do so, 
and it has shut out a lot of smaller builders who can’t afford to purchase serviced 
lots.  That, therefore, affects the consumer and the type of house they can have.  (DI – 
7)   
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We deal a lot with those who acquire land for builders and they tell us land prices 
have tripled since 2003 when the original plan came into effect.  (P – 3) 
 
What is driving up the cost of residential land right now is the boundary and the fact 
that there are few parcels of land remaining.  Any land left in the boundary is 
conflicted with two elements: one, all of the easy sites are gone, so what is left 
probably has issues; two, because it is still available, the price has gone up.  So what 
you have left is very expensive land that has unusual costs associated with bringing it 
on for development.  (DI – 5) 
 
In response to the complaints, the City of Ottawa commissioned a study to provide an 
objective opinion the causes of the increase in local vacant land prices in recent years.  The 
February 2005 report Trends in Residential Land Costs in the City of Ottawa and Factors 
Affecting Them (2005) demonstrated that the residential market was performing at or near 
peak levels from the time the new urban boundary policy was implemented, but cautioned that 
increased demand and escalating land prices were the result of a variety of market influences 
and economic cycles and not just the implementation of a more restrictive growth 
management policy.   
 
The report concluded that while there was no evidence that the policy caused a “spike” in 
prices, it did contribute somewhat to the upward pressure on urban residential land prices.  
This pressure was attributed primarily to the highly concentrated ownership of urban 
residential land and the reluctance of larger landowners to sell serviced lots to small builders 
under the current municipal policy context.  The report stated that while the development and 
building community understood that the policy would be reviewed in 2008, many believed the 
current boundary would be held for a much longer period.  With demand for residential land 
high and supply low and under the current policy context, many larger developers and 
builders preferred to retain their lots for their own use and resist selling to smaller builders, 
thereby ensuring a secure supply of serviced lots.  Thus, when serviced lots become available 
to smaller builders competition is high and land prices are pushed upward.  The report stated 
that the difficulty in obtaining lots has pushed some builders to carryout projects in other 
communities or shift to other forms of residential development, such as infill projects inside 
the Greenbelt.  Several respondents had similar theories about the influence of the urban 
boundary and land prices. 
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In Ottawa we have a very concentrated ownership of land.  We’ve got about five guys 
who own most of the designated land.  So those five guys have a big say about where 
it happens, how it happens, and when it happens … There is tons of land out there but 
there is a constrained supply in terms of ownership.  (P – 1) 
 
Some of the respondents argued that high land prices in recent years have forced homebuyers 
to seek lower cost alternatives in municipalities beyond the city’s borders.  The City of 
Ottawa (2005a), attributing this phenomenon to improved road access and the increasing cost 
of housing in Ottawa. The out-migration of Ottawa residents to other Canadian locations is 
weighted heavily to those municipalities around Ottawa and Gatineau.  The high proportion of 
in-bound commuters from some adjacent municipalities shows that residential growth in those 
locations is linked to jobs in Ottawa.    
 
City of Ottawa planning staff and private consultant respondents argued, however, that the 
movement of residents to surrounding municipalities could be linked to provincially-funded 
transportation improvements as much as they could be to urban boundary policies. 
 
How do you balance the tightening up of policies against the development of a 4-lane 
highway?  The development of Highway 7 to Carleton Place has an impact on 
development.  They did the 416 several years ago which now allows people from 
north Grenville to be in the City of Ottawa in 20 – 25 minutes.  So, which is it?  Is it 
the fact that the rules are so tight in Ottawa and the rules are so cumbersome 
compared to outlying areas or is it the fact that we have better transportation 
networks?  It is a bit of both.  (SM – 2) 
 
Over time, as the City gets bigger, that commutershed is getting bigger and bigger.  
Because of the 417, there have always been a lot of commuters from Russel Township.  
What we are seeing now is that they have extended the 416 so that area is going 
crazy.  They are 4-laning Highway 7 to Carleton Place so that area is booming.  (CO 
– 2) 
 
The “leapfrogging” of urban development increases travel to work mostly by automobile, 
which can represent a lost opportunity to increase ridership and serves to increase 
environmental impacts from automobile use.  Also, those who work in Ottawa but reside in 
surrounding municipalities do not contribute to the City’s main revenue-generating sources: 
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development charges and property taxes.  The City thus provides services without the benefit 
of collecting fees. 
 
In general, respondents did not respond negatively to the use of an urban boundary to identify 
the spatial extent of the urban area.  In several interviews, key informants actually recognized 
the risks of making it too large.  The concern of many, instead, was that they did not believe 
there was a sufficient amount of vacant designated land within the boundary to accommodate 
growth over the 20-year planning horizon.   The implication was that land values were 
increasing dramatically and housing was becoming unaffordable.  Families wanting a single 
detached house with a large lot were therefore moving to adjacent municipalities just beyond 
the City’s borders to find desirable accommodations.  This has implications on appropriate 
planning over the larger region, for which there is not a comprehensive plan. 
 
While respondents were quick to recognize that land values were increasing due to a 
constrained supply, most failed to associate this with the trend to compensate for higher land 
prices by building at higher densities.  Interestingly, most agreed that the market for 
townhouses was increasing because housing prices were increasing and not as many first time 
homebuyers could afford singles.  The literature review does caution, however, that 
containment policies must be accompanied by strategies that ensure sufficient opportunities 
for higher density, infill or redevelopment projects, something the development industry 
argues does not exist in Ottawa.  Similarly, urban boundaries must also include provisions for 
affordable housing and continuous monitoring programs to reduce the impact of housing price 
inflation.  Based on many respondents’ opinions about the low demand for rental units and 
lack of government incentives for the creation of affordable housing, the provision of lower 
cost housing was not considered economically viable by many in the development industry. 
 
To most respondents, Ottawa’s tight urban boundary did nothing to address community and 
political resistance of intensification projects at the site level and did not help with regulatory 
challenges.  Similarly, it failed to respond to market realities, thereby causing Ottawa 
residents to move to other communities that have less rigorous policies.   
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Table 5.4 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the urban boundary to effectively support residential intensification. 
 
Table 5.4: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of the Urban Boundary in 
Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 1 0 0 5 
Development Industry 0 1 3 4 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 1 1 1 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 2 1 
Community Association Representatives 0 0 0 2 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 1 2 6 14 
 
5.3.2 Intensification in Target Areas  
 
Within the urban area, residential and employment growth is encouraged to develop at higher 
densities on greenfields and through infill or redevelopment of the existing built-up area.  
Official Plan policies support intensification throughout the General Urban Area and promote 
it particularly in five target land use designations: Central Area; Mixed Use Centres; 
Enterprise Areas; Mainstreets; and, in the Vicinity of Transit Stations.  The City suggests that 
these designations provide the greatest opportunities for compact development because of 
their orientation to alternative forms of transportation and opportunities available for the 
provision of mixed land uses.  Table 5.5 provides a summary of the policies applicable to 
these designations and Figure 5.4 demonstrates their location in the municipality. 
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Table 5.5: Summary of Official Plan Policies for Intensification Target Areas 
Central Area 
• the focal point of economic and cultural activities   
• while a wide range of uses are encouraged to expand in this area, there is 
particular emphasis on increasing residential opportunities  
• increased residential development will enhance the downtown experience by 
supporting day and night, and year-round activities 
Mixed Use 
Centres 
• located on rapid-transit network which lies adjacent to major roads  
• situated within the Greenbelt and in suburban communities 
• focal point for housing, jobs, and commercial services over time 
• emphasis is placed on encouraging transit-supportive land uses 
• mixed uses offer greater variety and enhanced choice and strengthens the 
Centre’s role as both a destination and an attractive place to live 
Enterprise Areas 
• business parks that are achieving, or able to achieve, higher employment 
densities due to the presence of multi-storey office buildings 
• policies have evolved to permit retail and commercial services in an effort to 
make them more attractive and convenient places to work 
• in an effort to transform these areas into more compact, mixed use areas, 
policies permit attached residential dwellings in Enterprise Areas so long as a 
set of criteria are met 
• may also consider Official Plan amendment to redesignate into a Mixed Use 
Centre so long as minimum employment targets are met and a CDP is 
prepared 
Mainstreets 
• arterial roads that have evolved as focal points for shopping, offices, and 
community activities 
• they provide opportunities for infill and redevelopment, particularly on 
surface parking lots and brownfield sites, with the expectation that a more 
densely developed form will in turn reinforce the mix of uses currently 
present, support transit initiatives, contribute to the continuity of building 
facades, and integrate with the adjacent community 
• mixed residential and retail uses are encouraged in the same buildings 
Vicinity of 
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Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a 
Figure 5.4: Ottawa’s Intensification Target Areas 
 
 
Some respondents acknowledged that the strength of the land use policies is that they bring 
awareness to the issue of intensification opportunities in target areas.  Others argue that the 
major weakness is that the policies are not entrenched in municipal programs that can actually 
lead to the implementation of intensification projects.  Interview respondents suggested that 
policies permitting higher densities are only now being incorporated into the zoning by-law, 
which is still in draft form, and are not supported by other initiatives.  As Alexander and 
Tomalty (2002) point out, policy planners fail to get the support of engineering, 
transportation, or public works staff when it comes to getting intensification projects approved 
due to the fact that they tend to be concerned exclusively with codes and standards of 
conventional design instead of broader policy objectives. 
 
In terms of what the City has actually done, they have certainly promoted the idea (of 
intensification).  The policies have a lot of intention, so it has changed the mindset of 
planning committee and council in terms of what they would approve, and even the 
mindset of the development industry, and maybe even some members of the general 
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public.  But … the attitudes that engineers have at looking at sewer capacity have not 
changed.  (CO -2) 
 
 
Development industry respondents expressed reservations about the market’s interest in 
locating in the areas targeted for residential intensification.  In particular, they had very low 
expectations about the ability to achieve high density residential uses in suburban mixed use 
areas because of the low market demand for higher density residential and the strong role of 
existing commercial uses on many of the sites.   
 
Mixed used centres haven’t been particularly successful anywhere, expect for maybe 
in Orleans.  Frankly, the market is not there for what they want to do.  It is very hard 
to create something that doesn’t occur in a natural economic way.  (P – 1) 
 
We think the mixed use centre policies are off the wall.  I don’t have a problem with 
mixed use centres being promoted for residential.  What I have a problem with is the 
City suggesting that new residential growth will be directed to commercial areas that 
are already developed.  (DI – 4) 
 
Some infill developers highlighted the challenges associated with trying to achieve the City’s 
Mainstreet objectives and be a good neighbour.  In most cases, vacant or underdeveloped 
Mainstreet parcels do not have a significant amount of buffering from existing residential uses 
because available sites are narrow, setbacks are minimal, and adjacent properties are often 
occupied by single detached dwellings.  Many agree that NIMBY opposition and lack of 
political support makes it virtually impossible to implement the City’s vision in target areas.  
Some development industry respondents complained about the need to constantly rely on the 
Ontario Municipal Board to get approvals in this case. 
 
It is nearly impossible to achieve the Mainstreet policies in the Official Plan at the 
same time as being a good neighbour.  Infill sites don’t allow you to have huge buffer 
zones.  Conflicts arise when the Official Plan policy states the infill project must be, 
“compatible with existing development,” and it is interpreted by the public as saying 
it must be, “the same as existing.” (DI – 6) 
 
There are examples where great projects on Mainstreets have to go to the Board 
because the community wasn’t prepared to accept the level of intensification 
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proposed.  These are legitimate sites on arterial roads with lots of existing shopping 
and other uses around them and the developers have to go to the Board.  (P – 2) 
 
Some respondents suggested that a more appropriate approach for defining and supporting 
target areas would be to more accurately assign growth to specific neighbourhoods rather 
than applying it to City-wide Official Plan designations. 
 
If the City was forced to take responsibility to establish intensification targets, 
determine how many buildings they needed and heights, and then distributed it 
through the wards and vote on it and approve it, then we’d be okay.  But right now, 
our industry is still spending hundreds of thousands or millions at OMB hearings just 
to get the zonings to do an intensification project.  (DI – 8) 
 
We should determine how much growth we should accommodate, where is the best 
location for it, what is the best form of that growth – should it be in clusters in one 
area or applied generally across the board – and we are going to provide the 
incentive for that to occur.  Right now, the intensification issue has got very little 
sharp tools to secure the implementation of it.  (P – 3) 
 
In general, the main criticism of the City’s intensification target areas stemmed from the 
concern that there where no implementing policies or programs beyond the high level Official 
Plan policies to encourage intensification in those areas.  Most of the respondents criticized 
this land use control by suggesting that the land use designations identified to accommodate 
higher densities did not necessarily correspond to the locations where there was a market for 
such a product.  A major criticism was that general intensification policies applied to entire 
land use designations were not strong enough to respond to community and political 
resistance at a site level.  Community and political resistance to higher density projects in 
existing developed areas often led to lengthy and expensive battles at the Ontario Municipal 
Board.   
 
Table 5.6 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the collaborative approach to create Community Design Plans that 
effectively support residential intensification. 
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Table 5.6: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of Target Areas in 
Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 0 2 0 4 
Development Industry 0 3 3 2 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 1 2 0 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 0 3 
Community Association Representatives 0 0 0 2 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 0 6 5 12 
 
 
5.3.3 Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law 
 
Since amalgamation, the City of Ottawa has been working with 36 inherited zoning by-laws 
from the eleven former municipalities.  In late 2004, the City began a process to harmonize 
the existing zoning categories and regulations.  The process involved three phases: project 
initiation and the creation of an Advisory group; pre-consultation with stakeholders and the 
preparation of a draft zoning by-law; statutory notification; and broad public consultation of 
the draft zoning by-law.  Stage 3 began in May 2006 with the release a Draft Comprehensive 
Zoning By-law – Urban Area for public comment.  After consultation is complete, the by-law 
is expected to be passed by Council in the fall of 2007.   
 
The new zoning by-law is important for a number of reasons, particularly to provide 
administrative efficiencies in the: 
• provision of zoning information to the public;  
• consistency of interpretation; 
• processing of development applications; and,  
• compatibility with other municipal regulations. 
  
City of Ottawa, 2007b 
 
The zoning by-law is an important document for implementing the policies of the Official 
Plan and other growth management documents.  In an effort to implement the City’s vision 
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for growth, the draft zoning by-law process began with the development of zoning 
“strategies” for many of the Official Plan land use designations.  This process enabled staff to 
identify appropriate zones based on Official Plan direction.  A “purpose statement” was then 
developed for each of the identified zones; a statement intended to provide details and 
linkages to the Official Plan policies.  The next step in the zoning by-law process was the 
preparation of the each zone’s individual by-laws.  Table 5.7 provides an example of the 
purpose statement for one of the City’s five residential zones. 
 
Table 5.7: Purpose Statement for Zone R1 – Residential First Density Zone 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of the R1- Residential First Density Zone is to: 
(1) 
 







restrict the building form to detached dwellings in areas designated as General Urban Area in 
the Official Plan; 
allow a number of other residential uses to provide additional housing choices within 
detached dwelling residential areas; 
permit ancillary uses to the principal residential use to allow residents to work at home;  
regulate development in a manner that is compatible with existing land use patterns so that 
the detached dwelling, residential character of a neighbourhood is maintained or enhanced; 
and,  
permit different development standards, identified in the subzone, primarily for areas 
designated as Developing Communities, which promote efficient land use and compact form 
while showcasing newer design approaches. 
 
 
Source: City of Ottawa, 2006c 
 
The main criticism of the draft comprehensive zoning by-law expressed in key informant 
interviews was the expectations of the development industry, rightly or wrongly, that it would 
go further to implement the policies of the 2003 Official Plan, which included the expectation 
that there would be upzoning in intensification target areas.  Instead, some in the development 
industry were frustrated to learn that it was simply an amalgamation of the former zoning by-
laws.   
 
While some respondents understood the city’s position and supported their approach, others 
were very critical of what they perceived to be a missed opportunity to implement the visions 
of the Official Plan, indicating that height and density restrictions are the biggest inhibitors 
with respect to intensification and zoning issues.  Their opinion was that the simple 
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standardization of the zoning by-law will have no effect on greenfield development and 
represents a lost opportunity to create significant changes in the inner area.   
 
The City makes it clear at the beginning that this is a consolidation and a 
regularization of the by-law.  But it truly doesn’t implement the intensification 
policies of the Official Plan by any stretch.  (P – 3) 
 
The government is not doing enough to make the rules work.  The zoning changes, 
which are the guts of the rules, have not been changed to reflect intensification.  If the 
City is serious about intensifying, they should permit it.  If they are not putting in the 
permitted densities in the by-laws, then it is not permitted.  (DI – 3)  
 
When going to all of the effort of adopting a new comprehensive zoning by-law, you 
would have expected the city to have attempted to implement the policies of the new 
Official Plan, which they aren’t doing.  The City has made it quite clear that this is 
basically an amalgamation of the former by-laws.  What a huge waste of an 
opportunity.  If you are going to go to all of that effort to create a new by-law, for 
heavens sake, implement the policies.  (P – 2) 
 
City planners responsible for the creation of the new zoning by-law made no apologies for the 
content and stressed that their mandate was not to upzone, but to compile the existing by-laws 
into one comprehensive document.  They argued that Official Plan policies specifically state 
that intensification should only happen through a comprehensive planning process.  In their 
opinion, upzoning sites would have circumvented the public consultation process and would 
have been in conflict with Official Plan policies.   
 
We are taking the broad policies of the Official Plan and translating it into more site-
specific policies and looking at ways of implementing policy objectives in a more fair 
and reasonable way.  We are usually in the middle of two diametrically opposed 
positions.  Nobody is going to be totally happy with the results.  Our job is to make 
everyone equally unhappy.  That is the reality of zoning, trying to find a happy 
medium between people who are trying to maximize profits and those that are trying 
to bar the door on development.  (CO – 6) 
 
While large amounts of upzoning did not occur, staff were confident that the process has 
helped intensification efforts.  For one, they say it cleans up the zoning by-law, making it 
easier to understand and creating consistent rules across the municipality.  According to staff, 
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draft zoning has increased heights along traditional Mainstreets, allowed for a broader mix of 
uses to encourage residential development, and reduced parking standards.  In an effort to 
encourage higher density development in the vicinity of transit stations and transit initiatives, 
building height limits have been eliminated in the centre of designated areas.   
 
Similarly, parking standards were changed across the municipality.  Parking maximums were 
introduced in the vicinity of transit stations and lowered in all other designations in a decision 
based mostly on transit objectives.  This change, however, raised concerns amongst 
development industry respondents who argued that they market their products on the 
availability of parking.  City staff respondents acknowledged their concerns but stated that 
while demand is important, it cannot be the only consideration.  An abundance of cheap 
parking undermines transit initiatives and means there is less incentive for transit use.   
 
City staff were not disillusioned, however, with their understanding of role zoning plays in 
encouraging intensification.  They recognized that zoning is an enabling mechanism but it 
does not guarantee that development will happen as envisioned.   
 
If you can’t market high rise in a certain area then, obviously, zoning isn’t going to 
make any difference.  They are going to go with whatever they can market … zoning 
provides an opportunity and it is up to the development industry to determine if they 
can do it or not.  Zoning doesn’t make things happen, unfortunately.  It just facilitates 
it.  (CO – 6) 
 
Community associations seemed, in general, supportive of the draft by-law, though individual 
Chapters were reviewing it at the time of the interviews.  Their opinion was that the existing 
zoning by-law provided plenty of opportunities for intensification.   
 
Our position is that the existing zoning by-law for the City of Ottawa provides lots of 
opportunity for intensification.  Just look out on the street, there are one storey 
buildings on Bank Street.  I didn’t force them to build one storey buildings on Bank 
Street.  There is the possibility of building four storey buildings there and there has 
always been the possibility.  So don’t tell me you need spot zoning to intensify.  Our 
starting position is, get out there and intensify under the existing zoning and when 
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you are finished doing that, then come back and tell me why you need spot zoning.  
(CA – 2) 
 
In general, the draft comprehensive zoning by-law, perceived by many as the document that 
could have the potential to support the implementation of intensification projects in target 
locations, failed to upzone sites appropriately.  As such, zoning amendments or variances 
would still be required to implement what many developers argue are the policies in the 
Official Plan.  This process can often be lengthy and costly for controversial projects, a fact 
that can dissuade developers from pursuing intensification projects.  While the draft 
comprehensive zoning by-law process may have not been the appropriate forum for granting 
substantial upzoning across the city, the new by-law does little improve regulatory conditions. 
 
Table 5.8 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law to effectively support 
residential intensification. 
 
Table 5.8: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of the Draft Comprehensive 
Zoning By-law in Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 2 0 0 4 
Development Industry 0 0 7 1 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 1 2 0 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 0 3 
Community Association Representatives 0 1 0 1 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 2 2 9 10 
 
 
5.4 Financial Incentives and Disincentives 
 
The literature review demonstrated that Financial Incentive and Disincentive programs can be 
used to encourage development in target areas and discourage it where urban development is 
undesirable.  Ottawa has implemented a number of programs that use financial incentives and 
disincentives to influence the location of new growth.  
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5.4.1 Development Charges 
 
The City of Ottawa collects development charges for the purpose paying for the capital costs 
of new development.  Recognizing that the cost of accommodating new growth is higher in 
newly developing communities and less in the built-up area because of the presence of 
existing services, the City has established three development charge areas: Inside the 
Greenbelt, Outside the Greenbelt, and Rural Areas.  Fees are the lowest for the rural area and 
highest for the suburban centres.   
 
In addition, residential development can be exempt from development charges in some cases 
to recognise the fact that the replacement of an existing use does not necessarily require 
investment in new infrastructure.  The City also recognizes that the waiving of fees 
encourages residential development in targeted areas by reducing some of the financial risks 
for developers.  Exemptions or reductions apply to: conversions; contaminated lands; non-
profit housing; any development in a development charge fee zone in the core area; and 
within 500 metres of a light rail or transitway station.  Spatially defined development charge 
areas and exemption areas are illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
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Source: Based on City of Ottawa, 2003a 
Figure 5.5: Development Charge Areas and Spatially Defined Exemption Areas 
 
 
Most of the key informants agreed that reducing or waiving development charges was an 
effective method of encouraging development in some areas and discouraging it in others.  
They complained, however, that the City of Ottawa’s current Development Charge system did 
not go far enough in reducing fees in target areas. 
 
In my opinion, it doesn’t go as far as it should have or could have.  It is a very 
watered down version of what it should have been or could have been.  In my opinion, 
there should be a separate DC for the inner area because that is virtually where all of 
the condo activity and intensification activity is occurring.  (CO – 2) 
 
Respondents suggested the City’s development charges should be strengthened not only for 
monetary reasons but also for symbolic ones.  For one developer, the waiving of fees in the 
core’s development charge free zone reflected a positive attitude by politicians at the time 
about redevelopment, giving developers more confidence in proposing higher density 
development. 
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A former mayor came up with the idea that to stimulate development in Centretown 
there would be no development charges.  She lured me right into development 
aggressively.  It was the attitude, it wasn’t just the money.  She was sending a 
message.  (DI – 2) 
 
Many respondents, however, doubted that the City could afford changing its development 
charge structure.  Most believed the fees could never be waived in target areas because of the 
City’s reliance on the revenue.  The City collects approximately $60 million in development 
charges every year, however, even this, according to staff, is not sufficient to cover the full 
cost of growth (City of Ottawa, 2002b). 
 
If you are trying to encourage condo development in the suburbs, the only way you 
can do that is by reducing the development fees, and I don’t believe that is going to 
happen because it was kind of a stretch for them to do it in the downtown … I believe 
economic incentives are the most important.  (DI – 4) 
 
I think it would help but the City can’t afford anything.  My sense is that the City is 
becoming more and more reliant on development charges to pay for City services.  
(DI – 9) 
 
In general, planners and developers alike thought that the Development Charge by-law could 
be strengthened to achieve the City’s intensification objectives.  While they appreciated the 
waiving of fees in the downtown and a few other locations, most respondents did not think 
the current development charge by-law went far enough and there was little optimism that it 
would change due to the City’s reliance on that revenue generator. 
 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
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Table 5.9: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of Current Development 
Charges Structure in Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 1 0 1 4 
Development Industry 0 0 5 3 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 0 1 2 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 0 3 
Community Association Representatives 0 0 0 2 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 1 0 7 15 
 
5.4.2 Brownfields Redevelopment Strategy and Community Improvement Plan 
 
In 2005 City of Ottawa began a Brownfields Redevelopment Strategy for the purpose of 
developing a coordinated approach to identifying, cleaning up, and redeveloping brownfield 
sites in the municipality (City of Ottawa, 2006d).  This process recognized that redeveloping 
brownfields creates a cleaner, healthier city; revitalizes communities; and provides an 
opportunity to limit greenfield consumption by accommodating new growth within the 
existing built-up area.  The result was the adoption of a Community Improvement Plan that 
provides a framework containing financial incentive programs and a municipal leadership 
strategy for promoting the redevelopment of brownfields.  Five financial incentive programs 
identified in the CIP are Financial Feasibility Study Grant Program; Environmental Site 
Assessment Grant Program; Property Tax Assistance Program; Rehabilitation Grant Program; 
and, Building Fee Grant Program.  Together, these financial programs help to alleviate some 
of the risks associated with brownfield redevelopment thereby encouraging the development 
industry to carryout intensification projects. 
 
In general, there was a very positive response about the initiative from most respondents.  
Development industry respondents shared stories about the challenges of building on 
brownfields, most of which highlighted the risks associated with the inability to know the 
extent of contamination until work beings.  Most were content with Ottawa’s Brownfields 
Strategy process and appreciated the competency of the city staff members who oversaw the 
development of the strategy.   
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I think it is a wonderful initiative and an important one because the infill sites we deal 
with, most of them have an issue.  Gas stations are the most obvious ones but you take 
a building down and you have asbestos.  It is an issue on most infill sites so we drill 
and test our brains out because we are concerned about what lurks under the surface.  
Those sites would lie dormant.  So I think what they are doing is a great idea.  (DI – 
2) 
 
We support the policy.  We were very impressed with the policy.  We think the City 
has been very proactive.  (DI – 7) 
 
I actually wrote, I think, the only congratulatory letter ever written to a city official 
on brownfields.  I think the guy that worked on it did a great job.  Not only was the 
city out of the gate faster than other cities in Ontario but he worked very closely with 
the province to come up with incentives, both provincial and municipal, and consulted 
with industry.  We were pretty impressed with it.  (DI – 8) 
 
Respondents not only acknowledged the importance of the monetary incentives introduced 
under the program, but thought that the brownfields strategy represented a change in the 
attitude of the City.   
 
It is more than just incentives …  It is a City-wide policy document that says that the 
city is encouraging development, the City is going to provide incentives, and the City 
is showing that it is making brownfield development easier.  This is a wonderful 
document because it provides not only incentives but it is also an education 
document.  It is saying that brownfield redevelopment is good.  (CO – 3)  
 
While there was no dispute that the incentive program is helpful in supporting intensification, 
there was some question about whether or not it was necessary given that a development 
project will only be successful if there is a market for the product.  A couple of respondents 
suggested that if the market is there, then perhaps incentives are not required.   
 
There are examples in Ottawa and other cities where there were no incentives but 
brownfields were still built on because the market was there.  There are other 
examples where the government provides huge amount of incentives in order for 
development to happen.  I don’t know which is more important, the market or the 
government incentives.  (CO – 3) 
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In general, there was little disagreement about the fact that Ottawa’s new Brownfields 
Strategy was an excellent step in the right direction in terms of financial and symbolic support 
for higher density projects.  Most respondents appreciated the efforts of the City and thought 
that it had significant potential for alleviating some of the financial risks borne by brownfield 
developers. 
 
Table 5.10 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the Brownfield Redevelopment Strategy to effectively support 
residential intensification. 
 
Table 5.10: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of the Brownfield 
Redevelopment Strategy in Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 1 2 0 3 
Development Industry 3 0 0 5 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 1 1 0 1 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 0 3 
Community Association Representatives 2 0 0 0 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 7 3 0 13 
 
5.4.3 Draft Density Incentive Guidelines 
 
As discussed in the literature review, Section 37 of the Provincial Planning Act allows 
municipalities to enter into an agreement with developers to share the increased value that 
may result from increased density or height of a development project.  Funds generated 
through Section 37 agreements may be used to support initiatives above and beyond 
development charges and other items agreed to through the development approvals process 
such as affordable housing, additional parkland, and other provisions listed in the Official 
Plan extract above.   
 
City of Ottawa Planning and Development staff recognized that developers were requesting 
that details concerning density incentive agreements be included in the Official Plan.  The 
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City also acknowledged their lack of experience in using Section 37 of the Planning Act.  In 
June 2004, City Council directed staff to establish a framework for the application of Section 
37.  The intention of the process was to establish a set of guidelines to assist in the 
implementation of density incentives.   
 
A limited number of stakeholders participated in a process to generate a preliminary set of 
guidelines to assist in further discussions.  The draft guidelines were approved in principle by 
Ottawa’s Planning and Environment Committee in September 2005 and refined in April 2006.  
The main points were: 
 
• Incentives will be focused on areas targeted for intensification; 
• The application of Section 37 will be directed to projects of a significant size, i.e. 
over 25,000 sq.ft. or 25 residential units and where the proposed density will 
exceed 20% of the project’s gross floor area or five residential units; 
• Incentives must be negotiated if the proposed building height exceeds 25% of the 
maximum allowable for developments whose overall project size exceeds 25,000 
sq.ft.; 
• The proposed development must represent good planning; and, 
• The rate of exchange of benefits for increased density and height shall be 50% of 
the net increase in land value resulting from the density increase, with some 
exceptions.  The increased value of the land and the value of the benefit to be 
provided will be determined by a real estate appraiser listed through Real Estate 
Services. 
 Source: City of Ottawa, 2006e 
 
The approved draft guidelines acted as a basis for further discussions with a broader number 
of stakeholders, including the development industry.  The response to the draft guidelines, 
however, was so controversial that the City of Ottawa decided in early 2006 to put the 
initiative on hold.  City planning staff recommended that Council defer the implementation of 
the guidelines until the new comprehensive zoning by-law was enacted.  This by-law can not 
be expected to come to Council again until 2008, after the draft zoning by-law has been 
approved.  
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Responses from key informants demonstrated how controversial this topic was in Ottawa.   
The basic argument against density bonusing was that the approved height and density of a 
project should be based exclusively on its planning merits.  If the height and density proposed 
is compatible with the surrounding area, if it can be integrated into the neighbourhood, and if 
it represents good planning, then it should not be subject to bonusing requirements.   
 
I am not keen on it because I think you should get the density pushed because it is 
appropriate.  It is either appropriate or not appropriate.  Period.  (DI – 2) 
 
I don’t believe in density bonusing … What I read into it is, if you want to come in 
and rezone in a neighbourhood to a higher level, the city would basically extort 
money out of the developer.  Basically, the city would give you approval if you gave a 
cash donation, or some other contribution, based on the approved appraised value of 
the property.  Zoning should stand on its own merit.  Is it legitimate? Does it comply 
with what the neighbourhood already is?  Can it be integrated into the 
neighbourhood?  (DI – 7) 
 
We don’t want to see density bonusing at all.  A project either stands on its own 
merits or it doesn’t.  (DI – 8) 
 
Similarly, respondents argued that there is the potential that height and density bonusing 
could be demanded by the City on sites where legacy zoning does not reflect the policies in 
the current Official Plan. 
 
In the broadest sense I support it.  The difficulty is that it may be used by the City as a 
negotiating tool where it shouldn’t be used.  You shouldn’t be forced into a situation 
where you are negotiating a density bonus on a site simply because the site’s current 
zoning doesn’t respect current Official Plan policy.  It is not what the zoning 
provisions should be dealing with … If all you are doing is changing zoning to 
respect current policy, you shouldn’t be subject to that kind of cost, or dare I say 
blackmail, on the application.  (P – 2) 
 
There is this grey area where it isn’t known if any zoning application means that you 
are bonusing if you are upzoning in any way.  How do we determine what is 
legitimate and appropriate zoning in the first place?  Without the zoning by-law being 
designed to comply with the existing Official Plan, there is no way to properly assess 
what bonusing is on any individual site.  (DI – 7) 
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Another major argument against bonusing was that it compromised the intent of the zoning 
by-law in an effort to achieve the City’s affordable housing goals, an objective that some 
thought was beyond the development industry’s responsibility.   
 
I am against that.  I think that it is so socialistic.  It just real makes me puke.  It is like, 
“oh, the common good”.  I think what people should do is good planning.  Don’t try 
and bribe me and tell me to put a shrub in and then give me a little height.  The City 
wants me to do something for the poor guy.  Well, the poor guy that walks by my 
place is going to get enjoyment.  We just try to create things that are liveable.  I don’t 
think I should be penalized for creating good space.  I think this bonusing idea is kind 
of goofy.  (DI – 1) 
 
This notion that we are going to pay for affordable housing?  Well, we are against 
that right off the bat.  Councillors are saying that new home buyers should be paying 
for affordable housing and I don’t agree with that.  Why should that responsibility be 
loaded on to the shoulders of such a small minority in society?  We think affordable 
housing should come from the city or the province.  Grocery stores don’t give a 40% 
discount to people who make less than $40,000 a year.  Car dealers don’t give away 
cars.  Why should new home buyers be paying more for the same house?  It is such a 
socialist country.  (DI – 8) 
 
In response to the complaints regarding the guidelines, the City argued that it is their 
responsibility to think of the larger community. 
 
They (developers) are thinking purely bottom line and we have to think bigger picture 
than that.  As much as they are not happy about how we are directing development, 
we are doing it for a very specific reason.  (CO – 6) 
 
In general, there was a total lack of support for the initiative that was expected to secure 
public amenities for the City.  Almost all respondents resented the idea, as they felt that height 
and density should be granted on a project’s planning merits, not on the public uses that can 
be provided by a developer.   
 
Table 5.11 provides a summary of responses by individual of each key informant group 
concerning the ability of the Draft Density Incentive Guidelines to effectively support 
residential intensification. 
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Table 5.11: Summary of Responses Regarding the Effectiveness of Draft Development 
Incentive Guidelines in Supporting Residential Intensification 





City of Ottawa Planning Staff 1 0 1 4 
Development Industry 0 2 4 2 
Real Estate and Private Planning Consultants 0 2 0 1 
Surrounding Municipalities 0 0 0 3 
Community Association Representatives 0 0 0 2 
National Capital Commission Planning Staff 0 0 0 1 
Total Responses 1 4 5 13 
 
5.5 Barriers to Intensification 
 
Key informants provided their opinions about each of the City of Ottawa’s policies and 
programs intended to encourage a compact urban form.  During these discussions, many 
respondents spoke generally about what they perceived to be barriers to intensification that 
transcended individual initiatives.  This section summarizes several of the themes that 
emerged during the discussions. 
 
5.5.1 Community and Political Resistance 
 
Despite the fact that weaknesses were identified in Ottawa’s intensification policies and 
programs, most respondents were complimentary of the City’s attempts to control sprawling 
development and encourage a more compact urban form.  No one disagreed with the merits of 
the policies or programs intended to implement the City’s vision for compact development.  
What they did argue, however, was that city-wide policies were not strong enough to support 
residential intensification projects at a site level because they did not adequately respond to 
the most significant inhibitors to intensification: community and political resistance. 
 
It is very easy to accept motherhood.  It isn’t until people see it in the zoning by-law 
that they realize what we meant.  That is always the problem when you are doing an 
implementation exercise. It is the first time when people clue in about what the 
implications of the policy are because the policies are very broad and generic in the 
way they are explained.  (CO – 6) 
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There is, generally speaking, a total lack of buy-in from the Councillors.  They all like 
to talk Smart Growth, they all like to talk vision and 20/20, and they all like to talk 
about how they are taking into account existing infrastructure and they think it is all 
wonderful and everything.  And as soon as it shows up in their ward it is all gone.  
(DI – 5) 
 
Complaints about a conservative populous resistant to change and weak politicians who 
failed to uphold city-wide intensification policies were discussed hand-in-hand.  Developers 
and planners alike provided numerous examples of projects that failed to gain approval or 
were approved with reduced densities after substantial public pressure.  Respondents 
suggested that while the public supported intensification efforts in theory, it was their 
concern about neighbourhood change that caused them to fight infill or redevelopment 
projects proposed near their homes.  This opposition led to time delays and cost overruns.  
 
The public will support intensification as a value.  When the Official Plan was passed 
everyone thought the policies were great and we were going to have this wonderful 
city.  It is when you get into their neighbourhoods that it is a problem.  The public will 
be very, very clear that they expected it to be somewhere else.  (DI – 7) 
 
Many respondents linked neighbourhood resistance to political opposition.  Some suggested 
that too often politicians cave to community pressure in an effort to retain their popularity 
and win another term on Council.  They claimed that the “career politicians” that have 
emerged in Ottawa over the last couple of decades have eroded the quality of planning 
decisions.  These politicians are accused of making decisions based on re-election strategies 
rather than upholding planning policies for the betterment of the city. 
 
Politics is no longer a part-time job, it is a career, and that is the difference.  “I’ve 
got to keep making people happy if I want to be employed and I may want to move up 
to the next level of government.”  There are some Councillors that still have very 
strong ideas but there are many of them who go with the flow and I think that is a 
frustration for the developers.  And it is frustrating for the planners too because we’ll 
quite often recommend approval of these things and they’ll get turned down because 
politically it is suicide to approve them.  (CO – 3) 
 
Since amalgamation, it is impossible for a Councillor to do the job part-time.  It is too 
much work, too many issues, and too much involvement.  Offhand, I don’t know of 
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any Councillor who has another job.  So, they are making decisions to support their 
livelihood as oppose to doing the best thing for the City.  And that is one reason why 
they are so responsive and reactive to community association input.  They don’t want 
to lose their livelihood.  (DI – 7) 
 
There are some, the best of the lot I think, who are very good at engaging their 
constituents, which by the way I am in favour of … There are some politicians who 
really do hold up the policies, the umbrella, that has been placed over the whole city, 
but many will just twist and bend them to suit the needs of the neighbourhoods at 
times.  (DI – 2) 
 
The quality of the municipal politician has declined so dramatically over the last 40 
years.  Forty years ago, people on Council, generally speaking, were people who had 
already succeeded in life and really wanted to give something back to a system that 
supported them and allowed them to succeed.  So they let the administration do the 
work.  They knew they were decision makers and they weren’t tinkerers or interferers.  
They had a very different perspective on the decision making process.  The quality of 
decisions was much higher.  You have politicians who couldn’t get a real job if their 
life depended on it.  They have to get re-elected or they’d be out on the street.  So they 
will do anything to get re-elected.  So you end up with a very low quality of 
Councillor.  The whole citizen participation now is a real mess because all that has 
done is created a situation that has put even more pressure on Councillors.  It makes 
Councillors much more vulnerable to attack and they can no longer remain objective.  
They can’t make decisions on principle; they have to make it on survival.  (DI – 8) 
 
Some suggested that community and political resistance slowed the development applications 
process so much that it was prohibitive for some developers to carry out higher density 
projects in existing built-up areas. 
 
I have heard about projects being abandoned, in particular small infill projects being 
abandoned, because of the political challenges and the amount of time it will take a 
developer to get through those, including going to the OMB.  I live downtown and 
there have been projects abandoned in my neighbourhood, good projects, because 
they don’t want to go through all that.  (DI – 7) 
 
Development industry respondents were clear to point out that a lot of their frustrations about 
intensification approvals were not geared to City planning staff, but to the decision makers.  
Some provided examples of projects in which staff wrote favourable reports in support of 
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development applications but they were later rejected by Council.  In general, the 
respondents were appreciative of staff’s efforts but criticized their bosses. 
 
Planners recommend, they don’t make decisions.  Even if you are the top planner at 
the City, you are writing a report that you put before Council or Committee who then 
decides whether or not they will endorse your report.  (DI – 6) 
 
Planners get beat up by Councillors all the time on zoning issues.  (DI – 3) 
 
You’ll get the Councillors telling the planning guys that they are in the pocket of the 
developers.  I don’t know how the staff actually stays.  I would find it demoralizing.  
Imagine if you had a job and your boss didn’t stand up for you.  Well, the mayor isn’t 
standing up for his staff.  And subjecting staff to comments that are almost liable?!  
Well, do they (politicians) have planning degrees? They don’t!  Why don’t they listen 
to the guys that do.  (DI – 1) 
 
It should also be noted that while some respondents were frustrated with public opposition, 
they did appreciate knowledgeable, well-informed community members.  Many noted that 
they saw the benefit of engaging the public early in the planning process, especially on what 
they perceived to be controversial applications. 
 
Having an informed public is good.  Statistically speaking, we have the highest 
educated and most well off family households anywhere in Canada.  Most 
neighbourhoods have very articulate spokespersons so they can come forward with 
an opinion and good information to counteract the developers.  But it is also a very 
conservative city.  Historically it has been a very sleepy, federal bureaucracy place.  
They’d never really like change, or need change.  Their properties increased in value 
2% to 3% or sometimes 5%.  Everyone had a good salary.  It was always very family-
oriented.  So there was never really any reason to accept big city things.  It is 
changing and I think it will continue to change.  (OC – 2) 
 
Staff usually makes contact with the community association.  If it is a high profile 
application, we’ll often make appearances at community association meetings, and 
with some files even more than once, to try and keep those channels of 
communication open.  It is more than just a courtesy call on the larger projects.  
Some community associations are so strong that you dare not talk to them.  The 
Federation of Community Associations and neighbourhood associations should be 
part of this process, especially when we are talking about intensification.  (P – 2) 
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Intensification requires community trust that you have thought about the issues that 
bother them – traffic implications, whether or not there is enough space in the 
playground or the community centres to deal with increased growth.  They don’t 
always get a good sense that there is.  With all of the budget cutbacks over the last 
number of years they don’t get a good sense that the City can come up with providing 
the services they said they would do should this development happen … Building a 
City and working together very much depends on if you say you are going to do 
something, you do it.  (CO – 1) 
 
Similarly, some respondents, while criticizing the efforts of some Councillors, recognized the 
realities of their situations and acknowledged the personal challenges they are faced with 
when having to make controversial decisions. 
 
Councillors are just residents of the community that have been elected to council so 
they reflect the attitudes of the people that elect them.  Their opinions, because they 
are the decision makers, carry more weight than the people that elected them but they 
are still based on the same value set.  (CO – 1) 
 
I think because Councillors represent and live in a particular ward, they can’t help 
but be influenced by a strong interest group, particularly before an election.  (DI – 3) 
 
Clearly, NIMBY opposition and political resistance go hand-in-hand in acting as a significant 
barrier to intensification efforts, particularly in older, well-established neighbourhoods.  The 
issue is complicated by emotional ties to a community and the fear of change. 
 
5.5.2 Regulatory Challenges 
 
City planning staff did not remain unscathed throughout the interviews.  Both development 
industry and city planning staff respondents acknowledged that there are divisions within and 
between city departments when it comes to approving intensification projects.  The greatest 
conflicts arise between policy planners, who plan at the city-wide level, and development 
approvals planners, who are responsible for implementing projects at the site level.  The latter 
are concerned with the integration of intensification projects into existing neighbourhoods and 
infrastructure and look to codes and standards to base their approval decisions. 
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The difficulty that we see is that Planning and Growth Management staff support our 
applications.  But there is a whole war going on between Planning and Growth 
Management, which has some engineers in approvals, and Transportation and Public 
Works, which have different engineers.  The difference between the two is that the 
Growth Management engineers review the engineering drawings and approve them, 
while in Transportation and Public Works, they approve the drawings from the point 
of view that the City is going to take ownership of them in a couple of years.  They 
want to see how it integrates into the existing system.  Well, the problem is that in 
infill situations the existing system is often very poor … So there is this on-going 
battle in City Hall that Growth Management and Planning supports intensification, 
but how it knits into infrastructure and infrastructure management is always an issue.  
(DI – 5) 
 
There is a lot of pressure on staff to recommend things a certain way.  In fact, there 
are often splits within staff.  I’ve totally disagreed with some stuff done by policy and 
especially disagreed with some stuff approvals has done.  You get a lot of sleazy deals 
that are made with pressure from the mayor’s office.  But it is like that in any 
administration.  (CO – 2) 
 
Other respondents also complained that the planning process in Ottawa is too cumbersome 
and bureaucratic.  There was an expectation from those in the development industry that the 
amalgamation in 2000 would make the planning process faster and easier.  Six years later, 
applicants complain of even lengthier approval timelines.   
 
When amalgamation was announced I had this huge sense of optimism.  We could 
take the models that worked and implement them everywhere.  Unfortunately, what 
happened is they took the worst practices!  The consensus was, don’t do anything the 
way the old City of Ottawa did it.  Unfortunately, they only took Ottawa’s.  So 
everything really slowed down.  Having said that, the City is doing a very good job of 
trying to find out why it slowed down and are trying to fix it.  (DI – 7) 
 
Amalgamation isn’t working.  It has totally screwed things up.  They are still using 
that as the excuse as to why everything is such as mess down there – permitting, 
planning, you name it.  The planning department is a mess, and they admit it, and it 
needs to be reorganized to suit amalgamation but they haven’t gotten around to it.  
(DI – 8) 
 
Our guys are telling us it takes 2 to 3 times longer to get approvals than pre-
amalgamation for both infill or greenfield development.  (P – 3) 
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The approvals process is no faster since amalgamation.  The City tends to say it is a 
staffing problem but no one from the development industry thinks it is.  It is a process 
problem and there are two aspects to it: one is that there is a process that is very 
formalized that they are stuck with and don’t seem to be flexible on and there is the 
difficulty in getting administration to make decisions to keep a project moving.  (P – 
2) 
 
City planning staff acknowledged the frustration expressed by applicants but defended their 
process, indicating that it took a long time to develop appropriate planning policies and 
processes for the new City.  Now that the first Official Plan has been fully approved and the 
draft comprehensive by-law is out for comment, they are optimistic about the future. 
 
Amalgamation presents an opportunity for change, but comes with a lot of baggage. 
Unfortunately, we had so many Official Plans and Zoning By-laws that they actually 
competed with one another.  It was difficult to know which one was working and 
which the best was because we always had to patch things together.  Having one 
Official Plan that we can use as a springboard for others is a big step.  (CO – 1) 
 
Certainly the regulatory process in Ottawa’s planning department has to improve to advance 
intensification projects in a timely manner.  Divisions between staff only slow projects and 
weaken the creditability of the city’s attempts to encourage a more compact urban form. 
 
5.5.3 Influence of the Market 
 
Market demand is a vital component for building much encouraged high-density residential 
units in existing urban areas, as it is the local market itself that is the main driver of 
intensification.  Infill and redevelopment processes occur on land that has been skipped over, 
is underused or not currently used at its best or highest potential, or has been abandoned.  It 
may be that sites have been avoided because of locational characteristics or because of 
complications on the property, such as soil contamination from a previous occupant.  Even 
with strong market demand and political will, repopulating older neighbourhoods is typically 
a slow process.  Similarly, intensification of the existing urban area is difficult to achieve 
when viable economic land uses and the fabric of stable neighbourhoods are altered by new 
development.   
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Most respondents recognized the role market demand plays in the implementation of 
residential intensification projects.  They acknowledged that while policies and programs can 
be used to facilitate the development process, they cannot in themselves force higher density 
projects to be built.  Instead, the development industry has to see an interest in the product 
before they begin the long and expensive process of designing, marketing, and building such 
a project. 
 
You can’t force developers to build something they can’t sell and you can’t force them 
to build something they can’t make a profit on.  They aren’t going to build something 
just for the hell of it.  Or you are going to end up with some God awful building 
because you have taken away the opportunity for the developer and the architect to 
create something innovative.  You are forcing them to compromise.  (P – 2) 
 
At the end of the day, a developer won’t be building something unless they can market 
it.  This is their livelihood.  If the demand is for a 50 wide, 100 foot deep urban lot 
with a single detached dwelling on it, then the policies can say all they want about 
townhouse development or highrises.  But developers crunch numbers and they 
prepare proformas and they know what the market is demanding far better than any 
municipality.  I am a planner so I know why we are trying for higher densities but 
there has to be a better understanding of the implications for the developers and just 
needing more communication.  (SM – 2) 
 
Apparent through the interviews was a general understanding that the intensification of the 
built-up areas happen through an organic process, not a prescriptive one.  An older 
neighbourhood may become popular because of a unique characteristic, such as its location 
on a transit line or a clustering of retailers.  Once a critical mass of new residents begin 
reinvesting in the neighbourhood, more people are attracted to it, improvements are made by 
both the private and public sectors, including infrastructure improvements and transit 
services, and the area becomes more popular for higher density development.   
 
For example, Ottawa’s Westborough Village has experienced this transition over the past 
decade and is now witnessing significant pressure for higher density infill and redevelopment 
projects.  As such, it is currently part of the Richmond Street Community Design Plan 
process.  The location of the Westborough neighbourhood is shown in Figure 5.6 and photos 
of the community are shown in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7: Images of Westborough Village 
 
 
Many respondents used the Westborough Village experience as evidence to prove that 
intensification of the built-up area is more of an organic process than a regulated one. 
 
A trend that you see in terms of intensification in Ottawa is the gentrification of older 
neighbourhoods with new retail and then residential.  Westborough is a good 
example where it is an older neighbourhood but, through renewal, it is getting hipper. 
(P – 1) 
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Over time, the area became more attractive and there is now more investment in it.  
People buy in the area, they start to renovate homes, they start to raise families, the 
school population increases …  (DI – 5) 
 
Policies aren’t making it any easier to intensify.  If you read the OP, mainstreets are 
expected to look like Bank Street in the Glebe and Richmond Street in Westborough.  
Westborough evolved naturally and became a very popular and trendy area naturally.  
Young families wanted to live there, more than downtown it seemed.  Good schools, 
they can walk to the stores, there is a whole bunch of boutiquey-type shops.  Everyone 
likes to shop there and they like to visit.  That popularity and attraction is what 
caused the strong market out there.  You can’t replicate the market, especially in 
suburban areas where they don’t have that historical foundation.  (DI – 7) 
 
The recognition that residential intensification occurs naturally by responding to market 
demands of the day may lie in conflict with City of Ottawa policies and programs that locate 
intensification potential to target areas.  While established Mainstreets and transit stations are 
appropriate places to encourage higher densities, the general urban area holds significant 
potential as well.  CDPs in neighbourhoods in transition could help the process, so long as it 
is prepared well in advance of the demand.  The challenge is that there is often little 
indication of where the next popular spot will be. 
 
There are some people who are into neighbourhoods before others.  Generally people 
with an artistic background tend to be leaders.  Other people are just logical in their 
thinking and have figured out where it is happening.  (DI – 2) 
 
Most respondents agreed that the market dictates where growth will locate and in what form it 
will develop regardless of what zoning and Official Policies state.  For this reason, policies 
should be rigid enough to encourage particular forms of development, but flexible enough to 
respond to market demand. 
 
5.6 Opportunities for Improvement 
 
While the City of Ottawa’s residential intensification policies and programs were criticized to 
varying degrees by key informants, no respondent was completely critical of Ottawa’s 
objective for a more compact urban form or the approaches for achieving it.  Instead, 
responses were tough but fair and lengthy discussions demonstrated the complexity of the 
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planning process and the varied challenges to intensification at the site level.  Some 
respondents suggested ways in which the current growth management strategy could be 
improved to better support intensification objectives. 
 
5.6.1 Use Education and Demonstration Projects 
 
Recognizing the challenges to intensification posed by community and political resistance, 
some respondents suggested that education programs geared to the public and Council could 
reduce their protectionist fears.  Many suggested using some of Ottawa’s successful 
intensification projects to demonstrate the community benefits of residential intensification. 
 
The solution is the education of the community associations and the Councillors 
about what they have to learn to live with if we are going to achieve these goals.  
Quite frankly, I think staff have tried to do this with Council and following this 
election, I trust they will try again.  But that is really the key.  (P – 2) 
 
As a whole, we still have work to do with Council.  The best education is to have the 
projects that have been built be there for a year or so, take them back and show them 
that, “yes, there was a big fight about this, but, Mr. Ward Councillor, have you heard 
any complaints about this property since it has been built?”  You really need those 
projects in place to go that next step.  (CO – 1) 
 
Demonstration projects really fell by the wayside in the late 80s.  CMHC were really 
well known for their demonstration projects, but then they became politically 
unacceptable.  Some elements of the private sector objected to the fact that the public 
sector was actually building projects so they fell out of favour, which is too bad.  I 
think CMHC did a lot of really nice demonstration projects.  I think they were just 
leading the pack that allowed other municipalities to do them as well, albeit at a 
smaller scale.  It is only through demonstration projects, I feel, that we can clearly 
illustrate benefits.  (DI – 8) 
 
We’ve had a number of seminars where we have invited people to discuss and we 
usually have everyone leaving with the same opinion that they came in with, and that 
is the unfortunate thing.  They will arrive at this session with their own agenda to 
protect it, not really to listen to what people are saying but to draw the line.  That is a 
mindset and it is something that is going to have to change over time.  We have made 
some progress but people don’t like change.  People see intensification as a 
devaluation of their neighbourhood.  They are concerned about traffic, about income, 
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about the whole neighbourhood going down.  That is the constant battle we are 
dealing with; people are really hesitant to make change because they are afraid of the 
implications.  We have to really demonstrate to them that the change is good before 
they can accept it.  The only way you can do that is by doing projects and 
demonstrating to them that it worked.  That is the advantage of these test projects and 
watching them for 5 years to see how they are affecting the neighbourhood.  (CO – 6) 
 
Other respondents, however, disagreed with education and demonstration projects’ abilities 
to achieve higher densities through community understanding and buy-in, arguing that 
planning is a complicated process and the public is not interested in learning the city-wide 
benefits of such an initiative.   
 
Demonstration projects don’t help.  They don’t want change, they don’t want different 
people in their neighbourhoods.  It is very prejudicial.  (DI – 7) 
 
I don’t think residents or politicians can get the point of intensification.  I think the 
whole thing is too complicated to convey to residents in a concise, compact, 
understandable manner.  It is only after extended exposure to these issues that you 
can begin to understand it.  I don’t know how you could ever educate residents on the 
details of it.  And most of them aren’t interested anyway. 99% of them just want to go 
about their lives and hope that there is someone responsible down at City Hall 
spending their tax dollars and making the right decisions.  (DI – 8) 
 
Despite what the nay-sayers say about increased education and demonstration projects, there 
was a general feeling amongst respondents that these efforts would go a long way in 
influencing decision makers’ understanding of the benefits of intensification. 
 
5.6.2 Establish Definitions 
 
To improve the regulatory process in Ottawa, some respondents suggested establishing some 
clearer definitions for terms that are used rather loosely throughout planning policy 
documents.  Several respondents suggested that the City should establish a clearer definition 
for “intensification”.  They claim that the term currently represents many different project 
types to different people and is not defined clearly by height, density, or proportional 
measurements.   
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For example, as quoted at the end of Section 4.4.3 Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law of 
this thesis, community association respondents were of the opinion that a new four-storey 
building on a Mainstreet, which is permitted in the zoning by-law, on a lot that had 
previously accommodated a one-storey building was a form of intensification.  It was their 
opinion that the development industry assumed intensification was anything greater than 
existing zoning.  The development industry argued that what community associations were 
proposing as intensification was not economically feasible to build. 
 
The City must define what intensification is because four- and five-storey buildings 
are very difficult to build.  At that height, you are on the edge of building using a 
wood frame.  You can’t put in elevators because it is too expensive and nobody would 
walk up the stairs.  So, you either build a three-storey building or an eight-storey 
building.  So you either build with a wood frame and don’t worry about elevators or 
you build with concrete.  When people say they want a cute little four storey building, 
you can’t do it.  It isn’t that we don’t want to, it just isn’t economical.  Whether an 
elevator is going up 5 floors or 12, it will cost half a million dollars.  (DI – 8) 
 
This difference in opinion demonstrates that the City needs to do more to describe what 
intensification is, how it can be achieved, and how it can be integrated into the existing built 
environment. 
 
I think as an industry and as a City, we have to do a better job of explaining what is 
meant by intensification and what its parameters are and what its guidelines are … I 
think the City, especially in the inner city areas, has to establish better what its 
principles are, what its priorities are, what its vision is in terms of the integration of 
an infill project.  And it has to do it quicker.  (DI – 5) 
 
City planning staff responded to these suggestions by referring to their recently published 
document Understanding Residential Density (City of Ottawa, 2005c), which demonstrates, 
using examples from Ottawa, the different forms higher density development can take in 
different neighbourhoods.   
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Source: City of Ottawa, 2005c 
Figure 5.8: Images from Understanding Residential Density 
 
We’ve recently released a very good publication on what density is and it uses 
examples of existing projects all over the City and compares the density of projects, 
illustrating that a fairly dense looking project could be less dense than surrounding 
housing that is on the street.  It does some good work and we need to get more out in 
the community and use those things.  Good looking projects that have been built by 
local developers are sometimes referred to.  (CO – 1) 
 
Respondents also suggested that it would be useful for the City to define what they 
considered to be a “successful” amount of intensification.  Similarly, respondents considered 
how success could be measured over time.  
 
On any parcel of land, all different elements come together to determine if it is going 
to be a success.  The City may say a policy has been a success but the policy is only a 
success because the other land uses are there to support it.  I don’t know how they 
measure success in terms of intensification.  People may argue that intensification 
may cause more problems, like higher crime or more congestion.  (SM – 3) 
 
I don’t think there were a lot of tangible targets in the visioning or OP for us to 
evaluate our progress to.  How do you measure success? Increase by 5 to 10% the 
number of people living in apartments or do we compare ourselves to other 
municipalities.  (P – 1) 
 
My major issue is, what is the measure for intensification?  What should we be 
measuring?  Number of people per hectare – okay, net or gross?  What time of day 
are they talking about?  Is it the number of households per hectare?  And if there is a 
deficiency in a particular neighbourhood, how do we figure out to fix it.  What is the 
intensification trend in the city?  More or less now that in the past?  Is a percentage 
appropriate?  How much of our city is dedicated to streets and parking?  How many 
people can walk less than ten minutes to get a tea bag?  (CA – 1) 
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Certainly, there would be a great advantage for the City to establish definitions for planning 
terms so that all stakeholders had a clear understanding of the issues being discussed.  Such 
definitions would also make it possible to develop appropriate measures in which to determine 
success. 
 
5.6.3 Stronger Political Leadership 
 
What many respondents claimed is one of the biggest problems in Ottawa’s attempts to 
intensify is a lack of leadership, the lack of someone who will uphold city-wide 
intensification objectives without the fear of opposition from the public and politicians.   
Recognizing the weaknesses of the political system, some respondents reflected on the days 
when urban planners were solely responsible for making planning decisions and were less 
influenced by community opposition or political pressures.  This sentiment was echoed by 
those who thought Councillors are too involved in the planning process. 
 
It should go back to 20 years ago when planners were planners and Councillors 
worried if your garbage got picked up and the snow got removed.  They are not 
planners.  (DI – 8) 
 
The problem with some Councillors is that they are micro managers.  (DI – 2) 
 
Most respondents were in agreement that leadership needed to come from the mayor and 
other political leaders.  The way they saw it, it was Council that adopted the motherhood 
intensification policies and they should be required to implement them. 
 
From the development industry’s perspective, any business needs some certainty so 
they can plan, organize, and get things done.  From that stand-point, it would be nice 
if someone could be a leader and decide whatever they wanted.  Once the private 
sector understands what the rules are, then the private sector will adjust.  Either 
they’ll leave town if it is that bad, or they’ll figure out how to make it work.  And if 
they figure out how to make it work, the worst thing they want is a surprise.  (DI – 3) 
 
A lot of people today are just ducking their responsibilities.  No one wants to make a 
decision because then they’ll be accountable and no one wants to be accountable 
anymore and I think that comes from the leadership.  So if you have got weak 
leadership where no one wants to be accountable then everyone just follows suit and 
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you don’t get anywhere.  I think the mayor could have a much better influence.  (DI – 
1) 
 
The City government has to take the lead.  Rather than passing an OP policy and 
waiting for applications to come in, they have to change the rules and create an 
environment in which they can implement that policy.  (DI – 7) 
 
It has got to be the political world because they set the policy.  They are advised, but 
they set the policy and the tone.  When you know you’ve got the real support of the 
political world, then you’ve got the courage to take on things that are challenging 
because the process is a very complex approvals dance.  (DI – 2) 
 
We have to have ward Councillors that will stand up to their own constituents and 
say, “You may not like this idea but it is good design and good for the public at large 
so suck it up and get used to it because that is what we are going to have to do.”  
That, or keep spreading.  Everyone says that spreading is the wrong thing to do, but 
no one is stepping up to remove the pressure.  (DI – 8) 
 
Political leadership in planning is what Ottawa had in the years prior to regional and 
municipal planning bodies.  Ottawa’s early plans are still referred to today because of the bold 
visions they presented for encouraging and accommodating growth.  It is clear that new 





As the findings demonstrate, community opposition to a development application can sway 
political leaders’ opinions and delay, or even prevent, the approval of a residential 
intensification proposal.  A collaborative approach to planning is, in theory, an approach that 
can be used to achieve stakeholder buy-in to achieve a common vision.  While consensus may 
not often be achievable amongst a variety of stakeholders with competing agendas, agreement 
on common goals can help to advance the planning process.  The findings of the research 
demonstrate that while the City of Ottawa has taken steps to include politicians, the 
development industry, and the public in both the 20-year visioning exercise and the creation 
of community plans, respondents expressed frustrations with the processes, stakeholders’ 
varied level of involvement, and the City’s response to their concerns.  The real or perceived 
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inadequacies to the collaborative process have considerable impact on the City’s relative 
ability to achieve a compact urban form. 
 
Official Plan policies that address the rate, amount, type and location of growth and 
encourage residential intensification are intended to aid in the regulatory process.  Ottawa has 
strengthened urban boundary policies, identified intensification target areas, and prepared a 
draft comprehensive zoning by-law all in an attempt to improve the regulatory environment to 
facilitate development at higher densities than previously experienced.  The perception of 
respondents, however, is that these land use controls do not reflect market realities and are not 
strong enough to respond to community and political pressure against intensification projects.  
The result is higher land values, an increase in negative net-migration, and the proliferation of 
vacant or underutilized sites.   
 
The land market is the most important factor in spatial development patterns.  Financial 
incentives can be used to encourage development in targeted areas and fees can be imposed to 
discourage growth in others.  Most of the respondents’ agreed that financial incentives and 
disincentives were the most appropriate way in which to support intensification projects.  Not 
only could they help cover the cost of more risky projects that take longer to complete, the 
fact that they exist provide developers with the confidence that the City would support 
intensification efforts.  Some respondents’ doubted, however, that the City had the financial 
capacity to support financial incentive and disincentive programs.  It goes without saying that 
key informants from the development industry were consistent in their responses that the 
waiving of fees would encourage development and the implementation of levies would be 
opposed.  This was evident in respondents’ strong support for the City’s Brownfield Strategy 
vs. the contentious Density Bonusing Guidelines.  
 
Even with a broad, multi-layered approach to growth management, implementing 
intensification objectives at a site level is a challenge in the City of Ottawa.  A complex of 
mix of policy, market, and community and political support is required to achieve higher 
densities in built-up areas.  The City of Ottawa has implemented a collaborative approach to 
planning, land use controls, and financial incentive and disincentive programs to support 
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intensification efforts.  Response to these initiatives, however, is mixed, and there is definitely 
no consensus on success.   
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Chapter Five provides a discussion of the issues that are inhibiting compact development in 
the City of Ottawa.  It examines how each of the growth management policies or programs 
responds to what both recent literature and key informants identified as the main inhibitors to 
intensification efforts.  The Chapter also provides recommendations on how the City can 
strengthen the growth management strategy to address these issues.  It should be noted that 
this Chapter deals exclusively with the City of Ottawa context and recommendations are not 
intended to be generalized to apply to the planning situation in other jurisdictions. 
 
6.2 Effectiveness of Current Programs 
 
The general approach the City of Ottawa has taken to accommodate growth reflects 
contemporary planning principals of Smart Growth – a relatively new generation of growth 
management that does not attempt to control, or manage development, but actually promotes 
growth (Danielsen et al., 1999).  Recognizing the environmental, social, and economic costs 
of sprawling development, Smart Growth programs encourage growth to occur in a compact 
form.  Compact residential land uses is particularly important for Smart Growth programs 
because housing comprises a major share of the built environment; residential uses influence 
the size and composition of a population; and, housing influences the locational decisions for 
other land uses (Danielsen et al., 1999; Tomalty, 1997). 
 
Encouraging residential intensification has been accepted as policy in Ottawa at several levels 
and in different programs and strategies, but the implementation of intensification projects is 
not happening in a significant way, which, as recent development trends demonstrate, has 
implications for the City’s growth objectives and goals for a compact urban form.   
 
This thesis is concerned with identifying the weaknesses in the City of Ottawa’s growth 
management strategy for the purpose of providing recommendations for improvements.  This 
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section considers how each of the City’s policies and programs respond to what recent 
literature and key informant interviews argue are the greatest barriers to intensification: 
Community and Political Resistance, Regulatory Challenges, and the Influence of Market 
Realities. 
 
6.2.1 Response to Community and Political Resistance 
 
Recent literature and key informant responses indicate that NIMBY opposition to 
intensification projects is one of the greatest barriers to achieving a more compact urban form.  
Community opposition typically stems from concerns over the potential decrease in property 
values; the impact of crowding on the transportation system, existing infrastructure, and 
community services; and, the perceived loss of community values (CMHC, 2004; Canadian 
Urban Institute, 1991; Paehlke, 1991).  For this reason, the decision to support controversial 
intensification projects can have a political toll on political leaders.  As evidence, many key 
informants felt that many Councillors in the City of Ottawa tended to make planning 
decisions based on election strategies rather than considering the betterment of the 
municipality. 
 
Based on the literature review and key informant interviews, Table 6.1 provides a basis on 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the City of Ottawa’s policies and programs’ 
ability to respond to the issue of community and political resistance to intensification.  Table 
6.2 provides a summary of how effectively the City of Ottawa’s current growth management 
policies and programs are working based on the evaluation criteria. 
  
   
  
   140
Table 6.1: Growth Management Policy and Program Evaluation Criteria – 
Community and Political Resistance 
Collaborative Approach 
Effective 
• A timely process that includes a broad range of stakeholders, 
including planners, development industry, community members, 
political leaders, local businesses, and surrounding municipalities 
• Information is shared through two-way communication to provide 
for mutual learning 
• Stakeholders are the appropriate person, accountable for their 
decisions, act responsibly, and be accessible to those they represent 
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective 
Collaborative Approach but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Collaborative Approach 
Land Use Controls 
Effective 
• Reduces regulatory challenges, typically through official plan 
policy or zoning, to facilitate intensification projects in target areas 
which could otherwise be stalled by community and political 
opposition 
• Target areas are defined spatially within the municipality so 
residents and politicians understand if and/or how they could be 
influenced by future development 
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use 
Control initiative but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use Control initiative 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives
Effective 
• Financial incentives and disincentives are significant enough to 
achieve land use objectives 
• Growth-inducing incentives reduces financial risks for development 
industry, giving greater incentive to develop in existing built-up 




• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Financial 
Incentive /Disincentive program but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Financial Incentive/Disincentive program 
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Table 6.2: Ability of Programs to Respond to Community and Political Resistance 
Policy or Program Effectiveness Discussion 
Collaborative Approach   
Official Plan Ineffective 
• Community and political involvement in the 
preparation of municipal-wide vision but development 
industry and surrounding municipalities  were left out 
of the process 
• There was an insufficient amount of time to respond 
to information coming from the municipality 
• Municipal-wide policies were not strong enough to 
respond to local constraints, as Councillors often 
failed to uphold the policies in their own wards and 
residents were resistant to change 
• No measurable intensification targets established  
Community Design Plans Effective 
• Process appears to be successful in attracting key 
stakeholders by using a variety of formats to solicit 
input from the general public, developers, and 
politicians 
• There is an expectation these efforts will help thwart 
community and political resistance when development 
applications come forward in the future 
Land Use Controls   
Urban Boundary Policy Ineffective • Municipal-wide policy that does not address neighbourhood or site specific concerns 
Target Areas Somewhat Effective 
• Ottawa has established some targets areas for 
intensification 
• General policies, however, applied to entire land use 
designations are not strong enough to respond to 
community and political resistance at a site level 
Draft Comprehensive Zoning 
By-law Ineffective 
• No upzoning created to implement the policies of the 
Official Plan, therefore does little to address NIMBY 
opposition to higher density uses on a site 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives 
Development Charges Ineffective 
• The spatially defined development charge areas and 
exemption areas not strong enough to encourage 
intensification in some areas and low-density 





• Provides incentives for the clean up contaminated 
sites which could mean reinvestment in a community  
• There are still occasions, however, when 
neighbourhood would still oppose new development 
over a Brownfield site 




• Clearly identifies cases in which more public amenity 
space could be provided if residents and politicians 
accept higher densities 
• But completely opposed by development industry 
respondents 
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In general, Ottawa’s growth management policy and programs’ abilities to address site level 
constraints posed by community and political resistance are very weak.  Most are municipal-
wide policies that provide general guidance but lack the teeth to support intensification efforts 
on the ground. 
 
6.2.2 Response to Regulatory Challenges 
 
As Downs (2005) and Farris (2001) recognize, the approvals process for infill and 
redevelopment projects is significantly more cumbersome than for greenfield development.  
Official Plan amendments, zoning amendments, or variances are usually required to carry-out 
a project in a developed area, potentially costly processes in terms of both time and money if 
the application is caught up by neighbourhood opposition.  Similarly, conflicts between 
municipal policy planners’ visions for compact growth can be in conflict with engineering and 
public works officials who have to approve a project based on a pre-determined set of codes 
and standards (Alexander and Tomalty, 2002).  Key informant responses suggested that this is 
the case in Ottawa today, where even after amalgamation the process is lengthy and approvals 
are unpredictable. 
 
Based on the literature review and key informant interviews, Table 6.3 provides a basis on 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the City of Ottawa’s policies and programs’ 
ability to respond to the issues of regulatory challenges to intensification.  Table 6.4 provides 
a summary of how effectively the City of Ottawa’s current growth management policies and 
programs are working based on the evaluation criteria. 
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• Broad range of stakeholders recognize the importance of 
intensification efforts and accept it as a principle 
• Tools for implementation, monitoring programs, and evaluation of 
success are included in the collaborative plan including locating 
target areas and creating measurable targets 
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective 
Collaborative Approach but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Collaborative Approach 
Land Use Controls 
Effective 
• Demonstrates the municipality’s symbolic support for 
intensification products 
• Facilitates intensification efforts by addressing the amount, rate, 
type, and location of future projects through policies and zoning, 
thereby reducing lengthy approvals process 
• Target areas are defined spatially within the municipality 
• Policy objectives for higher densities correspond to sites with 
servicing opportunities  
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use 
Control initiative but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use Control initiative 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives
Effective 
• Financial incentives and disincentives are significant enough to 
achieve land use objectives 
• Growth-inducing incentives reduces financial risks for development 
industry, giving greater incentive to develop in existing built-up 
area which typically requires cutting through more “red tape” than 
greenfields 




• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Financial 
Incentive /Disincentive program but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Financial Incentive/Disincentive program 
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Table 6.4: Ability of Programs to Address Regulatory Challenges 
Policy or Program Effectiveness Discussion 
Collaborative Approach   
Official Plan Somewhat Effective 
• The City’s attempt to package residential 
intensification as a legitimate way in which to 
accommodate a growing population is appropriate 
• However, municipal-wide policies do not improve the 
approvals process because it does not address site 
level constraints  
Community Design Plans Somewhat Effective 
• General agreement that a common community vision 
and a general land use plan will help reduce regulatory 
challenges during the application stage 
• However, the process is lengthy, costly, and there is a 
lack of consistency amongst plans 
• Also, there is a concern about the status of the plans 
and their implementation 
Land Use Controls   
Urban Boundary Policy Ineffective • Municipal-wide policy that does not address regulatory challenges 
Target Areas Somewhat Effective 
• Locating land use designations that can appropriately 
accommodate higher densities is a good strategy 
• However, municipal-wide land use policy is not 
necessarily appropriate on some sites, mostly in the 
existing built-up area, because they have constraints 
that make them unattractive for infill or 
redevelopment because of servicing issues that have to 
be addressed through engineering techniques  
Draft Comprehensive Zoning 
By-law Ineffective 
• Fails to upzone sites appropriately and zoning 
amendments or variances would still be required to 
implement policies in the Official Plan 
• Process can often be lengthy and costly for 
controversial projects  
Financial Incentives and Disincentives 
Development Charges Somewhat Effective 
• Waiving or reduction of fees is a symbolic gesture of 
the City’s support for intensification projects 
• Current development charge by-law could better 





• Step in the right direction in terms of symbolic 
support for higher density projects  
• Sites, however, may have specific constraints making 
them unattractive for intensification because of 
servicing issues that must be addressed through 
engineering techniques 




• Would clearly define when Section 37 of the Planning 
Act should be used and would facilitate negotiations 
between the development industry and city  
• But completely opposed by development industry 
respondents 
• Fails to consider engineering constraints on sites 
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In generally, the City of Ottawa’s growth management strategies’ policies and programs 
attempt to reduce regulatory constraints by supporting higher density development in 
municipal-wide land use policies.  This symbolic gesture could provide some confidence that 
the City is strengthening their encouragement for a compact urban form.  The problem with 
motherhood policies, however, is that they do not address the challenges approvals planners 
and engineers have when trying to integrate new development in an existing built-up area.  
Financial incentives improve the regulatory process by reducing some of the financial risks of 
taking on infill and redevelopment projects, however, the current initiatives do not go far 
enough to ensure an efficient approvals process. 
 
6.2.3 Reflection of Market Realities 
 
While a compact urban form has environmental, social, and economic benefits over sprawling 
development, it was clear through the literature review and the interview process that 
improvements to regulatory constraints do not simply make high density, infill development 
“happen”.  Lifestyle choices favouring single-family homes and automobile ownership have 
contributed to sprawling development and, with support from increasing incomes, the demand 
for suburban life is self-perpetuating (Carruthers, 2002).  The suburbs and countryside are 
perceived to be safer and cleaner places to live compared to urban centres and houses on the 
periphery of urban areas are expected to have considerable appreciation potential (Daniels, 
2001).   
 
Recent development trend data in Ottawa shows that the construction of higher density 
residential units has increased in recent years.  Both city planning staff and other respondents, 
however, were clear to acknowledge that this has little to do with regulatory changes and a lot 
to do with market demand.  It was recognized that reinvestment in a neighbourhood is an 
organic process that is facilitated but not created by regulatory improvements.  The 
respondents were consistent in their understanding of the fact that the market drives the 
demand for intensification units.   
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While demand for higher density units has been increasing, the majority of Ottawa residents 
still favour low to medium density housing forms.  Migration trends demonstrate some 
residents will move to neighbouring municipalities to find the housing form they desire at a 
price they can afford.  This has implications on the development of land across the region. 
 
Based on the literature review and key informant interviews, Table 6.5 provides a basis on 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the City of Ottawa’s policies and programs’ 
ability to reflect market realities.  Table 6.6 provides a summary of how effectively the City 
of Ottawa’s current growth management policies and programs are working based on the 
evaluation criteria. 
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• Ensures all participants understand the benefits and challenges of a 
compact urban form 
• Takes into consideration the local market context, including historic 
growth and future economic prospects, by including a broad range 
of stakeholders familiar with past trends and future opportunities  
• Implement comprehensive but flexible targets capable of 
responding to changing market demand 
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective 
Collaborative Approach but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Collaborative Approach 
Land Use Controls 
Effective 
• City intensification policies and zoning are flexible enough to 
respond to the market for higher density development, supporting it 
in appropriate locations that emerge organically 
• Recognizing the weaknesses associated with the application of 
intensification objectives to land use designations that are spread 
around the municipality, identify specific target areas 
Somewhat 
Effective 
• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use 
Control initiative but some weaknesses exist 
Ineffective • Fails to include any of the parameters identified in an Effective Land Use Control initiative 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives
Effective 
• Financial incentives and disincentives are significant enough to 
achieve land use objectives 
• Recognizing that intensification target areas must correspond with 
locations where there is demand, growth-inducing incentives must 




• Includes most of the parameters identified in an Effective Financial 
Incentive /Disincentive program but some weaknesses exist 
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Table 6.6: Ability of Programs to Reflect Market Realities 
Policy or Program Effectiveness Discussion 
Collaborative Approach   
Official Plan Ineffective 
• The vision was developed by “experts” from cities 
across North America but did not include the local 
development industry 
• Official Plan was based in theory and did not reflect 
market realities 
Community Design Plans Effective 
• Developers’ involvement in the process demonstrates 
that they believe they can market the balance of units 
required (60% singles, 30% multiples, 10% 
apartments) 
• Generally achieving the density target of 29 upnh by 
increasing the number of multiples but not apartments 
• Uncertain if the last apartment block that actually 
implements the density will ever be developed in 
suburban locations 
Land Use Controls   
Urban Boundary Policy Ineffective 
• Insufficient amount of land held by few landowners 
has resulted in an increase in land prices and in turn 
housing prices 
• Does not provide for a sufficient amount of land to 
accommodate greenfield demand 
Target Areas Somewhat Effective 
• Appropriate to locate higher density development in 
these locations because of transit and road access 
• Because applied to a broad land use category, it does 
not necessarily correspond with locations where there 
is a market for such development 
• Commercial market so strong in some locations it 
would not make economic sense to develop for 
residential 
Draft Comprehensive Zoning 
By-law Ineffective 
• Fails to implement the policies in the Official Plan  
• Even if there was a market for higher density 
development in target areas, draft zoning by-law fails 
to provide the zoning to allow it to occur 
Financial Incentives and Disincentives  
Development Charges Somewhat Effective 
• By-law needs to be strengthened to reduce charges 
where market is located for intensification efforts, 
such as target areas 
Brownfields Redevelopment 
Strategy Effective 
• Reduces development costs on sites that may not 
otherwise attract investment 
Draft Density Bonusing 
Guidelines Ineffective 
• Provides no incentives for developers who believe it is 
basically blackmail for permission to build a good 
project 
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In general, the policies and programs that make up Ottawa’s growth management strategy do 
not respond appropriately to market realities.  While it appears that the market will accept 
medium-density units, it is less likely that it will support significant amounts of higher density 
forms of housing.  The attempt to force future residents into higher density units on smaller 
lots could have further implications for Ottawa’s constrained land supply and negative net-
migration.  Incentives designed to encourage high density units do not necessarily correspond 
to locations that are deemed desirable by the market, particularly suburban sites. 
 
6.3 Recommendations for Strengthening the Strategy 
 
The review of the weaknesses of the City of Ottawa’s growth management policies and 
programs provides a base for which recommendations can be developed to strengthen the 
strategy.  The following is a list of recommendations that pertain to the City of Ottawa 
planning context. 
 
1.  Set ambitious but achievable targets for intensification  
 
The City of Ottawa must set an achievable target for residential intensification in the built-up 
area to track the success of intensification efforts.  A high target will require an aggressive 
action plan and buy-in from the communities that may be affected.  Clearly, Ottawa’s current 
climate of resistance to infill and redevelopment efforts would make too high a target difficult 
to achieve, which could lead to erroneous vacant residential land supply estimates and a 
greater constrained land supply. 
 
A more appropriate solution would be to generate a residential intensification target higher 
than recent trends and plan for incremental increases over time.  This will require a strict 
definition for “intensification” and identification of the current built boundary.  The work 
being completed for the province’s Places to Grow planning effort in the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe demonstrates how difficult this process can be (MPIR, 2006b).  Lessons learned 
there, however, can be used to inform Ottawa’s process for establishing an appropriate but 
achievable target. 
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2.  Recognize the importance of a diverse housing choice 
 
Ottawa is facing risks to its economic competitive position relative to other urban centres in 
Ontario and elsewhere.  The findings demonstrate that Ottawa’s expectation that higher 
density units will accommodate a significant proportion of future growth means that 
additional land has not been brought in to the urban area and the constrained land supply 
means uncompetitive markets.  Also, the expectation of higher land costs in the future reduces 
the incentive for large land owners to build, which in turn reduces available supply and 
increases costs to builders and home buyers.  A constrained supply and higher prices is an 
incentive for development to leapfrog to surrounding municipalities.  An upward pressure on 
household expenditures can affect the City’s attractiveness to industries where higher salary 
costs outweigh the quality of life benefits of living in Ottawa. 
 
Much of the City of Ottawa’s population growth in the coming years will be through the in-
migration of workers attracted to employment opportunities in Ottawa.  The City must 
understand the changing demographics so as to ensure that the available vacant land supply is 
consistent with market demand.  If demand is for lower density residential, the City may have 
to add additional land to the urban area.  The consequence of not doing so could mean 
increases in negative net migration and faster growth in adjacent municipalities at the expense 
of Ottawa’s economic, social, and environmental growth management goals.  It should be 
acknowledged that there are excellent opportunities available to create efficient, liveable 
communities on greenfields.  Similarly, if demand is for higher density units, the City must 
ensure that these can be constructed in desirable areas. 
 
3. Create public awareness of the importance of a compact urban form 
 
Recent literature and the findings of the key informant interviews demonstrate that one of the 
greatest barriers for residential intensification is community and political opposition.  
Tregoning et al. (2002) recognize the importance for planners to link development patterns 
with issues that resonate with the public, such as linking sprawling development and 
segregated land uses with increasing amounts of obesity or reduced family time due to longer 
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commutes.  In doing so, the larger public can relate development patterns to their own 
situations and individualize the benefits of a more compact urban form. 
 
4. Celebrate the success of recent infill and redevelopment projects 
 
Residents’ concerns about intensification often relate to the issue of the compatibility of new 
development with the existing built form and the worry that a new project will be of lower 
quality than what currently exists in a neighbourhood (Paehlke, 1991).  A public education 
campaign about the shape infill and redevelopment projects can take should be carried out by 
the municipality.  A campaign that promotes recent projects can be used to demonstrate the 
design features that can be integrated into a building to ensure compatibility with existing 
development at the same time as promoting the community-wide benefits associated with 
intensification efforts.  Local infill developers such as Charlesfort and Domicile have been 
successful in creating attractive residential projects in the existing built-up area for decades 
and their projects can be used as excellent examples of highly designed buildings that fit in 
well with their environment. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Recent Infill and Redevelopment Projects in Ottawa 
 
 
Similarly, during the interview process, several developers joked about the fact that residents 
who once opposed their buildings are now living in them.  Rather than simply being an 
interesting antidote, these success stories should be shared with residents opposing similar 
projects in other communities.  Content residents living in communities that have had 
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successful infill or redevelopment projects carried out should be encouraged to attend 
meetings in support of similar initiatives elsewhere.  A large number of YIMBY (yes-in-my-
backyard) supporters would be an appropriate challenge for NIMBY opposition (Tregoning et 
al, 2002). 
 
5. Develop a long term strategic plan to guide future growth management decisions 
 
Ottawa’s Official Plan is focused on a 20-year time frame as required by provincial policy, a 
short time considering most planning approvals generally take several years.  Unlike historic 
planning efforts, the City has not considered growth beyond the legislative planning horizon.  
The implication is that Ottawa will continue to plan incrementally, thereby making boundary 
expansion and infrastructure investment decisions based on immediate short term needs rather 
than on a strategic vision for the future. 
 
A longer term outlook would recognize that Ottawa will continue to grow long after the 
horizon of the existing Official Plan policies.  A 50-year strategic plan would provide a long 
term vision, an indication of where the City is expected to grow, and where major 
infrastructure investments will take place in the more distant future.  A long term plan would 
maximize the benefits of development and minimize the costs of sprawl by more efficiently 
managing such things as transportation, water and sewage treatment and distribution, and 
parks and open space.  While the strategic plan would not have the benefit of planning act 
legislation, it would be imperative in establishing long range planning goals and give 
stakeholders confidence in shorter term planning decisions. 
 
This process could be driven by a re-invigorated National Capital Commission.  In a new role, 
the NCC would not only be responsible for beautify the City, but be given the opportunity to 
turn the national capital into a model of sustainable planning efforts for the country.  A top-
down planning approach is what the City of Ottawa and neighbouring municipalities clearly 
need to unify planning efforts. 
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6. Establish partnerships with municipalities outside of the City of Ottawa 
 
Responses to growth management techniques are typically observed at a regional level.  
Political fragmentation can undermine large land use planning efforts, as individual 
municipalities adopt their own land use regulations and growth targets.  In the absence of a 
large, regional approach to planning, neighbouring municipalities can implement growth 
management measures without considering the impact of such measurers on adjacent 
municipalities.  “Spillover” can occur between municipalities who have adopted controls to 
those who have not. 
 
The negative net migration trends experienced in Ottawa in the last several years and the 
higher growth rates experienced in surrounding planning jurisdictions demonstrate that this is 
a reality.  There has been no indication that the City has consulted with neighbouring 
municipalities in past growth management efforts.  To lessen the impact on adjacent 
communities, the municipality must recognize the impact Ottawa’s growth management 
strategy has on surrounding municipalities and partner with them to develop a comprehensive 
plan that covers a larger geographic area.    
 
The major challenge to preparing and implementing a regional plan would be in developing 
consensus amongst the various levels of government and planning authorities.  The idea of 
implementing recommendations through one approval board or a Federal District is 
unrealistic, as demonstrated in the failure of some earlier planning efforts.  Only a 
provincially-led process, like the Places to Grow effort, could realistically carryout a regional 
plan.  For the time being, Ottawa’s simple recognition of growth trends and planning visions 
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7. Create champions  
 
The infill, redevelopment, and intensification process is lengthy and requires consensus from 
developers, the public, and the local government to be completed efficiently.  Creating trust 
through partnerships can help fast-track this process and create champions for the cause.   
 
The findings of the research clearly demonstrate that there is very weak leadership in the City 
of Ottawa, including both the planning department and Council.  The City’s approach to the 
Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law is evidence of a weak attempt to implement the Official 
Plan’s motherhood principles for intensification.  Planners must advocate for higher densities 
and for the tools to make them happen if they truly believe that compact development is in the 
public’s best interest.  Developing education programs and demonstration projects is essential 
to support their arguments.  Staffs’ complaint that there are insufficient resources to support 
intensification efforts is unacceptable.  More creative solutions to NIMBY opposition and 
political resistance must be explored.  A leader in the City’s planning department must make 
this a priority.   
 
On the same note, if City Council truly desires a more compact urban form they must 
demonstrate their intentions through the allocation of monetary resources to the planning 
department at budget time.  Similarly, politicians, and in particular the mayor, must make the 
tough decisions to support controversial proposals that may not be supported by the public but 
are beneficial for the community at large.   Strong political leadership would best demonstrate 
the Council’s commitment to the development a compact urban form, giving confidence to 
both planning staff and the development industry.  
 
6.4 Conclusions  
 
The research findings were very much consistent with the literature review.  The City of 
Ottawa has adopted a growth management strategy that promotes compact development 
through infill and redevelopment of the existing built-up area and higher densities on 
greenfields.  The City has developed numerous policies and programs to encourage such 
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development, just as the literature review indicated is appropriate.  Still, intensification efforts 
are challenged by community and political resistance which has not be resolved through a 
collaborative process, by regulatory issues that have not been satisfied by land use controls, 
and by market constraints that have not been resolved by financial incentive and disincentive 
programs. 
 
As the City embarks on its mandatory 5-year Official Plan review, it has the opportunity to 
strengthen its growth management strategy to better support its vision for a compact urban 
form.  It is recommended that the City adopt realistic and achievable projections for growth 
and intensification; consider growth over the longer term with a more regional perspective; 
and, play a much stronger role in leading intensification efforts.  There is an opportunity for 
the City to create an improved strategy that will, like earlier plans, make Ottawa once again a 
proud leader in urban planning efforts in Canada. 
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This Chapter summarizes the research problem, the findings, and the recommendations that 
form this thesis.  It begins with a statement of the purpose of the study and provides a 
summary of the findings.  It also identifies areas for further research. 
 
7.2 Purpose of the Research 
 
The City of Ottawa will be embarking on its mandatory five-year Official Plan review in 
2008.  Policies in the current Official Plan support a compact urban form and programs have 
been developed to encourage the intensification of the built-up area, particularly for 
residential uses.  The City, however, has not, to date, achieved a significant amount of 
residential intensification.  The key question motivating this research was: How can the City 
of Ottawa’s growth management strategy be strengthened to better support residential 
intensification in order to achieve the compact urban form promoted in the Official Plan?   
 
 
7.3 Research Findings 
 
Ottawa has developed policies and programs to encourage intensification, implementing the 
very same initiatives that the literature review suggests is appropriate for achieving compact 
development.  The problem is that the City’s policies and programs are not robust enough to 
respond to the concerns, legitimate or otherwise, of the public.  Strong community opposition 
forces some “career politicians” to vote based on re-election strategies rather than upholding 
planning policies for the betterment of the city.  While motherhood principles are integrated 
into visioning documents and Official Plan policies, they are not strong enough to support 
development applications as they come to Council, even in instances where planning staff 
support the proposal.  Land use controls have not sufficiently addressed regulatory challenges.  
While time and monetary costs of controversial intensification projects could be offset by 
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financial incentive and disincentive programs, the Brownfields Strategy is the only one that 
appears to have significant support across the City.   
 
This thesis provided a number of recommendations for strengthening City of Ottawa’s 
policies and programs in an effort to bring its growth management strategy into the 21st 
century: 
 
• Set ambitious but achievable targets for intensification; 
• Recognize the importance of a diverse housing choice; 
• Create public awareness of the importance of a compact urban form; 
• Celebrate the success of recent infill and redevelopment projects; 
• Develop a long term strategic plan to guide future growth management 
decisions; 
• Establish partnerships with municipalities outside of the City of Ottawa; and, 
• Create champions. 
 
With a strengthened strategy that establishes achievable growth and intensification targets; 
encourages community support; considers growth over the longer term and with a regional 
perspective; and is advocated by strong leaders, the City of Ottawa can be confident in its 
short term planning decisions and move boldly into the future. 
 
7.4 Further Research 
 
The recommendations presented in this research highlight a number of areas that require 
further study.  Education and demonstration projects, clearer definitions for intensification 
and measurements for success, and stronger leadership were thought to be possible ways in 
which to better achieve intensification at the site level.  An opportunity exists to explore each 
of these options in depth, identifying opportunities and constraints for each, and applying 
findings to the Ottawa context. 
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The challenges to implementing compact development objectives are not unique to the City of 
Ottawa.  The provincial government of Ontario is playing a leading role in promoting a 
compact urban form and requires municipalities to do the same in their local planning efforts.  
Frustration was expressed about both the federal and provincial governments’ downloading of 
responsibilities to local municipalities and the elimination of important programs that could 
support intensification projects, namely funding for affordable housing and financial support 
for things like public education and demonstration projects, initiatives that had previously 
been carried out by the province.  Further study could focus on the role of higher-level 
governments’ should play in supporting municipal intensification efforts.   
 
7.5 Concluding Statements 
 
Growth management needs to be given high priority on Ottawa’s urban agenda.  Growth 
management is always a difficult subject that often takes lower priority than the immediate 
and pressing issues that call on the attention of Council.  But the City will be forced to face 
this issue as growth exhausts the supply of vacant urban land and investment decisions for 
transit and infrastructure demand certainty about the long term direction and character of 
growth. 
 
The complex demands of urban growth are not an “inconvenient truth” but an opportunity.  
Planning for growth presents an opportunity to renew the fundamental vision for Ottawa and 
to engage in a process that will take the City well into the 21st century.  It is important that the 
City engage in a fulsome debate and a comprehensive exploration of its future to address the 
issues of growth head on.  Ultimately, the updated growth management strategy will come 
down to the type of city the residents and civic leaders want to leave as their legacy to the 
next generation. 
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The following is the script that was generally followed during the key informant interviews.  
The interviews were carried out in a conversational way, with the interviewee generally 
leading the discussion.  In situations where the interviewee was intimately familiar with a City 
of Ottawa growth management policy or program, more detailed probing questions were 
asked. 
 
   
As you know, I am conducting this study as part of my Master’s degree in the School of 
Planning at the University of Waterloo under the supervision of Professor Trudi Bunting.  I 
would like to thank you for volunteering to participate in my research.  Your knowledge about 
the subject will no doubt offer valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing strategy.  
 
May I obtaining the following information prior to the formal interview commencing? 
• Company 
• Position 
• Number of Years Working in Planning Matters 
• Number of Years Working in Ottawa 
• How familiar are you with growth management and the City’s intensification 
policies and initiatives – play a role in the development of Official Plan policy?   
 
The City of Ottawa has worked hard to produce a comprehensive strategy to address growth 
concerns.  The policies presented in the Official Plan help city staff and Council balance 
competing priorities by providing strategic direction for day-to-day decision making.  The 
City of Ottawa Official Plan policies manage growth in two ways: directing new growth to 
land within the urban boundary; and encouraging compact, mixed-use development on 
greenfields and infill and redevelopment in existing built up areas.  Since the Official Plan has 
been introduced the City has undertaken a number of important initiatives to support the 
policies in the document.  It is these initiatives that I would like to talk about today.  
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The purpose of this study is two fold: to evaluate Ottawa’s growth management strategy in an 
effort to identify which initiatives are perceived to be successful and which could be 
improved; and to consider additional initiatives that may also help the City of Ottawa reach its 
social, economic, and environmental goals as presented in its 2004 Official Plan.   
 
I am confident that this research will help to identify opportunities to expand Ottawa’s 
existing programs and introduce new strategies that have been tested in other jurisdictions. 
 
Is the City of Ottawa’s vision correct? 
• Has the City of Ottawa effectively engaged stakeholders in the growth management 
process?  
• What has the current level of collaboration meant for the success of the growth 
management strategy? 
• Are residents and politicians ready to see more intense development occur in their 
neighbourhoods? 
• Is there market demand for the type of units that the City is encouraging?   
• Is there demand for infill and redevelopment projects in the target locations 
identified in the Official Plan? 
• Are Official Plan policies concerning unit and use mix being carried out on 
greenfield sites?   
• Should there be stricter policies concerning denser commercial and industrial 
development? 
• Are there sufficient opportunities for infill and redevelopment to substantially 
reduce the need for greenfield development? 
 
Are current initiatives working? 
• Is growth successfully being directed to target areas?   
• Are community design plans successively encouraging communication between the 
city, developers, and the public? 
• What has been the response to the City’s Brownfields Strategy? 
• What has been the response to the density incentive guidelines? 
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• Do the policies in the Draft Comprehensive Zoning By-law make it easier for infill 
and redevelopment to occur? 
• What is the impact of NIMBY?  What is the solution? 
• What is the impact of political resistance?  What is the solution? 
• What additional incentives or disincentives do you think would be appropriate to 
encourage a more dense urban form? 




• What do you think about the role of the Province? 
• The current plans for the City of Ottawa concern only the land that is within its 
municipal boundary.  Should long-range urban planning in Ottawa be done at a 
more regional level?  Would it be appropriate to establish a regional body consisting 
of elected officials from Ottawa, Gatineau, and surrounding municipalities to be 
responsible for long-range urban planning in the capital region? 
• Do you think a 20-year planning horizon is adequate time-frame for long-range 
planning efforts? 
• Do you mind if I contact you for additional comments during my research process? 
• I don’t have any other formal questions to ask but I wondered if you had any other 
comments that you would like to add about growth management in the City of 
Ottawa? 
 
Thank you so much for your time and insight.  It is expected that the findings of this study 
will benefit both the scientific community and society.  The results will be written up and 
submitted to journals, thereby expanding the literature on growth management in Canada and 
in a national capital.  The results will also be compiled and shared with City of Ottawa 
planning staff with the expectation that it will inform their growth management strategy 
review process which is just beginning. 
 
 
